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i 
SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA ISSUES 
RELATED TO POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE 
This dissertation constitutes a study of all issues rele-
vant to South West Africa/Namibian independence, from 1915 
to June 1983. The method employed is primarily of a descrip-
tive, histcirical and analytical nature, which brings together 
in a concise study a variety of primary research materials, 
particularly with extensive use of newspaper resources. Due 
to the limited available material on South West Africa/ 
Namibia, it was necessary to rely upon these journalistic 
sources to a large extent. 
It was, therefore, necessary to assume that: 
• 
1. newspaper references are correct and valid, and that 
articles by relevant authorities and political figures 
are a true expression of the writers' political beliefs; 
2. that in terms of books, journals and other published 
materials in relation to South West Africa/Namibia, the 
facts have been accurately researched and verified, and 
3. that personal conversations with relevant authorities 
are genuine as to the thoughts expressed. 
A number of hypotheses are put forward: 
1. that independence will come about as the result of a 
i i 
process of negotiation and not because of military vic-
tory or defeat~ 
2. that the South West Africa People's Organisation is 
bound to be part of any true settlement; 
3. that this organisation cannot claim to be the 'sole 
authentic representative' of the Territory's population, 
and 
,4. as a result of this, there is a definite need for the 
accommodation of other internal parties in a genuine 
settlement as well. 
i i i 
I declare that this dissertation is my own, 
unaided work. It is being submitted for 
the degree of Master of Arts at the Univer-
sity of Cape Town, Rondebosch. It has not 
been submitted before for any degree or 
examination in any other University. 
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PREFACE 
This dissertation is undertaken with the pur-
pose of placing South West Africa I Namibia in 
a recent perspective. The topics and material 
analysed in this dissertation have been dis-
cussed in an impartial manner, without pre-
verential treatment to any organisation or 
authority. Being a born South West Africa/ 
Namibian greatly contributed towards this end. 
I must express gratitude to David Welsh who 
made many valuable suggestions while super-
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INTRODUCTION 
As with all other dynamic social situations where people 
have to resort to force to attain their national indepen-
dence, the South West Africa/Namibian case requires care-
\ 
ful identification of the most salient features and themes 
intricately bound to this independence process. Having 
identified these features with regard to this particular 
study of SWA/Namibia, it is possible to construct an over-
all perspective, and to decide on the procedures to be 
adopted, 
SWA/Namibia can correctly be described as a country of 
startling contrasts. Geographically it is comprised of 
vast wastelands subjected to extreme climatic changes. It 
has a small population, numbering little more than one 
million people living together in isolated urban or rural 
areas, who uphold and support a variety of political ideas/ 
convictions and parties. They share a long history of 
colonial administration, and many of the population groups, 
at one stage or another; have sought an end to colonial 
domination. This search for self-government was, and still 
is, the strongest bond binding the peoples of SWA/Namibia. 
In addition to the presence of a foreign colonial adminis-
tration, the present situation in the territory is further 
complicated by the diversity of existing local political 
aspirations, and the fact that all eleven population groups 
are not united in a common struggle. 
Briefly then it would appear a number of study areas can be 
identified: 
(i) a geo-economic description of the country itself; 
(ii) 
(iii} 
to identify the main actors, political parties, 
gioups, and governments with real interests in the 
t 1rritory and its independence; 
and to evaluate the merits and demerits of their 
respective claims, principles and policies, in order 
to reach some tentative conclusions on the current 
state of affairs in SWA/Namibia, and what would 
thforetically appear to be the most desirable future 
state of affairs. 
The above:are the main themes of study covered in this 
dissertation. At first sight it is clear that this is too 
wide a scope to cover in any dissertation, without it being 
likely to suffer from superficiality and possible theo-
retical gaps. The dilemma involved in the analysis of 
political situations and issues as complex as those 
encountered in SWA/Namibia, often compels the analyst to 
adopt a micro or macro approach. On the micro-level the 
focus will be on the detailed examination of one or a few 
interrelated sets of central issues, while a macro-level 
approach aims at all the most salient issues into a broad 
perspective. 
The second approach has been opted for in this dissertation. 
As it is impossible to separate and rank in order of impor-
tance the areas of study the aim was to place the entire 
SWA/Namibia independence dispute in an historic analytical 
perspective, current until 1983. Methodologically this 
was a~hieved by: 
1. Extensive culling of contemporary newspapers from SWA/ 
Namibia, South Africa and some United States papers; 
2. Interviews with political and bureaucratic actors in 
SWA/Namibia; and through reviews of published 
secondary sources. 
It is regretable that limitations on length resulted in the 
unequal treatment of the five sections of this dissertation. 
Section 1.1, dealing with the economy of SWA/Namibia, is 
one of the areas of study covered in less detail. The 
intention of this sub-section was the presentation of a 
broad perspective of the economy of the territory. It was 
not aimed at suggesting possible alternatives to the 
existing economic structure which could facilitate the 
needs of an independent Namibia. It simply points out 
that the country has the potential to become economically 
independent, provided that cordial trading relations are 
maintained with South Africa. 
Sub-section 1.2 identifies the central actors and groups 
with vested interests in SWA/Namibia. This sub-section 
is of considerable importance as it identifies the two main 
camps involved in the ihdependence dispute, as well as 
setting out their respective versions of an independent 
future. (Many issues mentioned briefly in sub-section 1.2 
are discussed in more detail in Sections 2, 3 and 4.) 
The views and future policies of the South West People's 
I 
Organisation (S~APO), active under the banner of the United 
Nations and international community, is dealt with first. 
Attention is then paid to the South African Government's 
attitude towards SWA/Namibia, and to those indigenous 
parties which identify themselves with the government's 
views. 
1. SWAPO is aspiring for an independence settlement in 
I 
line with 'majoritarian democracy', based on the prin-
ciple of 'one-man one-vote'. 
I 
2. The South African government is seeking a 'peaceful' 
transition towards independence and the continuation of 
democratic competition through regular popular elec-
tions. 
In this dissertation it is argued that a simple 'majorita-
rian' settlement does not appear to be the most suitable 
way to uphold democratic practice in SWA/Namibia. The 
existence of a number of ethni minority groups, in the 
presence of one very large population group, the Ovambo, 
would appear to call for a different type of settlement. 
Some form of 'consociational' or 'participatory' democracy 
is suggested. 
There was no scope for a complete study of all the theo-
retical issues related to consociational democracy, but 
because it is claimed to be a technique of coping with con-
flict in'deeply divided societies such as SWA/Namibia, only 
the fundamental principles of this type of democracy have 
been pointed out. Nor was any attempt made to suggest an 
'ideal' form of government for the territory and its 
peoples. 
Furthermore, this dissertation does not include an evalua-
tion determining whether SWAPO's program has progressed 
from a one-party social democracy to democratic socialism. 
The term 'democracy' is interpreted as incorporating a set 
of fundamental human rights; freedom from the arbitrary 
use of force; and the rule of law. 
Sub-section 1.3, highlights SWA/Namibia's position in rela-
tion to the League of Nations and the United Nations Organi-
sation (UN). The discussion takes on the form of an 
historical analysis. This sub-section provides a useful 
perspective of the background against which local political 
and military resistance emerged from the 1940s. Mention 
is also made of what appears to be an inability on the part 
of the international community, and the UN in particula~, 
to compel the South African Government to grant SWA/Namibia 
national independence. 
Section 2, dealing with the military situation in SWA/Namibia 
in particular, and Angola and Southern Africa in general, 
sets out the consequence of South Africa's administrative 
and military presence in the territory. The section 
examines how this presence is perceived by the indigenous 
population groups, SWAPO, the intern~tional church community, 
and South Africa. The Cuban issue is discussed only in 
re~ation to SWA/Namibia, and not as an issue per se. As 
the Cuban issue poses an almost insurmountable obstacle in 
the way of SWA/Namibian independence, there appears to be 
no reason for discussing the issue at length. 
In the conclusion of Section 2, 
I 
South Africa's military 
and economic policies towards Southern Africa are put into 
broad perspective. Throughout Section 2, extensive 
reference has been made of the Government's objections to 
the 'dangers• inherent in the linkage between SWAPO and the 
African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. Although 
suggested as a possibility, the feasibility of an ANC insti-
gated insurgency war on the South African border has not 
been discussed. It must be remembered that geographical 
conditions prevalent on the South African border, such as 
harsh open terrain and sparse vegetation, are much less 
suitable for the conduct of insurgency war than those con-
ditions prevalent on the SWA/Namibia-Angola border where 
there is dense semi-tropical vegetation. 
Section 3 takes on the form of a detailed discussion of 
local political developments between 1970 and 1983. This 
obviously is a further essential part of the dissertation 
as it ascertains not only the importance of the indigenous 
political parties and actors, but also whether SWA/Namibia's 
peoples are ·politically mature enough to don the mantle of 
national iridependence. It is evident from this discussion 
that the major indigenous political groupings are bound to 
be part of any true independence settlement, and that such 
a settlement, in their eyes, is in fact long overdue. 
The party spectrum of SWA/Namibia ranges from the conserva-
tive far right, to parties with socialist principles and 
policies. Only the larger more important parties have 
been isolated for discussion in Section 3. Amongst these, 
priority has been given to those parties which opted to 
function 'within' the structure of the existing political 
dispensation, if only through voicing consistent criticism. 
This approach is relatively plausible as only SWAPO is 
actively involved in the armed struggle. Parties such as 
SWANU, SWAPO-D and the NIP keep a lower political profile 
without compromising their beliefs. 
Section 4 is devoted to the evaluation of SWAPO's claims 
in the independence dispute. The organisation's history, 
ideological motivations, popular support, and unity are 
discussed. The issue of SWAPO's popular support is of the 
utmost importance and is considered at length. 
Informed observers are united in the view, and as this 
dissertation asserts, that SWAPO's massive support from the 
Ovambo-speaking group is sufficient to assure the organisa-
tion of an electoral victory in a 'free and fair' election 
held within the territory. However, considerable uncer-
tainty exists as to SWAPO's wider national support from 
the other ten ethnic groups. 
To ascertain $WAPO's non-Ovambo support certainly would 
require empirical research, and endeavour not undertaken 
in this dissertation. Speculatively, though, it is 
possible that percentage wise SWAPO could be as strongly 
represented in the other population groups. 
l 
For the 
purpose of this dissertation it is assumed that SWAPO's 
support from the Ovambo is already almost certain to result 
in an election victory, and that further support from the 
i 
other popualtion groups would only assure such a victory. 
Despite SWAPO's massive Ovambo.support, it is ~rgued that 
some form of representative dispensation should be intro-
duced to accommodate the other minority groups. It is 
unfortunate that ·only a 'free and fair' election or 
empirical research can reveal the extent of SWAPO's wider 
national support, and therefore, determine the viability for 
a 'consociational' or 'participatory' political structure 
for the territory. 
In conclusion Section 5 brings together the most salient 
points to have emerged in the dissertation, of which the 
most important are: 
1. The unlikely possibility of a military victory for 
either the South African Defence Forces or SWAPO; 
2. The need for indigenous political participation in any 
true independence settlement; 
3. The crucial factor of SWAPO participation in such a 
settlement; and 







THE ECONOMY OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA 
GEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION 
South West Africa/Namibia (SWA/Namibia) is a vast territory in 
the south-western part of the continent of Africa, stretching 
along the South Atlantic coast, .covering an area of 824,295 square 
kilometers. It shares a l 600 km border in the north with 
Angola, in the east it is bordered by Botswana, in the south and 
south-east by the Cape Province of the Republic of South Africa (l), 
while the Capri vi Strip, a 64 km wide corridor stretching into 
the border area between Zambia and Botswana, is also part of 
h 
. ( 2) 
t e Territory. There is little doubt amongst those know-
ledgeable about SWA/Namibia, that it is a country of extremes, 
a fact which seriously harrpers its economic development. Twenty 
percent of its area is desert, while only 32% is suitable for 
d l d 
. (3) 
ry- an cropping. 
MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ECONOMY 
The economy of SWA/Namibia nas been described as a plural or 
dual economy, consisting of a predominantly modern European 
exchange sector and a traditional subsistence African sector. 
The exchange sector is represented by large mining companies 
controlled by South Africa and other foreign interests, a 
fishing industry, commercial communities in 
the larger business centres and many large, individually-owned, 
farms. <4 ) The traditional subsistence sector,. owing to the 
3 
dry nature of the climate with prolonged droughts, is largely 
comprised of non-profit orientated crop cultivation by African 
subsistence farmers. 
The Territory is rich in natural resources: diamonds, found 
mainly in the coastal desert and coastal waters; copper, lead, 
zinc, vanadium and uranium; its rich off-shore fisheries; an 
extensive beef industry and its karakul industry.<~) The majority 
of these enterprises are white-owned, and in the case of minerals, 
dominated by large South African or international companies. 
SWA/Namibia is ranked as one of the world's largest producers 
of diamonds, and in recent years, 1976-1983, there has been 
extensive exploration for uranium, while the prospecting for oil 
h . b . . f. d ( 6 ) as een 1ntens1 1e . 
MINERALS 
' I 
W.H. Thomas correctly pointed out that mining is the most impor-
tant resource ba~e for development in the Territory. In the 
past, mining activities were entirely dominated by two mines, 
viz. the copper mine at Tsumeb, and the diamond mine around 
Oranjemund. They produced about 90% of the value of all minerals 
extracted in SWA/Namibia, and contributed approximately 27% t~ 
35% of the total Gross Domestic Product during the 1960s, even 
though their share in overall employment was only about 4% in 
19 7~ . ( 7 ) There is some controversy about the role played by 
these mining enterprises in the development of the Territory and 
its peoples. 
4 
Consolidated Diamond Mines Limited (CDM), the De Beers con-
trolled diamond mine in the south of SWA/Namibia, to discuss 
but one of the more prominent examples, has made an important 
contribution to the economic progress of the country. Through 
the revenue and foreign exchange accruing to the government from 
its operation, and through its investment in the training and 
advancement of its employees, CDM could be considered as the 
single
1 
most significant private sector contributor to the 
development of this emerging state. In 1980, CDM contributed 
17% towards the profit of its parent company, De Beers, though 
in doing so, it provided SWA/Namibia with approximately 40% of 
the public revenue generated in the country. ( 9 ) Furthermore, 
company and other taxes(g) effectively absorbed more than 60% 
of CDM's profits in 1980, in addition to personal income-tax on 
salaries and wages paid to employees, (R44 million in salaries 
and wages in 1980). CDM and associated companies spent R27 
million on prospecting during 1981, while prospecting expenditure 
over the period 1979-1981 amounted to RSl million. 
CDM is also the biggest employer of labour in the private sector, 
with 6,800 employees at the mine at any given time. Taking their 
dependents into account, a substantial number of SWA/Namibians 
rely wholly or partly on work provided by CDM for a cash income. 
Each year the company ploughs back a proportion of its profits 
into the CDM Chairman's Fund, which initiates and supports 
numerous projects of social,· economic, cultural and educational 
. . th T . (lO) importance in e erritory. At first sight it would appear 
that CDM is not randomly exploiting the resources of the country 
without any form of return some of the activities undertaken 
5 
would be necessary in an independent future. CDM's policy, as 
expressed by Sir Harry Oppenheimer, is to remain unchanged when 
independence comes to SWA/Namibia. (ll) 
In addition to copper and diamond mining, uranium extraction 
has gained prominence since 1976. Rio Tinto of South Africa is 
developing what is expected to become one of the world's largest 
uranium operations. Reserves in the uranium mine at Rossing, 
near Swakopmund, are estimated to be 100,000 tons. Figures on 
the earnings of uranium are kept secret, but Thomas believed that 
gross tax revenue from this source could amount to about RlOO 
million in the early 1980s. (l 2 ) 
FARMING 
Commercial farming is almost entirely restricted to the export 
of cattle and the production of Karakul pelts (persian lamb) 
h . h . . d t . l b h" f (l 3 ) w ic is carrie ou main y y w ite armers. Farming con-
tributed approximately 20% to SWA/Namibia's Gross Domestic Pro-
duct in the 1970s. Commercial agriculture and stock-raising 
are totally controlled by whites, with the majority of Africans 
employed as sheperds and farm labourers. Over 90% of the value 
( 14) 
of agricultural output is livestock or livestock products. 
In contrast to mining and fisheries, most farms belong to 
farmers residing within the. Territory. This is true for most of 
the 6,324 farms held by some 5,000 whites, the majority of whom 
are Afrikaans and German-speaking. 
Despite the high expectations placed on the farming industry by 
6 
outside organisations such as the United Nations, a rather 
different situation exists in reality. Prolonged droughts, 
deficient marketing systems, general maladministration and in-
surgency warfare, since the early seventies, combined to signi-
ficantly reduce the productivity of the northern farming region. 
The central and southern regions are similarly hard hit by the 
drought conditions. Indebtness of the farming community, 
(16) 
amounting to Rl57,7 million in 1982 , 1was to the poor pros-
pects for the period 1983/84. A survey on Proposals for the 
Restoration of Farming in South West Africa, conducted by J.E. 
Harrison Farm Consultants, in association with the Institute of 
Agricultural Economics of the University of Stellenbosch,. tabled 
in 1982, present some revealing figures on the well-being of the 
farming community from 1970 to 1981/82. This is reproduced as 
Appendix III at the end of this section. Its most important 
findingwas that the severity of the drought conditions experienced 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s was not worse than on previous 
occasions. This is supported by the figures in Appendix III, 
which, in a number of cases. reflects a steady increase i.n 
productivity over the past decade, 1970-80. 
The production of Karakul pelts, however, reflects a gradual 
decline since 1979. SWA/Namibia is one of the world's largest 
suppliers of this luxury commodity, exports going to the Federal 
. (17) 
Republic of Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom. 
However, as Thomas correctly pointed out, the supply and price 
of Karakul is subject to fluctuation. Due to changing fashion 
trends, ineffective marketing and droughts, the price of Karakul 
pelts deteriorated markedly between 1979 and 1981. 
7 
FISHERIES 
More important than agriculture, as far as exports are concerned) 
but less stable and less employment inten?ive, is the ~erritory's 
I , 
fishing industry. (l 8 ) Commercial fishing is an important part 
of the industry and is dominated by eight South African companies 
and their affiliates. Most of the produce is canned for export. 
However, there has been a serious decline in both inshore and deep 
water catches, and profitability, primarily caused by ruthless over-
fishing. The result was that by 1981/82, the fishing industry 
was near to collapse. This, it was suggested, resulted from 
South Africa's purchase of larger and more efficient trawlers, 
as well as over-fishing by foreign countries, such as Russia, 
~pain and other members of the International Commission of South 
East Atlantic Fisheries founded after South Africa's expul-
. f th U . d N . F d d . l l . . (l9 ) s1on rom e n1te at1ons oo an Agr1cu tura Organ1sat1on. 
For the following examples, figures and conclusions, I am heavily 
indebted to Eric Lang's public addresses delivered in Windhoek 
during M~y 1982 and May 1983. Mr Lang, a local businessman and 
millionaire, who made a thorough, but unpublished study of the 
SWA/Namibia economy, made several revealing statements never 
made in public before. (He challenged individuals and authori-
ties to prove any of his findings incorrect.) 
Lang had not been part of any political group in the country, 
nor had he taken part in any party-political organisation. As 
a result of what he called "this fortunate state of affairs" he 
was able to venture into the minefield., researching some "darker" 
regions of the economy.(20) Laeg, like Thomas(21), comments on 
8 
the fact that so many statistics relevant to an understanding of 
the SWA/Namibian economy is "officially" inaccessible. He said 
that he had come to the conclusion that these figures are with-
held from local government in order to "eliminate any chanc-e of 
. ( 2 2 ) 
interfering with the South African overall strategy". 
Regarding the political situation, he felt strongly that South 
Africa, as the architect of the present constitutional dispensa-
tion, and as the dominant factor in the economic and political 
spheres, is largely to be blamed for the Territory's economic and 
political crisis. Referring to the controversial Proclamation 
No.AG.8 (1980), providing for an ethnic dispensation and eleven 
local governments which will be extensively discussed in the 
section dealing with Local Politics Lang described these as 
an 
" ... enormously complicated, bloated, inefficient 
and hideously expensive government system, devoid 
of all sanity, that has institutionalised tribalism 
and effectively led to the semi-paralysis of the 
political and economic development of the Territory." (23) 
In his opinion, South Africa imposes an economic and political 
infrastructure on the country primarily to serve South African 
and not SWA/Namibian interests. 
"In fact I am prepared to go so far as to call 
South West Africa's economy a slave economy, 
an economic buffer, a pantry of the South African 
economy from whicb it smooths out the ups and downs 
in its own economic cycle." 
(i) From 1920 to 1969 the Territory was treated as a colony, 
and all development was narrowly focussed and minimal, 
9 
compared to the wealth created for South Africa and foreign 
shareholders. 
{ii) Between 1969 and 1976 the country was, for all intents and 
purposes, integrated as a fifth province of the Republic 
of South Africa. During this period South Africa "pre-
tended" to locally invest R200 million, but "this was all 
South Africa ever contributed between 1915 and 1976". <24 > 
Lang drew attention to the growing indebtness of SWA/Namibia to 
South Africa. From 1979, when the total external government 
debt was R28 million, to a debt of R70, 7 million in 1980, to 
R80 million in 1981, to an estimated R600 million in 1982, and a 
staggering projected Rl 000 million for 1984/85. <25 > However, 
for those who persist in calling SWA/Namibia a poor country 
dependent on its rich neighbour, South Africa, one can draw atten-
tion to the following statistics. In 1981 ·swA/Namibia produced: 
l. 25% of the copper producti9n of South Africa; 
2 . 35% of the zinc production of South Africa; 
3. 65% of the silver production of South Africa; 
4. 70% of the tin production of South Africa; 
5. 93% of the lead production of South Africa, and 
6. 70% of the value of diamonds of South Africa. 
{26) 
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: Independence and Beyond 
A booklet entitled 'Transforming A Wasted Land', by Richard 
Moorsom and published by the Catholic Institute for International 
Relations, made the following relevant statements. Any attempt 
to predict economic and social trends in SWA/Namibia's agricul-
10 
tural sector, or to discuss rural development strategy, is faced 
with a number of special difficulties. Firstly, the likely situ-
ation at independence is far from clear as an agreement on inde-
pendence is not yet in sight, nor is there any hard evidence that 
South Africa had any target-date planned. Independence, there-
fore had a time horizon aE any time between 1983 and some point in the 
indefinite future. 
Secbndly, the terms of independence, whenever granted, definitely 
will influence the short and long-term aftermath, as the Terri-
tory's social, economic and administrative structures are so 
closely integrated with those of the Republic of South Africa, 
that a thorough-going disengagement is. bound to be a radical 
process. Thirdly, the resources on which an incoming Namibian 
government will be able to rely in organising and carrying 
through its development programme, would largely depend upon the 
amount of international support that it can gather. A fourth 
aspect that will limit available resources,will be the real pros-, 
pects 'for a SWAPO government in a genuinely independent Namibia, 
especially because of the organisation's commitment to socialism. 
Any transition towards socialism would be an arduous process 
requiring a great deal of caution as it proceeds. 
Mr E. Cross, General Manager of the Zimbabwean Dairy Marketing 
Board, supports these views. When he presented the Rossing 
Foundation Quarterly Lecture in Windhoek in November 1982, Mr, 
Cross emphasised that businessmen in SWA/Namibia should prepare 
themselves for a SWAPO government. He outlined a number of diffi-
culties businessmen in Namibia would be faced with under a SWAPO 
government: 
1 1 
1. Overcoming the strains in society, particularly overcoming 
the tensions between social and economic classes; 
2. The new political leadership would lack essential adminis-
trative skills crucial for the smooth operation of a modern 
state; 
3. The high living standards of the minority would heighten the 
sense of conflict in a free society; 
4. The entrenchment of military groups with strong political 
influence and power; 
5. The outflow of administrative and technological skills once 
the process of independence had been concluded; 
6. The heavy dependence on a small number of economic activities, 
closely linked to and dependent upon South African transport 
and markets. ( 2 7 ) 
Finally, however, independent or not, SWA/Namibia, as result of 
existing linkages and structures, is going to remain thoroughly 
reliant on South Africa for years to come. <2 B> Yet, one impor-
tant point that has emerged throughout the preceding first part 
of section one, is the desirability for much greater local involve-
ment in the administration and control of the economy, as this can 
only benefit the entire country. As Thomas sums up: 
"In South West Africa the process of sharing the 
existing ecoqomic wealth is currently more crucial 
than the creation of such weal th. Vested interests 
from foreign countries, from the Republic of South 
Africa and from the existing elite are indeed aware 
of such wealth, and have successfully exploited it 
so far. Impediments like droughts, the long dis-
tances, low labour productivity, etc. have not really 
prevented such profitable investments. The 
challenge now is to widen the resource base and in-
corporate all groups of the small population into 
12 
the modern economy. If this can be achieved in 
a way that also guarantees political stability, 
the country may~ the long run also attract sig-
nificant numbers of skilled and enterprising immi-
grants (irrespective of their racial background), 
who may fill South West Africa's most important 
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LEGEND OF SYMBOLS 
VERKLARING VAN SIMBOL£ 
24° (alphabetical by symbols) 
(alfabelies YDlgens simbole) 
Silver Ag Silwer 
Gold Au Coud 
Berryllium Be 8erillium 
Bismuth Bi Bismut 
Caesium Cs Sesium 
Copper Cu Koper 
Diamonds Oa Diamante 
Iron Fe Yster 
Fluor-spar fl Vloei:;paal 
· Germanium Ge Germanium 
Graphite Cr Grafiet 
Gypsum Cy CiDS 
tcyanite Ky Kianiet 
lithium Li Litium 
Manganese !,In Mangun 
Sall Na Sout 
Niobium Nb Niobium 
lead Pb Lood 
Tin Sn Tin 
Soda. trona So Soda trona 
Tantalum T~ hntaal 
Titanium Ti Titaan 
Vanadium v Vanadium 
Wolfram w WoUram 
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GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION GEOGRAFIESE LIGGING 
1 Tsumeb mine myn 
2 Abenab mine myn 
3 friesenberr Alt Bobos Karavotu Uris 
4 Harasib Uitsab 
5 Berg Aukas mine myn 
6 B&ltika 
7 l(ombat mine myn Guchab 
8 Rietfont,in prospect mynboumoontlikheid 
9 Harasib Pb-Zn prospect mynboumoonllikheid 
10 Okorosu 
11 Eisenberg 
12 Ondundu mine rnyn 
13 Coantagab 
14 Copper valley 
15 Kopermvn 
• 16 On1aba Owibende 
17 Otjosondu mine myn 
Trirsurvey, 1963. 
Oriehoeksmetin.2. 19o3. 
18 Onganja COtjuanjali) mine myn 
19 Kyanile kop 
20 Oamites 
21 MatcMus mine myn 
22 Helikon Rubicon Aurora 
23 Orion < Oonkerhoeli;) 
24 Kainkagchas 
25 Khan mine myn 
26 Kranz~ri mine myn 
27 Ciftkuppe 
28 Onguati 
29 Namib le.admine loodmyn 
30 Uis tinmine tinmyn 




35 Klein Aub 
36 ~obos Noois Dymoeb etc. ens. 
37 Kobos 
38 Natas , 
39 Gorob mfne myn .:..~ 





45 T iintalite valley f(inderzitt 
46 Haib river mine niyn Kromrivier.mine myn 
47 Grabwasser 
48 Aiais 
49 Loreley mine myn 
50 Consolidated Diamond Mines· Main workint aru 
Vernaamste delfa:eblt'd 




SWA/NAMIBIA MEAT BOARD ANNUAL REPORT 
Marketing of Livestock in SWA /Namibia 
Cattle Slaughtered Live Animals Total in SWA/Namibia Exported/ SA 
Year Pere. No. .i. . Pere. No. No. 
1970 25,5 106 514 74,5 312 383 418 897 
1971 2 7, 3 140 528 72, 7 3 73 361 513 889 
1972 26,4 155 834 73,6 433 910 589 744 
1973 36,8 184 456 63,2 316 663 501 119 
1974 23,6 64 298 76,4 208 245 272 543 
1975 23, 7 78 256 76,3 249 792 328 048 
1976 33,4 130 769 66,6 260 869 391 538 
1977 43,0 150 523 57, 0 199 75 7 350 280 
1978 39,9 158 883 60,l 239 994 398 877 
1979 46,0 194 323 54,0 228 85 7 423 180 
1980 49,0 226 735 51,0 236 435 463 1 70 
1981 30,2 142 733 69,8 330 642 4 73 3 75 
Small Stock 
1970 36,8 1-4 9 283 63,2 256 951 406 2 3.4 
. 1971 36,8 156 616 63,2 267 023 423 639 
1972 33,6 109 779 - 66,4 219 508 329 287 
1973 34,6 89 566 65,4 167 002 256 568 
1974 31,l 98 335 68,9 217 363 315 698 
1975 23,8 98 231 76,2 314 335 412 566 
1976 25,3 98 722 74,7 290 948 389 370 
1977 26,9 · 101 425 73,1 275 951 377 376 
1978 31,7 117 267 68,3 253 160 370 427 
1979 32,9 121 450 6 7, l 248 081 369 531 
1980 39,2 131 670 60,8 204 050 335 720 
1981 22,4 167 553 77,6 583 182 750 735 
Source: 1981 SWA/Namibia Meat Board Annual Report 
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Appendix III continued 
Gross Domestic Product 
R, million 
1976 119,6 







Gross Output from Farming 
Contribution by Agriculture 








Year Karakul Sheep+ Beef Wool Other 
'I' 
Total 
Pelts R, · million 
1976 50,2 86,3 2,6 13,3 152,4 
1977 36,2 78,6 2,9 14,9 132,6 
1978 34,3 79,3 3, 2 16,1 132,9 
1979 46,7 82,7 2,3 1 7 I l 148,8 
1980 42,8 107,8 2,8 30,6 184,0 
1981 20,1 130,5 2,5 35,2 188,3 
++ 
+ Source: SWA/Namibia Statistical and Economic Review, 1982. 
++ Source: Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing, 
Pretoria. 
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DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: 
A SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA CASE STUDY 
INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding part of Section 1, I have briefly dealt with 
South West Africa/Namibia's geography, .natural resources and 
industrial and agricultural sectors, but refrained from dealing 
with the Territory's population. This I have done with a specific 
purpose in mind, one which is neither easily arguable nor defen-
sible. Despite these difficulties, which will become more 
apparent as the discussion progresses, I will argue for SWA/ 
Namibia being a plural society and the need for a political solu-
tion that gives recognition to this fact. This, I believe, is 
contrary to the popular belief in a 'majoritarian' settlement for 
the Territory. 
The statistical table (overleaf), based on its multiplicity of 
_ population groups, suggests that SWA I Namibia is a plural society. 
Taking pluralism to mean what Kuper, Smith and others believe it 
to denote, the plurality of the SWA/Namibia society becomes even 
more evident. Kuper defines plural societies as 
" ... societies characterised by certain conditions 
of cultural diversity and social cleavage ... , 
arising (rom the contact of different peoples and 
cultures. within a single society 11 , 
while Smith's definition reads:. 
" ... pluralism is a condition in which members of 
a common society are internally distinguished by 
fundamental differences in their institutional 
practice 11 • ( 4) 
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Population Composition and Statistics: 1960-1981/82 
1960 (1) 1970 ( 2) 1981/82 ( 3) 
Population Group Total Pere. To tat Pere. Total Pere. 
Ovambo 239 363 45,5 352 640 46,3 516 600 51,l 
White 73 464 14,0 90 583 11,9 75 600 7,4 
Damara 44 353 8,4 66 291 8,7 76 800 7,6 
Herero 35 354 6,7 50 589 6,6 77 600 7,6 
Kavango 27 871 5,3 49 512 6,5 98 000 9,7 
Nama 34 806 6,6 j32 935 4,3 49 700 4,9 
Coloured 12 708 2,4 28 512 3,7 43 500 5,3 
Caprivian 15 840 3,0 25 580 3,3 39 500 3,9 
SAN 11 762 ·.2,2 22 830 3,0 - -
Rehoboth 
Baster 11 257 2,1 16 649 2,2 25 800 2,5 
Kaokolander 9 223 1,7 .6 567 0,9 - -
.Tswana 9 992 1,7 4 407 0,6 6 800 0,67 
Others - - 15 089 2,0 - -
TOTAL 526 004 100 762 184 100 1 009 900 99,67 
Both definitions by Kuper and Smith hold true with respect to the 
SWA/Namibian society, which exemplifies cultural diversity on a 
significant scale, social cleavages and institutional differen-
tiation between the indigenous groups. (Even when defined in 
cruder terms such as the existence of a black/white, traditional/ 
modern division.) 
D. McK. Irvine, in his paper 'Plu~al Societies and Constitutions', 
includes, among other qualities denoting pluralism: 
1. cultural diversity; 
2. ethnic or racial particularism; 
3. disparities in power; 
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4. socio-economic differentials, and 
5 t . f 1 . d . . (S} . percep ions o re ative eprivation. 
All of these, in one way or another, are applicable to the SWA/ 
Namibian situation. Furnivall's definition refers to groups 
that: 
II mix but do not combine, which upholds their 
own religion, culture, language, ideas and ways, 
and live side by side but refrain from inter-
j mingling into one political unit", ( 6) 
' 
could be applied to SWA/Namibia, provided that one important 
qualification, which is equally relevant to the other definitions, 
is added. It can be said that South Africa's early colonial rule, 
and its policy of separate development since the early 1960s, not 
only perpetuated the German colonial policy, of enforced separa-
tion of the indigenous groups, but actually entrenched the exis-
tence and further development of the multi-ethnic pluralism of 
SWA /Namibia. Equally undeniable, however, is the fact that 
separate indigenous societies had existed in the Territory even 
before German colonialism came in the eighteenth century. Herera, 
Nama, Damara and Owambo were separate polities and were subjugated 
( 7 ) separately. 
Critics of this viewpoint would argue that a natural process of 
unification or amalgamation would have taken place in the absence 
of the repressive colonial regimes. This argument, however, is 
not as persuasive as its advocates would like to believe. 
Numerous historical examples of nations and ethnic groups on 
both the European and African continents suggest that such a pro-
cess of 'natural amalgamation' is by no means inevitable. Despite 
centuries of development they have remained as diversified as before. 
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Besides, unification into one South West African nation did not 
start off before German arrival, and after a long period of 
enforced division, it is even less likely to begin in the 1980s. 
Nevertheless, the important fact is the indisputable plural nature 
. of the SWA/Namibian society in the 1980s. 
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION: A MAJORITARIAN 
APPROACH 
Political organisation in and around SWA/Namibia, from the 1950s, 
focused upon two main directives envisaged for an independent 
future. The entrenched Status Quo structure, backed by South 
Africa, has gradually come under increasing pressure from a 
national liberation movement opposed to a South African imposed 
settlement. (For convenience and clarity, the South African 
initiative is discussed and incorporated in a later part of this 
section. ) 
It must be i remembered that violent, military-based, rebellions 
' 
against German occupation had already taken place in the late 
nineteenth century( 8 ), and that semi-organised non-violent poli-
tical opposition to South Africa's colonial occupation of the 
Territory started in the 1940s and 1950s. Traditional leaders 
such as Herera Chief, Hosea Kutako, and Nama Chief, David Witbooi, 
repeatedly submitted petitions to the United Nations for South 
West African independence which gave the anti-colonial movement 
its initial impetus. Kutako and other leading Herero formed a 
Council of Chiefs to watch, publicise and protest each new act 
by the South African administration. ( 9 ) 
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During the early 1950s South West African contract workers in 
Cape Town came into contact with the African National Congress 
and other parties opposed to white rule, and came to realise the 
need for a similar representative organisation. The Ovamboland 
People's Organisation (OPO) was subsequently founded on 15 April 
1959. (lO) The OPO, initially sought to protect Ovambo workers' 
interests only, was 
Organisation (SWAPO) 
renamed the South West Africa -People's 
only on 19 ~prii 1969(ll), in order to be 
broadly nationally representative. Despite increased numbers of 
deputations and petitions to the United Nations (by 1960 120 
petitions annually reached the United Nations), (l 2 ) SWAPO, at a 
national congress in Windhoek in 1961, realised the futility of 
peaceful resistance and started its preparation for a military 
struggle. On 18 July 1966, from its Headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam 
SWAPO officiall¥ declared its intended military campaign against 
South African occupation of SWA/Namibia. 
On 12 December 1973, the United Nations General Assembly, through 
Resolution 3111 (XXVIII), recognised the national liberation move-
ment, the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), as 
the sole authentic reptesentative of ·the Territory and its peoples 
and declared its support of the 
h . l . ( 13 ). strengt en nationa unity. 
mid-1950s?to the early 1980s the 
h- - 76 7 movement in its efforts to l=-v' 
On numerous occasions, from the 
United Nations Security Council 
has reaffirmed the legitim~cy of the indigenous peoples' struggle 
against South African presence, undertaking to supply moral and 
material support for the struggle. It further called upon the 
South African Government to fully cooperate in a peaceful .transfer 
of power in Namibia Resolution 323 (i972) - to an independent 
government. 
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Security Council Resolution 385 (1976) condemned all South African 
attempts calculated to deny free and fair elections under United 
Nations supervision, which would enable the Territory's people to 
d . h . f (14) etermine t eir own uture. Resolution 385 (1976) called 
for free elections for the entire country as one political enti~y 
to 'enable the people to freely and fairly determine their own 
future', by electing representatives to a 'Namibian Constituent 
Assembly', to draw up and adopt the Cons ti tut ion for an indepen-
d d . N .b. (15) ent an sovereign ami 1a. This was reaffirmed by Security 
Council Resolution 435 (1978) 
SWAPO envisaged that, in the immediate aftermath of independence, 
the new peoples' government would be faced by·a formidable task 
of national reconstruction and social transformation. For SWAPO, 
political independence would mark the threshhold of a new phase of 
struggle whose objective would be nothing less than the complete 
elimination of all forms of imperialist domination and the 'trans-
formation of capitalist exploitation into a genuine socialist 
democracy there are, it argues, only two paths for an indepen-
dent nation: to return to imperialist domination (neo-colonialism, 
capitalism, state capitalism) or to take the path of socialism. (lG) 
Tasks anticipated by SWAPO prior to independence· include:· 
" ... the liberation and winning of independence for 
the people of Namibia, by .all possible means, and 
to establish a democratic peoples' government". (17) 
This will imply the: 
" ... unification of all Namibian people, particu-
larly the working class, the peasantry and progres-
sive intellectuals into a vanguard party capable 
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of safeguarding national independence and of 
building a classless, non-exploitative society 
based on the principles of scientific socialism", (18) 
" ... the economic reconstruction in a free, 
democratic and united Namibia will have, as its 
motive force, th~ establishment of a classless 
society." (19) 
From these quotations it is clear thirt SWAPO stands for the up-
holding of certain democratic principles, in its desire for a 
'democratic peoplei• government', yet, this government in its 
ideal form, would be underlined and strongly based upon the 
'principles of scientific socialism'. In short, the organisa-
tion would want to establish a "SOCIAL DEMOCRACY" in an indepen-
dent Namibia. (Note, these terms are not explicitly used by the 
organisation. ) 
It so happens that democracy has never been identified with one 
specific ideological doctrine it rather has come to be a 
universally honorific term. Richard Wollheim saw social demo-
crats as;. 
11 
••• indifferent to cons ti tut ion al and political 
organisation, but at the same time wanted to secure 
the full prestige of this concept (democracy) for 
their own preferences in what they considered to be 
the truly important field that of economic 
organisation 11 • ( 20) 
'Social Democracy' is generally conceived as a state and style 
of the society, and may thus be defined as an ethos and way of 
1 . . d 1 1 1 . d . ff (2l) 1fe - characterise by a genera evel 1ng of status 1 erences -
which, in practice, is envisaged as a government exercised in the 
name, and in the interests of an overwhelming majority of the 
population, the working class. <22 ) By implication this would 
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mean a black "peasant" class government for South West Africa/ 
Namibia. 
These basic SWAPO ideals are not only condoned and supported by 
the International Community, the United Nations in particular, 
repeatedly pledged full commitment to do whatever possible to 
enact them through 'free and fair elections'. Moreover, it is 
possible to list in point form a number of reasons for this 
I 
unswerving support for SWAPO and its cause: 
1. As pointed out before, as early as the 1940s and 1950s, 
deputations and petitions to the .United Nations depicted 
South Africa as the enemy and oppressor of the indigenous 
peoples of South West Africa. This view of South Africa 
remained unaltered right into the 1980s. 
2. In recent years, especially since the 1970s, a call had gone 
up for the holding of 'free and fair elections' under United 
Nations supervision. South. Africa's refusal to cooperate 
in holdin~ such elections, along with other attempts at 
working out a future for the Territory, did not help to 
create a more favourable international· position for South 
Africa as far as SWA/Namibia was concerned. 
3. SWAPO's special representative with observer status at the 
United Nations enabled the organisation firmly to entrench 
its claim to wide national support, as well as allowing it 
to campaign for the 'honouring of the will of the majority', 
. h h U . d N . . d l . ( 23 ) I 1.e~ t roug n1te at1ons supervise e ect1ons. n 
addition to being provided with a platform to state its 
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policies, SWAPO also received extensive financial support 
to uphold its struggle. 
On the other hand, there are other practical considerations that 
place the SWAPO and international claims in a less favour-
able light. In this concluding part of the first section, these 
practical, and very real, considerations will be discussed. 
This is done, however, not to deliberately discredit SWAPO in any 
! 
way whabsoever, but to suggest and advance one possible alter-
native solution to the Territorial question, other than outright 
"majority rule" as demanded by SWAPO. (Attention must be drawn 
to the fact that points only briefly mentioned in this section 
will be dealt with in detail in the relevant subsequent sections.) 
A suitable issue to begin with, one surrounded by much contra-
versy, claims and counter-claims, is the extent and source of 
SWAPO's national support. The International Community and 
'informed observers' often claim the organisation to be broadly 
nationally based, with support coming from a number of indigenous 
groups, and not only from the Ovambo-speaking group, as oppo-
nents of SWAPO assert. The Ovambo .are the organisation's major 
source of support, since, as indicated by the tabulated statistics, 
by 1981/82, it comprised 51,1% of the total population which 
in itself constituted sufficient back-up for SWAPO's demand for 
"majority rule" provided that it received this group's un-
divided support. 
Nevertheless, granting SWAPO the benefit of the doubt in allowing 
for some support emanating from the other ten groups as well, it 
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would appear as if the organisation's claim that it enjoys 
majority support would be further strengthened and justified. 
In the final analysis this might very well be the case, although, 
SWAPO's support amongst these groups could not be total. It 
could hardly be the case, as in 1981/82, there existed more than 
40 listed internal parties, (a number of which existed on paper 
only), each with its own constitution, political leaders and 
aspirations. 
In the event of 'free and fair elections' under United Nations 
supervision, after 1983, a SWAPO victory would almost be a fore-
gone conclusion based simply on the expected support from the 
Ovambo-speaking group. Yet, would such an election victory 
necessarily justify SWAPO or Ovambo domination or rule over the 
remaining groups and parties? Quite a few of the local political 
.leaders would deny this, because an election based on the prin-
ciple of first-past the post, winner-takes-all, or simple majori-
tarianism would possibly consign them to perpetual exclusion from 
any share in power. 
These leaders, like SWAPO, could very well enjoy the popular and 
true support of their respective groups, but due to irreversible 
numerical discrepancies be unable to serve their interests. 
Obviously then, the question of importance is whether an unquali-
fied system of 'majority rule' would in fact be the most suitable 
. type of political system for the SWA/Namibia situation. 
Finally, mention must be made of the strong. role played by 
ethnicity in all existing political parties. Virtually all 
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parties, even the hotly non-collaborationist socialist ones, 
have ethnic bases. SWANU effectively being Herero, the NIP 
2 4 ) 
Coloured, and SWAPO-D Ovambo. Even SWAPO is overridingly 
ethnically based, drawing most of its support from the Ovambo. 
The SWAPO-Democrats even claim to be: 
" ... composed of loyal SWAPO members, representing 
the SWAPO members who have remained true to the 
original and traditional principles and policies of 
SWAPO." (25) 
Ironically, leader of the SWAPO-Democrats, Mr Andreas Shipanga, 
had been expelled from a United Nations conference on SWA/Namibia 
in the French capital during April 1983, with not a single 
. ( 2 6) 
"Namibian" accredited as delegate other than the SWAPO 
delegates. 
/ 
The problem at present is that 
(a) one does not know with any precision what the patterns of 
support for the differe~t parties would be, although it is 
widely acknowledged that SWAPO would win with a majority, 
and 
· (b) by definition one cannot know what bases· would crystallize 
once competitive electoral politics had been initiated. 
But one can have a reasonable idea that ethnicity would continue 
to be significant and that present divisions (however created 
and entrenched by whoever) would continue to be salient. Thus, 
the case of making provision for a political system that avoids 
simple majoritarianism is strong. 
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Turning to SWAPO's concept of 'democratic majority rule', much 
needs to be said. What must be established at the outset, is 
whether SWAPO's notion of democracy, as Joseph Schumpeter suggested, 
would imply a competitive system in which politicians from all 
groups would be free to rally and compete for electoral support 
. d t . . l. t. l ff. ( 2 7) d . f h th h in or er o gain poi ica o ice , an 1 so, we er sue 
competition would recur at regular intervals in the future. The 
earlier discussion on the nature of a social democratic state 
i 
suggested that this might not be the case. 
Kenneth Minogue points out that democratic principles work only 
because there is an overriding constitution contract or 
agreement th t h . b . . . . l · l ( 
2 8 ) at preven st eir eing pr1ncip es on y. 
This, in effect, would call for the continuation of democratic 
principles and not just occurrence as a one-time event, i.e. 
'free and fair elections' under United Nations supervision, 
merely to install a SWAPO government. 
Given that the people should govern, and that direct democracy 
(whereby the people themselves actually participate in the act 
of governing) is not possible in a modern State a system in 
which there are elections at fairly regular intervals and where 
the candidate who receives the most votes gains office, does seem 
logical at first sight. But it is precisely this notion of 
majority rule and government by the people that is being ques-
tioned. 
As H.B. Mayo se~ it out, it is so difficult to defend the majority 
system under the so-called universal franchise, that one of the 
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commonest methods of defending c~rrent practice is to argue that 
the system precludes genuine majority rule and actual government 
by the people. <29 ) This is a view supported by Michels and 
Mosca, who argue that the political elite 'chosen by the people' 
. h l . l . l. · · ( 30 ) int emse ves constitute an exc usive ruing minority. 
Furthermore, in the presence of competing ethnicities, as in 
Africa, demands for the application of the majority rule prin-
ciple are unrealistic as it produces more social conflict rather 
! 
( 31 ) 
than less. 
In his book, Approaches to Democracy, Stankiewicz states, on the 
issue of majority rule, that: 
" ... making decisions by counting heads ... is a 
final resort to break a deadlock when reason can go 
no further ... Originally, that is what voting was 
supposed to do. It was the condition that made 
(the) majority rule compatible with minority rights. 
When made the primary principle of political action, 
however, it raises serious difficulties in respect of 
minority rights: the latter, under the primacy of 
majority rule principle, are reduced.to a set of 
restrictions of dubious-power and uncertain extent. 
What powers they have depends upon the degree of 
tolerance within the society ... if the principle 
of majority rule is shifted from a position of last 
resort to that of first resort, 'tolerance', not 
reason, becomes the primary value of the society, 
the one without which the system will not work." (32) 
In terms of SWA/Namibia, the following quotations from a 
reader's letter in the Namibian Review expresses the crucial 
issue. It appeared after a comment published by the editor on 
the so-called "two-way" pre-implementatic;>n Geneva Conference: 
"Mr Editor, I think you could have elaborated a 
little more on the UN's refusal to invite these 
three parties (NNF, NIP and SWAPO-D) (33) and to 
to make the show .a two-way operation. The point 
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here is that there is a danger .of many of us 
falling into the trap of certain people who want 
to dichotomise the SWA problem into simply a mili-
tary issue between SWAPO and South Africa and in 
the process diminish the long-term implications of 
such a dichotomisation. Our problem, I believe, 
is only partly a military question. Long-term 
stability based on internal stability and a sound 
economy will ultimately depend on the cooperation 
of all the patriotic forces of our country. And 
as things stand today, no single organisation has 
a monopoly over the will to fight for freedom or 
of the answer to the problem of national recon-
struction. This vital element of our problem 
should never be allowed to be sacrificed on the 
altar of political expediency." (34) 
"Insofar as the issue of United Nations impartiality 
is raised by South Africa, I agree that it is a bogus 
issue. · But not the issue itself. Personally, I 
maintain that United Nations support for SWAPO and 
South Africa's tutelage over the DTA are two evils 
that MUST be opposed with equal force. They are 
both predicted on false notions and are disastrous 
in their consequence for the unity and welfare of 
our people. The possibility and possible danger 
of replacing the DTA's despotic rule with a vic-
torious "Idi Amin" (Sam Nujoma) wrapped in the 
glory of United Nations recognition may have conse-
quences which it might be too late to do anything 
about . " ( 3 5 ) 
A PLURAL. APPROACH: , SWA / NAMIBIA 
There exists an enormously detailed and well-crafted literature 
on the characteristics of plural societies and the problems 
encountered in maintaining or installing democratic government 
in such societies. It would be tedious as well as unnecessary 
to attempt a summary of this literature in any detail. As I do 
not want to outline an "exact model" system for SWA/Namibia, but 
merely advance a proposed alternative to 'majority rule', I will 
confine myself to the most basic and well-known literature on 
what is described as consociational democracy; the prerequisites, 
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central features and workability of a consociational structure 
in SWA /Namibia. 
Juan Linz asserts that: 
" ... extremist politics are the result of structural 
strains, and in certain societies, in certain his-
torical situations. The ideal democratic situa-
tion occurs when very large majorities grant legi-
timacy to both political institutions and the socio-
economic structure, and when the social order is 
not perceived as unjust nor is reasonable change 
seen as threatening to those in privileged posi-
tions in the existing order. The constraints 
imposed on significant segments of the society by 
the illegitimacy of the existing social order ... 
will affect the degree of freedom to institute 
and defend democratic political institutions. It 
is no accident that political actors who are 
highly indignant abo~t the injustice of the social 
order are often ready to risk the stability of 
democracy, which for them is of lesser value than 
social change." ( 36) 
In terms of SWA/Namibia two common difficulties are pointed out. 
The difficulty of creating democratic institutions, in a formerly 
* oppressed society, and to maintain these once they are installed. 
The strong possibility of a SWAPO Government and its definite 
commitment to socialism will endanger such institutions. The 
plurality of the SWA/Namibian society poses further problems. As 
Professor Robert Schrire stated in his paper, 'Power and Power 
Sharing in South Africa', in situations where: 
" ... the population is heterogeneous with vast 
differences in race, ethnic background, values 
and income, a system that is based upon one-man 
one-vote in one National Parliament is not suit-
able for undertaking the enormously complex ta~k .. 
of reconciling conflicting group aspirations."(37) 
John Seiler, in his 'Consociationalism Authoritarianism: Incen-
tives and Hindrances Toward Power Sharing and Devolution in South 
;,jf (T~ WHITE p<f u.LRT&otJ 
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Africa and Namibia' agrees, asserting that: 
II the multi-ethnic character of Namibia must be 
accounted,for in any broadly acceptable political 
solution. Only consociational democracy offers 
this general prospect for a just and stable poli-
tical future." (38) 
Similar to the point made by Linz, Arend Lijphart in 'Democracy 
in Plural Societies' makes it clear that societies with deep 
cleavages based on Lacial or ethnic lines, with large socio-
' economic inequalities between the segments, present serious pro-
blems for the initial institutionalisation of democratic prin-
ciples in such deeply divided societies. <39 > Since, as Donald 
Rothchild pointed out, "ethnic boundaries may acquire a dangerous 
self-sustaining quality, especially in those cases where ethnicity 
is deliberately fostered", SWA/Namibia and South Africa being 
prime examples. Rothchild further asserts, and Lijphart would 
agree with him, that mutually reinforcing cleavages, contrary to 
cross-cutting cleavages, directly diminish the workability of 
consociationalism. <4o) Presently, SWA/Na~ibia lacks such cross-
cutting cleavages. 
In fact, the Territory reflects much deviation from the four 
basic principles Nordlinger lists for the institutionalisation of 
conflict regulatory measures in the first place: 
1. the existence of mutually perceived external threats; 
2. that intense conflict and its consequences would hamper the 
economic well-being of all the groups; 
3. to acquire or retain government office, and 
4. 
. ( 41) 
to avoid bloodshed amonst the segments. 
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In SWA/Namibia the external threat that does exist, the insurgency 
war on the northern border, is not mutually perceived, in fact, 
the greater part of the population, the Africans and other non-
whites, see this threat as beneficial to their liberation. As 
a result of the military conflict in the northern operational 
area the interests and well-being of all sections already is 
affected. Power-sharing, and not the entrenchment or acquisi-
.tion by one group, is the objective in SWA/Namibia, while blood-
shed, as a result of the military struggle, is a reality which 
must be terminated as soon as possible, as it could very easily 
1 • spill over to the socio-political spheres as well. 
At first glance it would then appear as if the situation in SWA/ 
Namibia by the early 1980s was not conducive to the introduction 
of consociationalism at all. Arend Lijphart, however, in his 
contribution to the Buthelezi Commission's investigation into 
structural alternatives for governing Natal-KwaZulu, explicitly 
states that: 
" ... the conditions f_avourable to consociational 
democracy are not necessary conditions, and hence 
that unfavourable conditions do not render consocia-
tional democracy impossible. Furthermore, if one 
wants a plural society to be governed democratically 
as a single unit, there is no alternative to conso-
ciational democracy, since majority-rule democracy 
is not suitable for a plural society." (42) 
Consociational democracy abridges the principle of majority-rule, 
though without deviating too much from normative democratic 
( 4 3) 
theory. 
According to Lijphart, consociational democracy may be defined in 
terms of four principles, all of which deviate from the Westminist 
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model of majority rule: grand coalition; mutual veto; propor-
. 1· d 1 (44) tiona 1ty , an segmenta autonomy. 
(a) The principle of grand coalition, or what may be called the 
principle of power-sharing, means that the political leaders 
of all segments of the plural society jointly govern the 
country. Thus, joint consentual rule in contrast to one-
man one-vote, winner-takes-all. 
(b) The mutual veto gives each segment the assurance that it 
will not be out-voted by a majority when its vital interests 
are at stake. This is synonymous with John C. Calhoun's 
"concurrent majority" principle that requires a majority 
in each segment before proposals on vital matters are 
accepted. 
(c) Proportionality serves as the basic standard of political 
representation, civil service appointments, and the alloca-
tion of public funds. It is aimed at giving special pro-
tection to small minorities. 
(d) Decision-making authority is delegated to the separate 
segments as much as possible. It complements the grand 
coalition principle: on all issues of common interest, th~ 
decisions are made jointly by the leaders of all segments, 
but on all other issues, decision-making is left to the 
( 45) 
respective segments. 
The crux of Lijphart's consociational principles is the prevention 
f · · (
46 > · h' h f h t o Zero-sum-s1 tua tion in w 1c grouos ear encroac men on 
their group-rights, and to avoid replacement of one form of 
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tyranny by another by means of constitutional arrangements. The 
mostextensive criticism of the workability of democratic and 
consociational systems is .advanced by Rabushka and Shepsle. In 
a short powerful paradigm they set out the developments most 
deeply divid~d plural societies undergo when granted independence. 
They are: 
1. pre-independence ethnic co-operation a multi-ethnic 
leadership coalition; 
2. post-independence ethnic co-operation ambiguity and 
strains develop in the ranks of the multi-ethnic coalition; 
3. demand generation and the increased salience of ethnicity 
the intensification of communal and not national preferences 
contributes to a short-lived multi-ethnic coalition; 
4. outbidding and the decline of the multi-ethnic coalition 
the disappearance of brokerage institutions as a result of 
the emergence of ambitious politicians; and 
5 .. electoral machinations and mistrust( 47 ) "The temptation 
of the majority to strengthen its powers by means which are 
not democratic, and for.the minority to rely on such means 
in order to obtain power, becomes 
. . ( 48) 
"9verwhelm1ng." 
Yet, with extensive consociational provisions, guaranteed by out-
side powers such as the Western Contact Group and South Africa, 
it does not necessarily.have to follow that SWA/Namibia will 
undergo the same breakdown process. 'Although different in a 
number of resoects, Australia, Belgium, India, Canada, ·swi tzerr 
land, the Netherlands, Sri Lanka and Botswana, have demonstrated 
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the effective functioning of consociationalism. (49 ) Sri Lanka, 
in fact, is precisely a case which demonstrates the non-workability 
of a non-consociational system in a divided society. SWA / Namibia 
may very well be a further exception to the Rabushka and Shepsle 
paradigm. Linz, for example, noted that 
11 
••• none of them has experienced a breakdown of 
their institutions, which leads to the suspicion 
that the very political mechanisms described by 
'consociational democracy' might be very effective 
in handling the strains that might otherwise 
endanger their democratic ins ti tut ions. 11 ( 50) 
While Benyon argues that the entrenchment of constitutional 
rigidity is not necessarily an adequate safeguard of ~ven those 
guarantees which are less dependent on ec~nomic prosperity, as 
( 51 ) . 
they can be by-passed , Linz stresses the importance of con-
stitution-building in new democracies. He adds, however, that 
equally important, or even more so, is the initial agenda adopted 
in the process. For that agenda often creates expectations that 
cannot be satisfied immediately or within the framework, and soon 
becomes the source of semi-loyalty on the part of the forces 
( 5 2) 
involved in the re'.]mie.-building process. 
'Despite the occasional words of optimism, it is clear that every 
multi-ethnic social situation, SWA/Namibia ~ncluded, poses very 
special problems to the institutionalisation and maintenance of 
democratic practices. The safest and simplest prediction that 
can be made about the behaviour of ruling groups, whether 
ethnically defined or not, is that they will act in the further-
ance of their own interests, or at least in what they perceive 
to be their own interests.(53) In the book Protection of Ethnic 
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Minorities Comparative Perspectives Pierre L. van den Berghe 
aptly sums up t~e state of affairs in situations where there are 
competitive ethnicities as: 
"Those who control the central apparatus of the 
empire will, irrespective of ideology, suppress 
ethnic dissidence as ruthlessly as they need or 
dare to . . . A policy of assimilation logically 
flows from situations where the state recognises 
the reality of ethnic differences, but denies 
legitimacy to all but one ethnic identity. 
Assimilation is consistent with the nation-state 
ideology. A single cultural norm is officially 
espoused, conformity to which is required of all 
citizens for full acceptance and rights. Groups 
failing to conform to this norm are defined as 
being outside the system until they pass the test 
of assimilation. Assimilationist ideology is 
always ethnocentric, in that it assumes that the 
dominant group sets the cultural standard that 
other groups are expected to emulate ... Further-
more it can be safely assumed that, to the extent 
that the state is identified with one of the constitu ..... · 
tuent groups, whatever ethnic group policies the 
state implements are going to benefit the dominant 
group rather than the subordinate groups! (54) 
In conclusion, a final very important point needs to be stressed. 
When I suggest a constitutionally provided for consociational 
democratic system for SWA/Namibia, I want to state clearly, in 
the strongest possible terms that such a system must stem from a 
process in which_ true popular leaders of all the population groups 
genuinely participated and contributed towards its formulation. 
' 
If this is not the case, there would be no possibility that even 
this type of political system will function in the Territory. By 
implication, I do not suggest a system equal to that experienced 
under the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, which, in some ways, 
resembled a consociational dispensation. 
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SECTION 1.3 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA: 
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION 
(SWAPO} OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBI~) 
J~Jvv}Pu ---:--
-~ 
The following historical analysis of United Nations' involvement 
' 
in the South West Africa/Namibia question is aimed at providing 
a useful factual background against which resistance to South 
Africa's administrative and military occupation of the Territory 
can be viewed. This section is purely analytic, many of the 
issues raised will be discussed elsewhere in the dissertation. 
INTRODUCTION: GERMAN OCCUPATION 1884-1915 
The "modern" history of South West Africa, also referred to as 
Kalanami (Kalahari-Namib)(l) or Namibia, can be retraced well 
beyond the sixteenth century arrival of the hunter-gatherer San 
people. The San were joined by the southward-migrating stock-
breeders, initially the Nama, later followed by the Herero and 
Ovambo, each arriving and settling as separate indigenous tribes or 
nations( 2 ) who remained separate peoples by maintaining endogamy. 
By the close of the eighteenth century a relative degree uf coexis-
tence and a basic minimisation of intergroup warfare had been 
attained. 
Due to the political nature of the dissertation, the historical 
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side of the SWA/Namibian situation will be sketched very 
:t:iriefly. White missionaries and traders who entered the 
territory during the 1860s, preceded German colonisation of the 
Territory, initiated at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. In 
1878, the B~itish had already annexed Walvis Bay, which was sub-
sequently transferred to the administration of the Cape Colony in 
I 
1884, while only in 1883, the German businessman F.A.E. Luderitz 
purchased, throug~ an agent, the Bay of Angra Pequena and a strip 
of land around it ·from a Nama Chief. (j) In the ensuing quarrel 
over British and German claims, the Germans extended their con-
1 ° l d h h . 0 f O I ( 4 ) 0 h O 1 h" f tro in an t roug "treaties o protection' wit r1va c 1e s. 
An Anglo-German Agreement in July 1890 shared the spoils. German 
South West Africa was created, but Britain retained Walvis Bay. 
( 
The Germans never established complete control over the entire 
colony, leaving the northern. regions unpoliced, but by 1904, they 
had subjugated the native nations, the Herero and Damara, who lived 
h f h . d k b h . . 1 (
5 ) sout o t e region to ay nown as Ovam o, tot e1r iron rue. 
Vast tracts of land were alienated under the guise of 'treaties 
of protection', signed by the local chiefs, which at the end of 
1903, left the Africaris with 31,4 million heqtares out of a total 
land area of 83.5 million hectares. (6 ) The rest was divided 
between the colonial government and the white. settlers. 
Not only were the Herero and Damara dispossessed of their land, 
their social and political structures were shattered too. A 
series of native decrees was enacted between 1906 and 1907 for-
bidding Africans to acquire land or cattle(?), forcing them to 
carry passes and face punishment for vagrancy if they could not 
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prove their employment. These measures were successful in 
forcing Africans into wage labour for white employers,, mostly 
farmers. By 1912, only 200 Herero and Nama were without paid 
1 t t th 1 t . bl ( 8 ) em oymen , a e owest wage-ra es possi e. 
For the first 30 years of White occupation, from 1884 unt~l the 
First World War, South West Africa was under German administra-
tion. In 1915 it was invaded by a force of approximately 43,000 
white South African volunteers shortly after the beginning 
of the war. (They acted.upon British instructions.) 
This force completed the occupation of the northern region of the 
country. The Khorab Peace Treaty, 9 July 1915, officially marked 
the end of German sovereignty over South West Africa and for the 
duration of the war( 9 ), July 1915 to December 1919, the Territory 
was placed under the military rule of the Union of South Africa, 
i.e. until the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. 
SOUTH AFRICAN RULE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATE 
After the war, the Allied Powers had to decide what was to be 
done with colonies formerly held by Germany and other defeated 
countries. They agreed that members of the new League of 
Nations would be designated to administer those territories. 
Article 22 of the League Covenant stated: 
To those colonies and territories which as a con-
sequence of the late war have ceased to be under 
the sovereignty of the States which·formerly ·· 
governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples 
not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world, there 
should be applied the principle that the well-
being and development of such peoples form a 
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sacred trust of civilisation, and that securi-
ties for the performance of this trust should 
be embodied in this Covenant. {10) 
South Africa, however, intended to annex former German South 
West Africa. { 11 ) While the British war cabinet expressed basic\ 
agreement(l 2 ), opposition from the United States President 
resulted in a compromise. South Africa would instead administer 
the former colony under a "C" mandate of the League of Nations 
I 
on behalf of the Mandates Commission. Its duty, laid down in 
the Mandate, was to prepare the Territory for eventual self-
determination and to "promote to the utmost the material and 
moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants". (l 3 ) 
This administration of South West Africa was to take place as an 
integral part of the Union Government, i.e. subjected to the sam, 
laws regulations and proclamations, and constituting an economic . ! 
. . . {14) ' 
responsibility until it could become 'viably independent'. 
A gross oversight occurred in that th~ meaning of 'viable inde-
pendence' was not clearly stipulated, in later years this was 
dearly regretted. 
Reports on the extent and direction on socia~, political and 
economic progre:;s within the Territory had to be presented to the 
. ( 15) 
League on an annual basis. . Until the demise of the League 
in 1939, South Africa submitted the required annual reports, 
which were examined by the Permanent Mandates Commission. Though, 
South Africa did not disguise its dislike of having to report to 
the League, as the Commission was critical of South Africa' actions 
. ( 16) 
on several occasions especially questioning the system of 
?eparate reserves for Africans and frequently reminding the Union 
Government that it could not annex the mandate. 
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With the outbreak of the Second World War the League of Nations 
, expired, signalling the resumption of international controversy 
around the future status of South West Africa and other mandated 
territories. Was South Africa to be responsible for its actions 
in South West Africa to the United Nations Organisation, created 
on 24 October 1945, or was the South West Africa Mandate to be 
dissolved? In reality, South Africa considered the Mandate 




it felt that its obligations to the League did not carry 
to the United Nations. (l?) 
Four possible alternatives were to be considered: 
1. annexation of South West Africa by the Union of South Africa, 
2. incorporation of South West Africa as a province of South 
Africa, 
3. placement of South West Africa under direct trusteeship of 
the international community, the United Nations, or 
4. the South African Government could maintain the Mandate, 
provided that it took place under direct supervision of the 
newly-created United Nations, as a trust territory. 
Although General Smuts, in 1936, opted for the first alternative, 
annexation, this idea was vigorously pursued only in 1943 when a 
local survey was held to gauge local attitudes. This "survey" 
inditated that 208,850 members-of the non-white groups favoured 
provincial incorporation with South Africa, while only 33,52Q 
. ( 18) 
opposed the idea. These figures were hardly persuasive 
since the "survey" was conducted by South African officials (?nly, 
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and it was further clear that many of the indigenous people did 
not understand the real implications of provincial incorporation. 
Nevertheless, South Africa had already extended its influence in 
South West Africa through control over local institutions. The 
I 
South West Africa Constitution Act of 1925 (No.42) established 
an all-white Legislative Assembly for the Territory, consisting 
of six members appointed by the Administrator and approved by 
the Governor-General of South Africa and twelve elected members. (l 9 
Africans and other non-white people were not allowed to vote. 
In 1949, the National Party Government introduced the South West 
African Affairs Amendment Bill whereby the Territory's white 
population was granted direct representation in the South African 
Parliament through six white members from the Territory. Two 
of the six members were to have "special knowledge of native 
affairs". <20 > 
After lengthy deliberations, ·on 12 December 1946, the United 
.Nations Security Council rejected South Africa's demands for 
full incorporation of South West Africa into the Union. <21 > (A 
demand that was reiterated in 1947 and 1948. ~ The United Nations 
disagreed with any new form of imperialism after World War Two, 
an even more important motivation for this refusal was that the 
General Assembly viewed the educational level of the indigenous 
peoples as too low to make such an important decision on their 
political future. <22 > South Africa subsequently refused to 
enter into a new international Trusteeship agreement and in 1949 
ceased to submit the reports required in terms of the Mandate. <23 > 
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Disturbed by these developments, the General Assembly decided to 
seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. 
In its first ruling in 1950, the International Court held that 
the Mandate was still in force and that South Africa could not 
unilaterally alter the status of South West Africa, but that it 
h d bl . . . h. ( 24) a no o 1gat1on to enter into a Trustees 1p agreement. Some 
of the more salient findings of the Court were: 
I 
1. South Africa continued to have the international obligations 
contained in the League Covenant and the Mandate; 
2. The function of supervision over the administration of the 
Territory by South Africa should be exercised by the United 
Nations, to which annual reports and petitions from the inhabi-
tants were to be submitted; 
'3. South Africa continued to have the obligation to promote to 
the utmost the material and moral well-being and social pro-
gress of the inhabitants as a sacred trust of civilisation; 
4. The Charter did not impose on South Africa the legal obliga-
tion to place South West Africa under the Trusteeship System, 
although it provided the means by which the Territory might be 
· , ( 25) 
brought under the system. 
South Africa, however, as it would frequently do in years to come, 
did not regard the Court's opinion as binding and it continued to 
deny the United Nations authority. Since its refusal, in 1949 (26 ), 
to submit further reports, the South African Government adopted 
an increasing arrogant attitude towards the international commu-
nity. For example, South Africa simply refused to cooperate with 
the United Nations' South West Africa Committee, appointed in 1953. 
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The Assembly had set up this new Committee on South West Africa 
to pursue negotiations with South Africa. <27 ) The Committee was 
authorised to examine available information on the Territory and 
to report to the Assembly on conditions in the Territory. 
During 1954-1955 the United Nations General Assembly and the new 
Committee continued to invite South Africa to negotiate on the 
future of South West Afriya but South Africa declined, stating 
I 
that it would not consider proposals which did not suit its basic 
requirements. The Committee in turn stated that the administra-
tion of the Territory by South Africa, particularly in regard to 
apartheid legislation, was not in conformity with the requirements 
of the Mandate, but it was unable to enact measures to alter this 
state of affairs. 
(28) 
In 1956, the General Assembly requested 
the Secretary-General to explore ways and means of resolving the 
question on the future of South West Africa, and to take whatever 
steps he deemed necessary to solve the issue. No positive 
results, however, were achieved. South Africa remained unwilling 
to negotiate with either the Committee on South West Africa or the 
Secretary General, and no further progress reports were submitted 
either. 
In 1957 the General Assemb~y made a further attempt to reach a 
solution through negotiation, when it established, through Reso-
lution (1143 (XII) of 1957), a Good Offices Committee, composed 
of the United Kingdom, United States and Brazil, "to discuss with 
the Government of the Union of South Africa a basis for agreement 
which would continue to accord to the Territory of South West 
Africa an international status."(29) All efforts by the Good 
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Offices Committee to rea~h such a basis for agreement were un~· 
successful. Under chairmanship of Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, the 
Good Offices Committee met with representatives of the South 
African Government in Pretoria in 1958, but its proposals, in-
valving United Nations supervision over the entire Territory, 
were unacceptable to South Africa. ( 30) In 1959 the Committee 
reported to the General Assembly that it had not succeeded in 
f . d. b . f d . f f ( 31 ) in ing a asis or agreement un er its terms o re erence. 
I 
On 4 November 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia, both members of the 
former League of Nations, and members of United Nations, insti-
tuted proceedings against South Africa at the International Court 
of Justice. The case concerned the continued existence of the 
Mandate for South West Africa, these countries charged that South 
Africa had violated its obligations under the Mandate by intro-
d . h . d 1. . . h T . ( 
32 ) B d . ucing apart ei po icies int e erritory. y so oing, 
these states introduced the start of a six-year effort to solve 
the problem by legal methods .. These initiatives failed to 
resolve the dispute over the Territory, however. In its judge-
ment, delivered on 18 July 1966, the Court found that Ethiopia and 
Liberia could not be considered to have established any legal 
right or interest appertaining to them in the subject matter of 
their claims and the Court accordingly decided to reject them. <33 > 
The Court's 1966 ruling proved to be a watershed in South West 
African politics. The indigenous inhabitants who had petitioned 
the United Nations for their independence since 1946, were shocked 
and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), formed in 
1960, saw no alternative but to turn to an armed struggle. <34 > 
55 
Two weeks after the Court's decision, 35 African countries 
requested that the problem of South West Africa be considered a 
priority topic at the General Assembly's 1966 autumn session. 
The judicial path seemed to be closed; and in August/September 
1966, both the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO} 
and the South African authorities reported a clash between African 
freedom fighters and South African soldiers in the Ovamboland area. 
In the meantime, in May 1962, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of 
the Special Committee for South West Africa, which had replaced 
.the Committee on South West Africa in 1961 by Resolution 1702 (XVI) 
of the General Assembly, visited South Africa and South West Africa 
. . . . b h S h f . G ( 35 } in response to an 1nv1tat1on y t e out A r1can overnment. . 
Reporting to the Assembly on their discussions with representa-
tives of the Pretoria Government, and their meetings with repre-
sentatives of the African and Coloured population groups in the 
Territory, the deputation concluded that it was the overwhelming 
desire of the African population groups that the United Nations 
assume direct administration of the Territory. They further con-
eluded that there seemed to be no way to carry out the tasks 
assigned to the Committee "short of the use of force or other 
compulsive measures within the purview of the Charter. 11 ( 36 ) 
During 1964 the South African Government endorsed in principle 
the recommendations made by the Odendaal Commission of Inquiry 
into South West African Affairs, for the establishment of 
separate "non-white homelands" in the Territory on tribal or 
ethnic basis, as well as a separ~ te "white area". ( 3 7 ) (The Oden-
daal Recommendations, therefore, signified the beginning of a 
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sustained effort to apply the apartheid system in South West 
Africa.) The Special Committee, in 1964, viewing the situation 
with concern, called upon South Africa to desist from implementing 
the Commission's recommendations a request that was not heeded. 
In 1965 the General Assembly declared through Resolution 2074(XX) 
that any attempt to partition the Territory, directly or indirectly 
constituted a violation of the Mandate for South West Africa and of 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. ( 32 ) 
M 2 f L/5. 
In 1966, following the negative results of the continuous pro-
ceedings instituted against South Africa by Ethiopia and Liberia 
in the International Court, and as an expression of outrage and 
concern over South Africa's decision to implement the recommendatio 
of the Odendaal Commission, the General Assembly decided to termi-
nate South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa and to place the 
T · t d th d · t · b · 1 · t f th Uni' ted Nati' ons. ( 
39 
erri ory un er e. irec responsi ii yo e 
By an overwhelming vote( 40) Resolution 2145 (XXI) was adopted in 
the General Assembly to relieve South Africa of its Mandate 
responsibilities, placing South West Africa under direct "control" 
q ( 41 ) 
of the United Nations. 
The Afro-Asian group at the Un~ted Nations, ~ince the South West 
Africa People's Organisation announced its intended military 
struggle against South African occupation, from the.organisational 
Headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) on 18 July 1966) became 
more insistent in its demand for international action. <42 > 
Between 1945 and 195 7 only two African States, Ethiopia and 
Liberia, were members of the United Nations. By the end of 
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1962 this situation had changed drastically, independent African 
States then amounted to fifty percent of the United Nations member-
ship.< 43 ) As these states became more organised in the United 
Nations, and due to their one-state one-vote status and strongly 
held feelings about racial discrimination, they were able to 
embarrass major Western powers to pressurise South Africa. 
Algeria's Fanonian African Radicalism< 44 ) and the establishment 
of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), in May 1963( 45 ) 
I 
fuelled this pressurising of South Africa. 
THE UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA 
In 1967, the General Assembly, at its fifth special session, con-
vened for the purpose of discussing the question of South West 
Africa, decided by means of Resolution 2248 to establish an 
eleven-member Council for South West Africa (renamed the United 
.Nations Council for Namibia in 1968) to administer the Territory 
until independence. (By 1980 its membership had expanded to 
31.)(46) Among the Councii's many functions are to help South 
West African refugees, organise training programmes for them, 
issue travel documents and establish an emergency programme to 
render economic and technical assistance to the Territory a 
United Nations Fund for Namibia was established to finance these 
t
. . . (47) ac 1v1t1es. 
In accordance with standing arrangements, the representative of 
the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) which has 
permanent observer status in the General Assembly, participates 
iq the work of the Council for Namibia~ The Organisation for 
African Unity (OAU) also participates in this Council in an 
····~ 
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. ( 4 8) observer capacity. The General Assembly, in 1967, decided 
to establish a post of United Nations Commissioner for Namibia to 
whom the Council for Namibia·should entrust such executive and 
administrative tasks as it deemed necessary. The Commissioner 
for Namibia is appointed by the General Assembly on an annual 
basis. <49 ) 
In 1968 the Council reported that it had been prevented £rom 
I 
ac\ively developing its functions by the refusal of the South 
African Government to comply with the terms of the Assembly's 
Resolutions (5 0) The Council stated that : 
" ... as the body charged with the administration 
of the Territory, the Council has sought to exer-
cise its authority as much as possible under pre-
vailing circumstances ", 
while the then Secretary-General, U. Thant, observed that it 
' . . ff G t . . 1 ' ( 51 ) •remains in e ect a overnmen -in-exi e '. 
By Resolution 2372 (XXII) adopted in June 1968, the General 
Assembly proclaimed that: 
" . . . in accordance with the desire of the people 
of the Territory, South West Africa would hence-
forth be known as "Namibia" and the name of the 
Council for South West Africa would change accor-
. dingly". (52) 
(For the purpose of this dissertation and until official inter-
nationally recognised independence is attained, the Territory will 
be, as far as possible, referred to as South West Africa/Namibia -
SWA / Namib1a. ) 
The liberation movement in SWA/Namibia had become more militant 
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from the mid-1960s, and in August 1969 the Security Council, 
through Resolution 269, specifically recognised the legitimacy 
of the military struggle of the people against the illegal 
. ( 5 3) 
presence of the South African authorities in the Territory. 
South Africa, as before, continued to ignore all United Nations 
decisions not only the Assembly's 1966 decision to teiminate 
the Mandate, but also other decisions, including Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970) of 30 January 1970, that condemned, the con-
r 
tinued presence of South Africa in the Territory as counter-
productive to international peace, and the advisory opinion of 
-'1. June 1971 of the International Court of Justice which said, 
among other things, that the continued presence of South Africa 
in Namibia was illegal, South Africa was under obligation to 
immediately withdraw its administration from Namibia and to end 
all forms of its occupation of the Territory. 
This second advisory opinion of the International Court not only 
emphasised the "illegality" of South Africa's administrative occu-
pation of the Territory, but also stated that 
"Member States of the United Nations are under obli-
gation to recognise the illegality of South Africa's 
occupation of Namibia and the invalidity of its 
acts, and in particular any dealings, with t.he 
Government of South Africa implying recognition of 
the legality of, or lending support or assistance 
to, such presence and administration." (55) 
In the 19 70s the dispute surrounding SWA / Namibian self-determination 
intensified greatly, on both .local 'and international fronts,· while 
the liberation struggle gradually gained momentum to become a 
fully-fledged guerrilla.war by the close of the 1970s. Throughout 
this period, 1966 to 1980, the United Nations continually expressed 
60 
its total support for the South West Africa People's Organisation's 
cause and struggle. South Africa on the other hand, not only 
disregarded decisions of the Court and United Nations, but 
embarked on further defiance. It intensified implementation .of 
its Bantustan policy within the Territory, by the establishment 
of more 'homelands and administrations', (see the section dealing 
with local political developments during the 1980s), as well 
as strengthening the forces designed 1 to suppress the liberation 
movement. 
In pursuance of the Security Council's mandate, the Secretary-' 
General proceeded to South Africa and SWA/Namibia from 6 to 10 
March 1972, where he had extensive discussions with the Prime Minister 
and prominent members of the Government. (56 ) Further discussions 
between the South African Government and the Secretary-General, or 
his special representative, Dr A.M. Escher, took place in the 
'• 
course of 1972 and in the early part of 1973. (57 ) In their 
report they stressed that many issues in regard to South Africa's 
interpretation of self-determination and independence for SWA/ 
Namibia still rema~ned to be clarified. The Security Council 
invited the then Secretary-General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, to continue 
with his negotiating effort, and again called upon South Africa 
for its full co-operation with the Secretary-General to bring 
about a peaceful transfer of power in the Territory. 
tion 323-1972).( 59 ) 
(Resolu-
The Council for Namibia, in the Lusaka Declaration of.].i.-J.un~~ 
1973, termed, (contrary to Resolution_323-e.f-l.9J .. 2L, the 
;-----~ :__~--..::__------~~--~ 
results of the contacts as laid down in the Secretary-General's 
({! 
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report as not only unsatisfactory, but counter-productive too, and 
called for their termination. The Council further concluded 
that the international community had to recognise that; 
11 
••• South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia 
could not continue without serious danger to 
international peace and security and that it was 
therefore, incumbent on all the nations of the 
world to actively support the struggle of the 
people of Namibia for liberty and independence." (59) 
And on 12 December 1973, the General Assembly, by Resolution 3II 
(XXVII)( 60) recognised SWAPO as the sole and authentic representa-
tive of the Namibian people, and supported the efforts of the 
movement to strengthen national unity. 
v \ .. 
In 1974, the General Assembly endorsed the decision of the
1
Council 
.,,.,-----·J --·- ,-,.........., 
for Namibia. to establish an Institute for Namibia in Lusak~, for 
the purpose of providing Namibians with the necessary education 
and administrative skills to administer an independent Namibia.· 
Following the announcement by South Africa on 31 August that 
from l September 1977 South Africa would administer Walvis Bay as 
part of the Cape Province, the United Nations Council for Namibia 
issued a statement condemning: 
II in the strongest terms this unilateral attempt 
by South Africa to destroy the territorial integrity 
and unity of Namibia". ( 61) 
South Africa's administration of Walvis Bay is hardly justifiable~ 
pe>LITICRL ~ terms, not even to mention thf\T 
the indigenous peoples had no say in what was an arbitrary exclu-
sion of a natural part of the Territory. 
\ On 10 April 1978, the five Western members of the Security 
\ 
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Council-Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the United States - transmitted to the Council 
a proposal for the settlement of the question of Namibia. -!2--
· the_amaz~m~n t:_ of all _part.ies_concer.ne_q , .. !.h!s P:.?PO~~l ~'!-F:. ~ccepted 
·by. the _South African Governm~p_t_ P~. _2UP.E..i·~- i;~-;_:) This Western 
proposal called_for: 
(a) the- appointment of a Speci·a-l~Represen.tatiye whose central 
. -------- -- . - -
I 
task would be to make sure that conditions were established for 
free and fair elections based on an impartial electoral 
process; 
(b) the release of all Namibi·an political·- prisoners or detainees 
and the return of all Namibian refugees and other Namibians 
outside the Territory; 
(c) a comprehensive cessation of-all-host~le acts by· all 
parties; and 
(d) the restriction to base of South African and SWAPO armed 
forces. (G 2 ) 
The Security Council, by Resolution 435 (1978), on 29 September 
approved the establishment of a United Nations Transition Assis-
tance Group (UNTAG) in accordance with the Western proposal to 
support, for a period of up to 12 months, the Secretary-General's 
·Special Representative to carry out his mandate. That, is, to 
ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair 
elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations. 
I 
Throughout 1979, efforts to achieve an agreement for the imple-
mentation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) were stalled 
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by South Africa's objections to certain provisions in the United 
Nations/Western Plan. These centered specifically on SWAPO 
bases inside SWA/Namibia and the supervision of SWAPO bases in 
. ( 6 3) 
neighbouring countries. President Neto of Angola proposed 
a 50 km wide demilitarised zone (DMZ) on both sides of the SWA/ 
Namibian-Angolan border, to break the deadlock then being 
·experienced in the settlement negotiations. South Africa, how-
ever, subsequently stipulated that a number of additional points 
! 
must be resolved; including the number of South African bases 
remaining in the DMZ, disarmament of SWAPO personnel and confirma-
tion that SWAPO would not have bases inside SWA/Namibia. (64 ) 
At the beginning of 1980 the stage was set for detailed technical 
discussions between the South African Government and the United 
Nations on the proposed DMZ. Lt. General Prem Chand, Commander-
Designate of UNTAG, visited SWA/Namibia, Angola, Zambia, Liberia 
and Nigeria during January 1980 to discuss the implementation of 
the proposed DMZ. This visit was followed by that of a high-
powered United Nations team, including two Under-Secretaries-
General, Mr B. Urquhart and Mr A. Farah, Mr M. Ahtisaari and Lt. 
( 65) 
General Prem Chand. However, no substantive progress was 
·reported on the proposed DMZ. 
Internal developments during 1980 confirmed earlier suspicions 
.on the part of West~!'.:J:1 negotiators and the United Nations that 
the South African Government had, in fact, ceased to believe, if 
it ever had belie~ed, in the possibility of an internationally 
recognised settlement in accordance with Security Council Resolu-
tion 435 (1978). Their suspicions arose from the South African 
. 
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Government's actions, which included: 
(a) in terms of Proclamation No.AG.19 (1980), a Ministers' 
Council with executive powers which came into effect on 
1 July 1980. <66 ) 
(b) Proclamation No.AG.105 (1980) which led to the establish-
ment of a South West African Territorial Force; 
(c) Proclamation No.AG.169 (1980) which provided for the Terri-
tory's own police force; and 
(d) Proclamation No.AG.8 (1980) which provided for the creation 
of ethnically based second-tier Representative Authorities. 
These acts were viewed as the introd~ction of a unilateral pro-
cess of internal political consolidation and a quest for legiti-
ma~y, which might well prove inimical to international negotia-
tions. Ideally, both the Western Contact Group and the United 
Nations hoped to begin implementing Resolution 435 (1978) in 
March 1981 and to secure independence not later than by the end 
of 1981. This, due to South African intransigence was not to 
be. Throughout 1982 the progress of the independence negotiations 
suffered further setbacks. South Africa found a new issue, the 
Cuban presence in Angola, to further stall upon a resolution of 
the problem. Although it was, in fact, the Reagan Administra-
tion which had introduced the Cuban issue in the negotiations 
the South Afri~an Government leapt at it· with enthusiasm. 
The United Nations Security Council met from 21 to 28 April, at 
the request of the African group, to reconsider the question of 
Namibia in the light of South Africa's refusal to implement 
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Security Council Resolutions in the Territory. The request, in 
the form of a letter to the President of the Council, further 
called for examination of the further Report of the Secretary-
General concerning the implementation of Resolution435 (1978). 
In this Report the Secretary-General noted that the President of 
SWAPO, Mr Sam Nujoma, reiterated the ..9..rganisation's acceptance 
of Resolution 435, and that it was ready to sign a cease-fire 
agreement with a South African delegation, so that peace might 
come to Namibia. It was further stated in the Report that the 
pre-implementation meeting in .Geneva (7 to 14 January 1981) had 
not achieved its objective, because: 
" ... it became clear in the course of the meeting 
that the South African Government wai not yet 
prepared to sign a cease-fire agreement and to 
proceed with the implementaion of Resolution 435 
(1978)". (67) 
Later in 1981, 2 to 5 June, the United Nations Council for 
Namibia met in Panama, where it adopted the so-called Declara-
tion of Panama. The question of Namibia, it said, was: 
" ... one of decolonisation and must be resolved in 
accordance with the provisions of the Declaration 
of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly 
Resolution 1514. The Council also reaffirmed 
that the present and illegal occupation of 
'Namibia' in defiance of the United Nations con-
stitutes a blatant denial to the Namibian people 
of their inalienable right to self- determination, 
freedom and national independence in a united 
Namibia". ( 68) 
The Declaration of Panama included both the recommendations of 
the Council and an extensive suggested programme of action on 
the Territory. 
from these. 
However, no concrete developments materialised 
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A new proposal, agreed upon by South Africa and the Western 
Contact Group, was tabled, near the end of 1981, to facilitate 
the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). It declared that 
negotiations for a SWA/Namibian settlement should be divided 
into three phases. Phase One was scheduled for July 1981 to 
November 1981, and would centre on a list of Constitutional 
Principles which would serve as guidelines for the creation of a 
Constituent Assembly whose 
1
task would be the formulation of an 
independence Constitution.• Phase Two was scheduled for December 
1981 to February 1982, and would define transitional arrangements 
in the period between the implementation of the United Nations' 
Plan and the day of independence. It focussed also on possible 
modifications to Resolution 435, the size, components and status 
of UNTAG and United Nations personnel, as well as the.responsi-
bili ties of the Administrator-General in SWA I Namibia. Phase 
Three would start with the actual declaration of a cease-fire, the 
exercise of the Administrator-General's powers by the United 
_Nations .Special Representative, and the start of the seven-month 
. ( 6 9 ) 
· period to culminate in the United Nations supervised elections. 
Unfortunately, this plan met with a host of difficulties, the 
most important of which was the Cuban presence in Angola, and 
no progress ·has been made beyond Phase Two (by 1983). 
I 
South Africa introduced two new factors which complicated matters 
even further; the abovementioned demand for the prior withdrawal 
of Cuban troops as an essential pre-requisite for South African 
acceptance of the United Nations' Plan and the announced inten-
. ( 70) 
tion for new internal ,elections in March 1983. The Cuban 
issue, by mid-1983, remained to be resolved, and the proposed 
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March 1983 elections did n6t take place .. However, the 
Administrator-General, Mr Hough, did disband the first so-called 
interim government which had been functioning since. 1978/79, and 
· his successor, Dr W. van Niekerk, went ahead to prepare the Terri-
tory for a second so-called interim dispensation, with new 
internal elections, for a "new" National Assembly, scheduled for 
September/October 1983. (?l) 
During May 1983, the African Bloc in the United Nations agreed 
to ease demands for economic sanctions against South Africa, in 
favour of a Geneva-type all-party round-table conference. Such 
a conference, "scheduled" for the end of 1983, . would guarantee 
that the SWA/Namibian issue was once again put firmly on the 
United Nations agenda. ( 72 ) The organisation had taken a 
backseat in the independence negotiations for the previous few 
years, in favour of the Western Contact Group. But whether 
South Africa would agree to such a conference was questionable, 
as South Africa's Ambassador ·to the United Nations, Mr Kurt von 
Schirnding, informed the Security Council, on 24 May 1983, that 
South Africa wanted a peaceful SWA/Namibian settlement, but that 
: attempts to force an ea·rly settlement ·.,:·would pe disastrous. He 
said that: 
II the world must understand that the South 
African Government will not bow to threats". (73) 
In the meantime, in May 1983, the United Nations Secretary-General, 
Dr Javier Perez de Cuellar, is to pursue the elusive settlement 
for SWA/Namibia, under a formula prepared for approval by the 
Security Council. He will be allotted three months, June to 
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31 August 1983, to parley with South Africa and its adversaries, 
before he must report back to the Security Council. ( 74 ) 
As stated in the introduction, the preceding section was meant 
to be merely analytical, providing a useful background to subse-
quent sections of the dissertation. The most significant fact 
to have emerged in it, was the United Nations' evident inability 
to intervene decisively in the SWA/Namibia question over a 
. period of more than three decades. What is more, as further i!ssues 
are introduced, it is possible that the United Nations will in the 
.forseeable future play a less important role in deliberations on 
the future of South West A~~i~a/Namibia. 
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UNDERSTANDING GUERRILLA WARFARE: A COMPARISON 
BETWEEN THE MAOIST MODEL AND THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA 
PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION GUERRILLA MOVEMENT 
A comprehensive understanding of the nature and implications 
of the type of war being fought in northern SWA/Namibia, and 
of the military situation elsewhere in Southern Africa, is an 
essential part of understanding the dispute iurrounding the 
Territory's independence. 
SWA/Namibia and its patron, the South African Government, are 
the only remaining vestiges of White rule on the Africa con-
tinent. This in turn is attributable to South Africa's econo-
. d 'l"t . 't . h · (l) mic an mi 1 ary super1or1 yin t e region. Economically 
South Africa is in a position to dictate the economic well-
being of most Southern African states to a greater or lesser 
extent, while South Africa's efficient military infrastruc'ture 
is geared towards maintaining and securing this privileged 
position without major challenge or alternition. 
The South African Government and its ideological allies in the 
Western world conceive the security of SWA/Namibia, and South 
Africa in particular, to be under a constant communist threat 
from International Communism; which in.this case is perceived 
h h d k R
. (2) 
to emanate from t e north oft e Cunene an O avango ivers. 
South Africa, unlike SWA/Namibia, is confronted by dissident elements from 
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within the country, notably the African National Congress, 
while SWA/Namibia presently serves as the front line to combat 
this communist threat. <3 ) Since this 'so-called' communist 
onslaught is not in the form of a conventional offensive, but 
is rather modelled on the lines of classical guerrilla warfare, 
it is necessary to explain the meaning of the war-related terms 
frequently encountered when dealing with the SWA/Namibian 
situation. 
One of the key terms is that of "hot pursuit", developed by 
the Rhodesian armed forces in their crossing of borders to 
pursue retreating insurgents based in the neighbouring countries 
of Zambia and Mozambique. Including follow-up operations on 
their bases when it was deemed in the interests of Rhodesian 
security. Since approximately mid-1975, the South African 
Security Forces have taken up similar tactics in pursuit of 
SWAPO bases in Angola and other neighbouring territories 
harbouring SWAPO guerrillas. 
Strict legal interpretation of this type of activity is bound 
to create difficulties. There is some measure of uncertainty 
surrounding th~ right of self-defence and especially preven-
tative self-defence, such as South African and SWA/.Namibian 
Security Forces' operations into southern Angola which does not 
always meet the requirements of "hot pursuit" as.narrowly 
defined. · For example, the August/September 1981 incursion 
by these forces into Angola, code-named 'Operational Protea', 
reminded one more of semi-conventional warfare. In strict 
legal terms, "hot pursuit" is defined as military action within 
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State B's territory, by State A, by which State A hopes to 
destroy the guerrilla bases from which previous attacks have 
come and to discourage further attacks. Clearly, this type 




In May/June 1977, Rhodesia entered Mozambique territory and 
attacked insurgent
1
bases up to a distance of sixty miles from 
the border. The Rhodesian Government justified its action on 
grounds of "hot pursuit".'-
condemned the action. {S) 
The United Nation~ Security Council 
The invocation of the doctrine of 
"hot pursuit" across a land border would appear, in the 
absence of a treaty between the states concerned permitting 
. b . . f. bl ( 6 ) it, to e unJust1 1a e. In 1966 the General Assembly 
solemnly declared that 
" ... no state has the right to intervene, 
directly or indirectly, for any reason what-
ever, in the internal or external affairs of 
any other state. Consequentl~, a~med inter-
vention and all forms of interference or 
attempted threats against the personality of 
the state or against its political, economic 
or cultural elements are condemned. (7) 
One must, however, point out the difficulties of definition 
and terminology problems involved in every situation-specific 
example, be it South Africa; Israel, the USSR or whatever 
_country in question. In terms of SWA/Namibia it is important 
to remember that South Africa's occupation of the Territory is 
regarded as illegal, while the insurgency cause of the South 
West Africa People's Organisation is regarded as legal and 
·.encouraged by the International Community. South Africa on 
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the other hand, holds a diametrically opposite viewpoint. 
While the governments of states harbouring insurgent elements 
justify their actions mainly on political and ideological 
grounds, justification for cross-border operations by South 
African and SWA/Namibian Security Forces has been based on a 
variety of factors, including those of a legal, political and 
strategic nature. 
Legally, the right of "hot pursuit" has only been codi.fied in 
the international law of the sea. (B) This "right" may also, 
however, find expression on land as well -as in the air, but 
not in the strict terms defined in international law. In 
case of ground pursuit it refers to the uninterrupted imme-
diate pursuit of an offender, or group of offenders into the 
territory of another state. Hot pursuit should be clearly 
distinguished from actions such ·as self-defence and reprisals. 
The distinction between the right of self-defence and the 
right of hot pursuit is founded primarily on the difference in 
objectives. Self-defence aims to repulse aggression or armed 
attack from the outside, and to protect the territorial inte-
grity and independence of a country. The _main objective of 
hot pursuit on the other hand, is the perceivedly effective 
administration of justice by an injured state, and, if possible 
bringing before its courts, and punishi~g; transgressors. 
As to reprisals, there appears to be some uncertainty as far 
as their legality is concerned. Under the Charter of the 
United Nations the use of force by way of reprisals is illegal. 
The destruction of guerrilla bases for the security of a state 
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as a means of preventihg future attacks pre-emptive raids 
is no longer permitted under the abovementioned Charter, 
Article 51, in fact, requires an actual armed attack. The 
United Nations Security Council considers "hot pursuit" as 
being one-sided and akin to reprisals which are illegal.< 9 ) 
Excluding the legal justification on which cross-border opera-
tions are based, considerations of a political and 
1
strategic 
nature obviously prove to be important rationales behind such 
operations. In this regard the following motives can be 
identi£ied: Pre-emptive, in strategic terms, has the dbjec-
tive of forestalling an imminent attack, immediately or on a 
long-term basis. Destruction or capture of weapons is, there-
fore, a prime objective in any pre-emptive strike in order to, 
at least temporarily, redu~e, delay or destroy an insurgency 
movement's military capa6ity. Pre-emptive strikes are 
obviously aimed at the larger insurgent bases and cannot pre-
vent smaller groups of insurgents from functioning. In fact, 
the destruction of command bases more often than not, causes 
extensive fragmentation among the insurgent forces, in order 
to avoid detection until such time as organtsed regrouping can 
take place. 
In the period following World War Two the doctrine and prac-
tice of "deterrence" steadily crystallised in international 
l . . all h ld b . . f. d (lO) re at1ons, espec1 y as t e Co War ecame mor.e,· 1ntens1 le . 
In its most general form, deterrence is simply persuading_one's 
opponent that the cost, a·nd or risk of, a given course of action 
he might take could outweigh its benefits. (11) In this case 
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the image of threat represented by the enemy, directly or 
indirectly, plays a decisive role on the activities of the 
. .d· (12) opposing s1 e. 
Deterrence through cross-border operations could serve both as 
a warning to the governments of states harbouring insurgents, 
as well as to the insurgent leaders, indicating that future 
operations will follow unless insurgent activities 
I 
cease. Where deterrence in the original sense,. as defined 
above, that is defensive or capability deterrence through the 
application on conventional level, can seldom serve to prevent 
liberation struggles, offensive deterrence, through threats 
coupled with action, is often seen as a more effectiv~ alterna-
tive, as is clearly illustrated in the case of SWA/Namibia. 
However, it does not appear as if cross-border operations can 
be a completely effective deterrent either. None of the 
governments. the Angolan Government more specifically, har-
bouring and assisting SWAPO/PLAN and other anti-South'African 
insurgents has reacted by withdrawing support, training or base 
facilities. (l 3 ) 
Thus far, a number of war-related terms have been explained, 
although, no definition has been provided for the meaning of 
either "guerilla warfare, insurgents, or insurgent activities". 
Clear understanding of these terms is vital for assessing the 
merits of both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary causes. 
Two types of warfare are generally acknowledged to exist. So-
called conventional warfare is practised when frequent land, 
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sea and air forces of two or more parties oppose each other, 
and when the outcome that is reached is of a military nature. (l4 ) 
Unconventional warfare includes nuclear and revolutionary war-
fare. "Revolutionary or insurgency" warfare is by no means a 
modern phenomenon. Rather it is the age-old practice of the 
weaker resisting the stronger. Revolutionary warfare, often 
described as a guerilla war or a war of liberation, unlike 
conventional warfare, does not depend exclusively on military 
powers, extensions thereof are also found on a psychological, 
political, social, and economic level. 
"Terrorism" is. the military technique or tactic employed by 
the revolutionary or insurgent, which involves strikes into 
the opponents territory by means of murder, indiscriminate 
. t. d bl . . ( 15 ) assassina ion an pu ic execution. Terrorism is a term 
with strong pejorative overtones that can be both official and 
counter-revolutionary as well as revolutionary. In opposition, 
it is essentially the weapon of a minority which sees no chance 
. (16) of success by means of persuasion. "Terrorists" on the 
other hand are perceived as groups of revolutionaries or insur-
gents who use sudden ·indiscriminate attacks on non-military 
personnel with the purpose of spreading terror to the detriment 
of established order.(?) 
The fairly frequent appearance of guerrilla warfare since 
World War Two, as well as the praise of it in voluminous litera-
turi and propaganda, has conveyed the impression that as the 
classical uses of military power recede, this type of conflict 
may spread more rapidly. The modern doctrine of "people's 
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wars" is of Maoist origin and has been further developed by 
other revolutionary and guerrilla leaders. Three theories on 
the nature of this type of warfare have been formulated in 
recent decades: 
1. Guerrilla war is initially the weapon of the weak, who 
will eventually grow stronger and achieve victory in con-
ventional battle. 
2. Protracted guerrilla war will eventually undermine the I 
will of the opponent and achieve ,success by political rather than 
military attrition. 
3. Revolutionary guerrilla war can be used not only to change 
the status quo after a revolutionary situation has already 
arisen, but also to provoke and create a revolutionary 
't . (18) s1 uation. 
In his excellent study, 'The Myth of the Guerrilla', J. Bowyer 
Bell presents ,-historical evidence to show that, contrary to 
. the abovementioned general belief, this form of warfare is 
unlikely to become as significant as some observers and pro-
ponents would like to believe. All successful cases, he 
said, (e.g. China, North Vietnam, Algeria, Angola and Mozam-
bigue), have involved national wars of liberation. The revo-
lutionary guerrilla, however, whether rural or urban, has 
(19) 
failed in nearly all other cases. For example, the 
failure of workable long-term solutions to domestic problems of 
a political, social or economic nature, failure to uphold the 
protection of civilian life and property after independence has 
been forcibly attained. 
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The Rabushka and Shepsle paradigm introduced in Section One of 
the dissertation supports this point made by Bell. That is, 
the emergence of ambitious politicians, in the post-independence 
period, who involve themselves in politics of outbidding which 
is based upon, and further fosters, ethnicity that ultimately 
leads to the breakdown of brokerage institutions; the decline 
of democratic principles and electoral machinations and a 
strong possibil
1
i ty for politic al violence. ( 20 ) 
As so-called Father of Revolutionary thought, Mao Tse-tung made 
a number of contributions to broaden our understanding of this 
type of warfare. It should be sufficient, however, to repro-
duce the most central of his thoughts on this topic, for 6om-
parison and contrast with the SWA/Namibia situation: 
(a) "In a war of revolutionary character, 
guerrilla warfare is a necessary part. 
Guerrilla operations must not be con-
sidered as an independent form of war-
fare. It is but a step in the toal 
war, one aspect of the revolutionary 
struggle. Guerrilla warfare has quali-
ties and objectives peculiar to itself. 
It i~ a weapon that a nation or libera-
tion organisation, inferior in arms and 
military equipment, may employ against 
a more powerful aggressor nation. ( 21) 
(b) "Without a political goal, guerrilla war-
fare must fail, as it must if its politi-
cal objectives do not coincide with the 
aspirations of the people and their sym-
pathy, co-operation and assistance cannot 
be gained. The essence of guerrilla war-
fare is thus its revolutionary character.· 
Because guerrilla warfare derives basically 
from the masses and is supported by them, 
it can neither exist, nor flourish, if it 
separates itself from their sympathy and 
co-operation." ( 22) 
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(c) "All guerrilla units must have political 
and·military leadership. This is true 
regardless of the source or size of such 
units. Unorganised guerrilla warfare 
cannot contribute towards victory. The 
unorganised guerrilla movement is a haven 
for disappointed vagabonds and bandits." (23) 
(d) '.'The strategy of guerrilla warfare is mani-
festly unlike that employed in orthodox 
operations, as the basic tactic of the 
former is constant activity and movement. 
Small units acting independently play the 
principal role. There is no doubt that 
conditions of terrain, climate and society 
in general are obstacles that may be,used 
to the advantage of the guerrilla. There 
are certain fundamental steps necessary in 
the realisation of the guerrilla strategy: 
1. Arousing and organising the people; 
2. Achieving internal unification politi-
cally; 
3. Establishing bases; 
4. Equipping forces; 
5. Recovering national strength; 
6. Destroying the enemy's national strength; 
7. Regaining lost territories." (24) 
Quite a number of similarities can be seen between the Maoist 
concept of guerrilla warfare and the activities in which the 
South West Africa People's Organisation's military wing, the 
People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) is engaged in, in· 
northern SWA/Namibia .. A vast number of differences, how-
ever, are also discernible. 
(a) PLAN acts as the military wing of the party and not as a 
separate organisation independent of SWAPO. · PLAN· is 
recognised by the entire organisation as the vanguard of 
the liberation struggle. The organisation as~ whole is 
moving step by step towards complete identification with the 
military wing. <25 ) Furthermore, in the South African 
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Defence Force, PLAN is confronted by a formidable 
opponent far superior in military expertise. It is, 
therefore, the task of the party, SWAPO external, which 
is responsible for· the political leadership, to organise 
the entire movement as a strong unified force - with one 
voice, one party and one leadership, (.26) 
both on a military and ·a political level. 
activities 
However, to coin-
cide with the basic rules laid down by Mao Tse-Tung. What we 
have to determine is whether the organisation has succeeded in mobilisin 
the revolutionary consciousness of the entire SWA/Namibian society. 
(b) The Political Programme of SWAPO stipulates that the 
organisation is a mass movement supported by the majority 
of oppressed Africans and that it is working towards the 
universal arming of the Territory's people. That is, 
" ... to transform the armed struggle in 
Namibia into a truly people's war. All 
commanding cadres of PLAN are called upon 
to make concrete efforts towards the 
correct understanding of the revolutionary 
role of the masses in this struggle as well 
as to make them realise that that role is-
the primary condition for victory." ( 2 7) 
The organisation, therefore, professes to be conducting 
a struggle in the interest,of all Namibians; and asserts 
as fact that the broad mass of the Territory's people is 
in support of its revolutionary cause, and that this mass 
support is essential for victory all in accordance 
with Mao's requirements. These claims are questionable: 
SWAPO cadres are predominantly recruited from one of the 
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Territory's eleven population groups, the Ovambo-
speaking group, with a small number coming from the 
Kavanga-speaking group. The .other nine groups do not 
actively participate in the armed struggle, which became 
evident from the examination of the identity of deceased 
insurg~nts in the operational area. In practice, not 
even the entire Ovambo population is actively involved, 
while it is safe to assume that at least a small number I . 
completely dissociate themselves from this armed struggle. 
This group, as pointed out in the section dealing with 
the South West Africa People's Organisation, support 
alternatives such as the SWAPO-Democrats, the Reverend 
Peter Kalangula's CDA, or the Democratic _Turnhalle Alliance 
which is also active in Ovambo. This, however, is only 
important for the sake of argument, as the Ovambo, SWAPO's 
major source of support, constitute 51,1% of the total 
population, leaving no doubt as to the magnitude of 
SWAPO's popularity in the Territory. 
, (c) The political Commissar of PLAN, Kakaure Nganjane, has on 
various occasions argued that the only way to militarily 
defeat South Africa, or attain political independence, is 
through an organised armed struggle. In a personal inter-
view with co-founder member of SWAPO, Mr Andreas Shipanga, 
one very significant point that emerged centred around 
the reason for the establishment of the liberation 
organisation in the first place. That was the fear of 
the indigenous leaders that SWA/Namibia would stay South 
African dominated, unless a drastic effort was made to 
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alter this state of affairs. They believed that unless 
they took up active resistance against the South African 
Administration in the Territory it would refuse to grant 
territorial independence. 
Initially, from 1957/1958 to 1961, resistance took place 
on a political level only, without resort to military 
means. Failing to achieve this end, the party leader-
ship decided that a military programme was necessary. 
Returning to the Maoist model, it would then be correct 
to state that SWAPO's military and politic~l strategies 
are very closely linked with the same goal. Furthermore, 
SWAPO have a centralised political and military leadership 
in the Commander-in-Chief of PLAN who is also the President 
of the party. 
(d) In terms of the guerrilla strategies set out by Mao, very 
little needs to be said except for the fact that SWAPO 
did not entirely succeed in attaining the military goals 
set out by him. SWAPO has not grown into a formidabl~ 
opponent capable. of conventional victory or reclaiming 
lost national territories. It did succeed, however, in 
mobilising the mass of Ovambo in support of the national 
liberation cause, although, the extent of this support is 
uncertain it can be assumed to be fairly extensive. Un-
like the FLN (Front de Lib~ration Nationale) in Algeria 
which was involved in a similar protracted war of libera-
tion,. SWAPO's support was never broadly based, 
. f 11 h . d' <20 ' coming rom a t e in 1genous groups. 
89 
The earlier cited, but not discussed, three theories of Leites 
and Wolf also bear some relevance. Especially, two of the 
alternatives which are applicable to the SWA/Namibian situation. 
Since the late 1970s SWAPO has, like the South African Govern-
ment, followed what could be described as a "two stream" 
. ( 2 9) · 
policy. This policy, on the one hand, is the continua-
tion of a lost military struggle with one purpose only, to 
maintain the organisation's credibility and recognition in the 
I 
international area and at home. Thus, the organisation's 
military activities function as back-up to its international 
position and continued political role in whatever negotiations 
may take place. On the other hand, should SWAPO be deprived 
of its political role, there is no.doubt that the armed 
struggle would continue indefinitely. <3o) 
Furthermore, since the armed struggle is most unlikely to be 
won, either conventionally or unconventionally, it is to be 
expected that the organisation would hope for, and work towards, 
a negotiated independence settlement rather than be compelled to 
continue with the armed struggle. This two-stream policy ties 
u~ with the third alternative, the creatio~ of a revolutionary 
situation in order to change the status quo. Initiation of 
the armed struggle in the early sixties did irideed contribute 
greatly towards the politicisation of the Territory's popula-
tion groups. By the close of 1982, the SWA/Namibia War of 
Independence had progressed to the stage where SWAPO could be 
discarded as a decisive mi~itary factor, yet, politically and 
diplomatically the organisation had grown from strength to 
strength. Incidentally, SWAPO's military struggle did not 
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progress as favourably as that of ZANLA-PF in the Rhodesian 
War of Liberation, which, by June 1976, had a definite edge 
in the military sphere as well. ( 3l) 
Included in the Appendix is a graph which illustrates the 
gradual decline of SWAPO's insurgency activities between 
January 1981 and December 1982. Nevertheless, despite its 
poor military performance, as suggested by the graphs, it 
. I 
could, on the contrary, be said that SWAPO's activities were 
true to the basic principles of guerrilla warfare which require 
not so much military victories as an ability to continue with 
such subversive activities. The following section examines 
the point that the South African Defence Forces' military 
· _prowess counted to its own detriment, as far as its popularity 



















INSURGENT INCIDENTS·IN NORTHERN 
JANUARY 1981 TO· MARCH 
SHA/NAMIBIA 
1983 
FIGURES RELEASED'BY THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA 
TERRITORIAL FORCE HEADQUARTERS 
I' 
I I I 









I I I• 
I I 
I I I I 
I I . I 
I I 
I I I I 
I 
I I I I 
I I! 
t I! I I 
I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
'I I 
I I I I 
I I 
I 

















I I I 
I II I I 
I I I I 
1-1 I 

















I I I 
I I ' I I I 
Ii I 








I I I I 
,r 
I , 
I I • ,, I 
I /I I I 
I ,. I I 
I I -I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I 
I I 
I I I 










I 1 I I 
I I I 
I· I 
I I I 
I II ' II 
I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I I I 
I I 
I I 












'I '"" I I 
l I I 
I l I I 
I I 'fo I 
I! .,, I 
I I ,, I 
I I I I 
I! ! 


















I I I I 
I I ,,, I I I I ,., I It 
I I I 
I I ! ! 
I I 'I J I 
I I I I I I 
I I 
I I I 
"1'. 





I - I I 
I I 
I 
'"' 'fj I I Ii" I I I ..._ I 
I 
I I I I 
i' I 
I i I 
I I ,,, I 
I 1//1 I I I ' I 
I I ,, 
I I I I I 
I I I I :-..! •· 1 i I 
I I I I"' ! I 
'I I I I I 
I I ' I I I I
I I I I 
I I I 
I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I 
I /, I 
I 'I I 
I I I 
I I I 11 
II 
I ' I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
I I I I I ! I I I I 
I I I I I I I 














l .• i ' I 
I tt] I 
I""' 
I I I· ,.,. 
:-5i-. 
(Il f 
I I I 
! • I 
~ l 
·-- ~ I I 
Ii I I 
' ~ I ·~ I 
I I 





. .....- ....... 




I I I 
I :e:;' 
I 







I I I 
i r_ ,- ·-· ~ !~-~ .... 
1'.- r 
I I 
_l _\i i .! I 
i 1 u, 
,b;lt-'. ~ 





J I I 
' ..... I I I !, I I ' .----. I I 
i I I ii I I I I I I 
I I I ! I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I l lll! ,• 
I I 1· 1 '/ I I ·I It t 

































I I I 
'I 
t 1 ! , 
!/, 
II 
I I I 
i I Ii 
I Ii 1 I I 1 •.11 I I I I 
I I I I 
I 'I 
I ; ~ .. '. ! ! I I ~ ! I :+H- \ - ~ 'i,!-·,i, •.;1c-t-+-F-r-+-H-t-t-H~ 
' ( l I j I I l I I I l I _J I .l. I _1_::J:q,-,,-'!'"~H+-l-H++-1-!-+.;1, 
! I \ >I j I I ! l I I I l I l I .--.. I I 
'I 
I 
I I I I 
; I ! I I 
I l I I 
I J 
I J ! 1 IJ I I ..,. f I j I j ·">1 --- I I I 
J f , If J' I I ! j I ? j I I I ) I I t 1 i j I I I 
l 
92 
REFERENCES: Section 2.1 
1. Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for US 
Policy, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Vol.l, 
No.5, (Georgetown, University Press), 1979, p.38. 
2. Geldenhuys, D., Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 
"Total National Strategy", The South African Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, (Braamfontein, March 1981), pp.2-5. 
3. It is signitificant to note that P.W. Botha warned that a revolu-
tion is not impossible in South Africa, and that indeed may have 
I 
domestic origins in Some Foreign Policy Implications 1 of South 
Africa's "Total National Strategy", p.8. 
4. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963). 
5. Security Council Resolution 411, June 30, 1977. 
6. Poulantzas in The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law, 
(1966), pp.11-12. 
7. Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and 
Sovereignty, General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX), (1966), p.11. 
8. Bowett, D.W., The Law of the Sea, (Manchester, 1967). 
9. Bowett, D.W., Self Defence and International Law, (Manchester 
University Press, 1958), pp.187-193. 
10. Martin, L., Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age, (Baltimore, 
John Hopkins University Press, 1979), p.15. 
11. George, A.L. and Smoke, R., Deterance in American Foreign Policy: 
Theory and Practice, (London, Columbia ·University Press,- 1974), 
p.9. 
12. Akerman, N., On the Doctrine of Limited War, (Lund, Berlingska 
Boktryckeriet, 1972), p.141. 
93 
13. By courtesy of Paratus: The Windhoek Advertiser, 6 April 1982. 
14. Halperin, M.H., Limited War in the Nuclear Age, (London, Harvard 
University Press, 1963), p.66. 
15. Bowyer Bell, J., The Myth of the Guerrilla, (New York, Knopf, 
1971 ), p.91. 
16. Gaucher, R. and Spurlin, P., The Terrorist, (London, 1968). 
17. Standard Encyclopedia of Southern Africa, Vol.IO, p.457, (Cape 
Town, Nasou Limited, 1974). 
18. Leites, N. and Wolf, C. (jr.), Rebellion and Authority: An 
Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, (Chicago, Markham 
Publishing Company, 1970). 
19. Bowyer Bell, J., The Myth of the Guerrilla, (New York, 1971). 
20. Rabushka, A. and Shepsle, K.A., Politics in Plural Societies:· A 
Theory of Democratic Instability, (Ohio, Merrill Publishing Company 
1972), pp.91-92. 
21. Tse-tung, Mao, What is Guerrilla Warfare? in Politics and the 
International System, by Pfalzgraff, R.L. {jr.), (New York, J.B. 
Lippincott and Company, 1972), p.248. 
22. Op.cit., p.248. 
23. Op.cit., p.250. 
24. Op.cit., p.260. 
25. Namibia: SWAPO Fights For Freedom, · Edited by the Liberation 
Support Movement, (Oakland, USA, LSM Information Centre; i978), 
p.29. 
26. Op.cit., p.42. 
94 
27. The Political Programme of the South West Africa People's Organisa-
tion (SWAPO) ·of Namibia, (Windhoek, SWAPO, 1979), p.6. 
28. Horne, A.A., Savage War of Peace, (London, Macmillan Limited, 
1977), pp.537-538. 
29. The Cape Times, 3 June 1982. 
30. Footnote: In interview with Andreas Shipanga. 
31. 
I Stiff, P., Selous Scouts Top Secret War, (Alberton, RSA, Galago 
Publishing Company, 1982), p.444. 
95 
SECTION 2.2 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE IN 
SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA: 
AN ARMY OF OCCUPATION? 
.The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, 
announced onl21 June 1971, was a complete and decisive vindi-
t . f th u . d N . I • • (1) ca ion o e nite ations position. After twenty-five 
years of equivocation the right of the United Nations (UN) 
as the lawful governing authority in South West Africa/Namibia 
(SWA/Namibia) had been put beyond legal doubt. In.the phase 
to follow, from the early 1970s, the churches in the Territory 
took on a leading role in expressing and safeguarding the 
interests of the SWA/Namibia people. The principal SWA/ 
Namibian churches, the Anglican, Lutheran, and Roman Catholic 
( 2 ) . 
churches , responded to the patriotic aspirations of their 
members by taking, for the first time, a public stand against 
th . d . f h . · ( 3 ) e continue occupation o t e Territory. 
These churches declared unequivocally that; 
"We believe that South Africa, in its a.ttempts 
to develop the country has failed to take cog-
nisance of Human Rights as declared by the 
United Nations in 1948 with respect to the non-
white people of tl)e Territory." ( 4) 
Furthermore, the Church Boards of the two Lutheran churches 
expressed in a letter to the South African Prime Minister in 
June 1971 that their: 
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" ... urgent wish is that in terms of the 
declaration of the World Court and in co-
operation with the United Nations, the 
South African Government will seek a peace-
ful solution to the country's problems, see 
to it that Human Rights are put into opera-
tion, and that South West Africa may become 
a self-sufficient and independent state." (5) 
Simultaneously, the Church Boards issued a pastoral letter 
' (6) which stated.in clear language their opposition to apartheid. 
This pastoral letter was read in every Lutheran Church. In 
a country where 80% of the population is black, its impact was 
profound. The two other major churches, the Anglican and Roman 
Catholic, gave their full and public support to the Lutheran 
stand. 
"The Christian Church, as the conscience of 
this nation, must now speak out with clarity 
and without fear, that apartheid must be 
denounced as unacceptable before God", 
stated Bishop Colin Winter on 25 July 1971. ( 7 ) 
Several months later Bishop Winter was expelled from the 
country for his outspokenness. · In 1978 two churchmen, H. 
Hunke and J. Ellis, published a book called 'Torture: A Cancer 
~~~~~~~~~~~
/ 
in Our Society' ( 8 ) which contained sworn statements by tor-
ture victims. This book was promptly banned and within the 
year the two churchmen were expelled from their congregation 
·in SWA I Namibia. Since 1982, international church conc~rn over 
alleged South African Defence Force (SADF) atrocities within 
'SWA/Namibia has mounted markedly. Reports on this issue were 
published by the British Council of Churches, the South 
African Council of Churches, as well as by the Southern African 
Catholic Bishops Conference: 
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1. The British Report found that there were unanimous 
opinions on the fears of the local inhabitants. SWAPO 
guerrillas it said, were called "amati" or "friends". 
They operated in areas where they were known, and because 
they explained their actions to the local people, what 
they did was predictable and understood. On the other 
hand said the British Council of. Churches, the "Security 
Forces maintain a reign of arbitrary terror aga~nst which 
I 
the local people have no redress. 11 ( 9 ) 
2. The Reverend Peter Storey, Director of the South African 
Council of Churches, (SACC), and Bishop Desmond Tutu 
visited the Council of Churches in SWA/Namibia (formerly 
a member of the SACC). During the visit they spoke to 
several church leaders, but did not visit the war-stricken 
North. On their return, the Reverend Storey said that 
truth was the first casualty in the war situation, because 
public opinion in the ~erritoy was not reflected in the 
. (10) Republic. The churches, he said, were deeply concerned 
about the violence and suffering of the people. He.said 
Bishop Tutu spoke to a wide spectrum of the population, and 
discovered that the situation was "rem:i.niscent of Vietnam." . -
The most universal thought amongst the suffering people was 
the fear of the Defence Force, and the fact that they, 
rather than SWAPO; were to be feared. The South African 
Army, Reverend Storey said,-alleged that it was protecting 
the country from onslaughts from outside, however, he con-
eluded that "he had discovered not grati ti tude, but a deep 
h f 
. ·1· . . .. (11) resentment to the Sout A r1can mi 1tary occupation. 
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3. Shortly after the breakdown of the Geneva Conference, 7 to 
14 January 1981 (l 2 ), an official of the Southern African 
Catholic Bishops Conference made a tour of SWA/Namibia. 
The official reported to the Administrative Board of the 
Conference. This report arose so much concern that a 
special meeting was held to study the situation. This in 
turn led to the holding of an extraordinary plenary 
sessio9 of the Conference on 27 August 1981. At the end 
of this special plenary session the Bishops' Conference 
issued a statement which: 
" ... assured the Namibian people that it 
gives its full support to their hopes and 
aspirations to become an independent 
nation, agreeing that this should come 
about through a ceasefire and the holding 
of free and fair elections as envisaged in 
UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) 
that had b~en accepted by all parties 
involved.,; (13) 
The statement added that 'out of deep solidarity with the 
churches in Namibia, the Southern African Bishops' Conference 
intends to study and observe the situation in Namibia and seek 
ways of closer co-operation with those churches'. It was 
decided that there should be a further investigation of condi-
tions in the Territory, with a view to the Conference using its 
influence in the cause of peace and justice, and insofar as this 
appeared necessary, ex~ressing its Christian concern about the 
b . . fl" d h 1 f .·b .. (l 4 ) I wrongs e1ng in 1cte on t e peop es o Nam1 1a. twas 
further agreed that a six-member delegation should visit the 
Territory on a fact finding tour. Thii visit was duly carried 
out during September 1981 and resulted in a thirty-five page 
Report released by the SACBC on 14 May 1982. 
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The Report made numerous criticisms of the present political 
dispensation in the Territory. It also arrived at a number 
of conclusions, of which the most important were: 
1. That the majority of Blacks in SWA/Namibia's northern 
operational area were not afraid of SWAPO, but were petri-
fied of the South African Security Forces there; 
2. That the majority of SWA/Namibians had an overriding 
desire to see Resolution 435 (1978) implemented; 
3. That atrocities were committed by both the Security Forces 
and SWAPO; 
4. SWAPO enjoyed majority support and would win any free and 
fair election held within the Territory; 
5. That although SWAPO was purportedly Marxist-orientated it 
was infiltrated by.Christians and enjoyed widespread Chris-
tian support; 
6. That South Africa was trying to impose its system of 
Apartheid on the peoples of SWA/Namibia; ~nd 
7. That it was also responsible for the current impasse in the 
independence neg6tiations, primarily because South Africa 




This Report of-the SACBC received widespread support-as-well 
as evoked further similar criticism. .Archbishop Dennis Hurley, 
President of the Bishops Conference and leader of the six-member 
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delegation, claimed that the Report corresponded with reports 
by the General-Secretary and President of the South African 
Council of Churches as well as with views expressed by the 
British and Namibian Church Councils. A (London) Times 
editorial read that 
" ... if only half of the alleged military 
brutality in SWA/Namibia was true, the 
charges constitute a condemnation which no 
government can ignore." (16) 
Early in 1982 in London, the British Council of Churches and 
the London-based Catholic Institute brought together church 
leaders from all the major denomination in an appeal to the 
Western Contact Group (WCG). Shouid South Africa continue to 
prevent the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 
435 (1978), then the respective governments of the WCG would be 
justified in supporting a call in the United Nations for the 
imposition of mandatory sanctions, in particular, a strictly-
monitored oil embargo. The group concluded its statement bi 
expressing the belief that in a country as overwhelmingly 
Christian as SWA/Namibia, the voice of the church was both sig-
nificant and representative of the aspirations of its peoples. 
Furthermore, in their ftealings with the Couricil of Churches in 
SWA/Namibia, they encountered the belief that too little atten-
' tion had been paid by the WCG to the Christian Churches in the 
Territory, which "speak unequivocally for the majority of 
Namibian people." (1 7 ) 
THE CASE IN SUPPORT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE 
In sharp contrast to the widespread international support for 
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the cause of the Namibian peoples, support for South Africa's 
military presence in the Territory is rather thinly spread. 
Only limited instances of support for the South African 
Catholic Defence League (SACDL), which is only a fringe group 
and barely representative of the.Catholics, voiced its con-
scientious objection concerning the statement made by the 
Bishops Conference on SWA/Namibia. The Leagues' Secretary, 
J. Roodbol, said that if the Bishops had proof of atrocities 
r 
committed by Security force members, it was their conscientious 
obligation to bring this to the notice of the courts. As far 
,, 
as SWAPO's alleged Christian faith was concerned, he pointed 
out that the official orientation of the organisation was 
Marxist and that it was backed by international communism. 
The-refore, the SACDL was asking the Bishops Conference to stop 
whitewashing SWAPO and stand up and preach Catholic doctrine 
instead of communism and terrorism and condemn them both, as 
(18) 
Pope John Paul II had done. In addition to the SACDL not 
/ 
being representative of the Cathol"ic it is clear that Mr Rood-
bol's statement was underlined by strong personal motives. 
\ 
A prominent black leader of the internal Democratic Turnhalle 
Alliance, Mr K. Riruako, even went as far as stating in the 
interim National Assembly, during 1982, that the "blood of this 
country" is on the hands of the Catholics and Lutherans. They 
"assist the murder.ers to murder well", and act as agencies for 
SWAPO, while encouraging ill-feeling amongst the inhabitants 
of the country. These allegations in turn were promptly 
repudiated by the local Catholic services•. This official 
announcement called upon Mr Riruako to produce proof to sub-
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stantiate his allegations, otherwise his statements would have 
to be considered as deliberate slander against the Church. (l 9 ) 
Similarly, Mr K. Kaura, member of the DTA Head Committee, 
released a report accusing the Evangelical Church in Germany, 
the World Council of Churches, the World Lutheran Federation, 
and the Namibian Council of Churches, of actively supporting 
SWAPO in its planned campaign of brutality against the indige-
nous Black peoples of SWA/Namibia. <20 > Once more requests 
were made, this time by the Namibian Council of Churches. 
that substantiating evidence be brought forward, and again no 
response was forthcoming. 
SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
As is usually the case in situations of conflict, the pictures 
presented on the one side of Churches within the local and 
international communities, as well as private people inter-
viewed; and on the other side, by the South African Govern-
ment and its supporters, are so different that they scarcely 
seem to refer to the ~ame issues and country. The fact of the 
matter is that atrocities were committed by Security Force mem-
bers, a fact readily admitted by Security Fo~ce s~okesman. In 
March 1982 a Military Board of Inquiry was officially insti-
tuted to investigate all reported acts of brutality committed 
by Security Force members. 
The Inquiry temporarily completed in· June 1982, presented 
findings supporting accusations brought by local and inter-
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national bodies. Atrocities of various natures were committed. 
Altogether thirty-seven people testified before the Board of 
Inquiry. In Kavango allegations ranging from theft, physical 
and sexual assault, intimidation and murder were investigated. 
Sixteen complaints, involving eight separate incidents, were 
brought to the attention of the authorities in this region. 
In Ovambo twenty-four incidents were brought to the fttention 
of the Board, only one of which could not be solved,' while more 
serious cases were referred to the SWA Police. It was further 
intended that this Board of Inquiry would resume its functions 
whenever new cases were reported, and to this end it addressed 
a serious request to the general public, urging them to report 
all complaints and incidents for investigation. This led to 
a second military investigation into alleged mistreatment of 
K · ·1· b S · F b dur1'ng May 1983.(
2l) avango c1v1 1ans y ecur1ty orce mem ers 
The second investigation followed after the man-handling of 
three villagers detained on 20 April 1983. <23 > As with the 
.\ first investigation it was interesting to note that alleged 
atrocities were limited to either the Kavango or Ovambo areas, 
both of which are situated in the northern ~perational area. 
A number of factors suggest that the Board of Inquiry was by 
no means successful in clearing all suspicion surrounding 
-- Security F.orce brutalities, or in erasing either_ the. _local or 
· international communities' fear of recurring incidents in the 
future. In fact, its ~uccess and credibili~y was jeopardised 
right from the outset, as the three major churches active in 
the operational area, the Evangelical Ovambo Kavango Church, 
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the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches, rejected the possi-
bility of a viable outcome.emanating from this joint Security 
Force Ovambo Administrative Board of Inquiry exactly 
because of the prominent role played by the Security Force 
officers on the Board. 
Church participation is urgently needed to lend credibility 
to the ~oard's activities amongst the local population. Acts 
of brutality are often reported to the churches but rarely to 
Security Force Officials only thirty-two complaints came 
to the attention of the Board. The stumbling block to church 
participation and recognition stems from the strong represen-
taion enjoyed by the Security Force on the Board of Inquiry, as 
a senior church official said, 
" ... why should one of the parties under inves-
tigation play such a prominent role in its pro-
ceedings?" (23) 
Consequently, even though invited, there was never any church 
'representation on the Board of Inquiry. 
Further shortcomings of this Boaid of Inquiry need brief men-
tion. The most obvious is the fact that the Board became 
operative only in 1982, and was, therefore, bound to miss quite 
a number of allegations and complaints simply because of the 
long time that had elapsed since the occurrence of some inci-
dents. Fear of retribution most certainly also played an 
adverse role in limiting the number of complaints officially 
lodged, all of which enabled local and South African Authori-
ties to present their own case in a more favourable light. 
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Unfortunately, even more serious accusations against the 
Security Forces went unnoticed. For instance, late in 1982, 
the Editor of the Windhoek Observer, Mr Hannes Smith, known as 
an out-spoken opponent of South Africa's military-administrative 
occupation of SWA/Namibia was put on trial on several charges. 
He was convicted under the Police Act, the Defence Act, the 
Publications Control Act and the Indecent or Obscene Photo-
graphic Matter Act. Legal details of this sordid court case 
need not be mentioned here, but, as a well-info'rmed member of 
the White community, Mr Smith made a number of interesting r . 
general statements relating to the Defenc~ Force's status in 
the Territory~ 
Amongst other things, he alleged that there was a definite 
deterioration in Defence Force liaison with the media and that 
the public were kept in the dark as to the true role and activi-
ties of the Defence Force in the Territory. In his own words, 
"For years and years you (SF) have misled the 
rpeople of this country with wrongful propa-
ganda." 
He also claimed that he was victimised since he,· 
" . . . acknowledged the existence of SWAPO and 
reported on the atrocities allegedly 
committed by both sides." (24) 
Coming from a prominent community member, sucih accusations can 
hardly be ignored. 
This is still not the end of the matter. Security Force 
members are by no means viewed as the major culprits in vio-
r 
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lating the civil security of local inhabitants. The Board 
failed to investigate rumours about the unofficial "extermina-
tion" squad operative in Ovambo under such names as "Koevoet/ 
Crowbar", "One Way", or "Unit K". This omission diminishes 
even further the Board's credibility none of the units 
alleged atrocities were brought before the Board. 
It is said that this "Police Task Force •1, (its official status) 
was founded to terrorise and intimidate,residents of Ovambo, 
with a view to pressurising them to assume a more anti-SWAPO 
stance. An article published in a church publication, 
( 25) 
"Omukwetu" , stated that "Death Squad K" had an extermina-
tion list of all the leading figures in Ovambo, which had to 
be achieved before independence. "Omukwetu" further alleged 
that some people had already been eliminated, while approxi-
t 1 f "ft . d th 1· t (Z6 ) ma e y 1 y more names rema1ne on e is . Task Force 
K is further accused of many acts of brutality, destr~ction of 
public facilities and private property, thereby amounting to a 
further source of fear and" intimidation. 
In personal interviews with several people, who wish to remain 
anonymous, as they frequently visit the northern region of 
SWA/Namibia, Ovambo more specifically, I was left with the 
impression that "Koevoet" or "Police Task Force K" indeed 
constitutes a severe menace to the safety of persons and 
property of civilians residing in this region. Moreover,, there 
is no doubt whatsoever about the brutal and suppressivse nature 
of this police task force. Denis Beckett, Editor of Frontline 
during a visit to the northern operational area, confirmed the 
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utter rejection with which Koevoet is viewed by the local 
inhabitants. ( 27 > 
Interestingly, not only black people are harassed, White people 
too fall prey to its victimisation. I came to the overall 
conclusion that an organised reign of terror had been enacted 
in Ovambo. The purpose of such a policy is somewhat unclear, 
yet, it is kqown that the majority of SWAPO supporters reside 
I 
in Ovambo, and may, therefore, be intimidated by these violent 
activities. It also represents a further threat to SWAPO 
supporters as many of the Police Task Force's members are 
. ( 28) 
"turned" ex-SWAPO's. The "turning" and active use of cap-
tured insurgents was extensively practised by th~ Rhodesian 
Selous Scouts. ( 29 > 
It is known that Police Task Force K is a formiddable counter-
insurgency unit, .involved in almost every hot pursuit operation 
and it is,claimed that it is responsible for 60% to 70% of all 
guerrillas slain in the war-zone annually. However, Commander 
of the Task Force, Brigadier Hans Dreyer, dismisses all adverse 
accusationsi describing the unit strictly as a disciplinary 
force which must execute its orderi and functions within the 
confines of what is prescribed by the Police Code. Though, 
as Beckett pointed out,· 
" . . . it would be wrong ( to say nothing of being 
illegal) to pass on specific allegations without 
taking considerable steps to verify them,". ( 30) 
This proved a difficult task due to the paucity of information 
published and the secrecy surrounding the unit. Peter Kalangula 
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for example, leader of the Christian Democratic Alliance for 
Social Justice which is operative in Ovambo, when interviewed 
by Beckett, bluntly stated: 
( 31 ) 
"I have no comment to make on 
Koevoet." 
Consequently, one is forced to rely on the local news media 
for publicised information on Koevoet. Due to the serious 
nature of issu~ surrounding the Task Force's activities, one 
~ 
must also be rather discriminatory in selecting this material. 
On 23 May 1983, in the proceedings of a court case held in 
Windhoek, the Court heard from Police Secret Service Inspector. 
Phillipus Nel that "Koevoet II did exist and that he had . 
heard that members had been "disguised" as SWAPO insurgents, 
b h h d . d t h 1 ' f th. ( 32 ) I ut tat e 1 no ave persona experience o is. n 
a further court case held in Windhoek on 4 May 1983 a former 
SWAPO insurgent, Angula Mwaala, told the Supreme Court that 
his group had made contact with a Polic~ counter-insurgency 
unit dressed in the same uniforms as SWAPO infiltrators. 
Known as "Iikenuelela" because they "wore the same clothes as 
SWAPO", Mwaala alleged that this was done to achieve success 
-. . - k. 11. SWAPO . t ( 33 ) A . d in capturing or 1. 1ng 1nsurgen s. s po1nte out 
earlier, the tactic of masquerading as i~surgents was put to 
extensive use by the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. <34 ) 
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 
So far only civilian-related incidents have been recounted. 
Often questions arise about the treatment meeted out to SWAPO 
Prisoners of War (POW). ProclamationsAG9 and AG26 provide 
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for detention without trial and for the release of information 
. ( 3 5 ) 
to relatives. These two Proclamations, passed in November 
1977 and April 1978 respectiveiy, have provoked criticism from 
as far afield as the Committee on South African War Resistors, 
various local international Church and Humanitarian founda-
tions, and from the internal Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 
which has repeatedly appealed to the Administrator~ General's 
office for the scrapping of these Proclamations as they reflect 
! 
the Defence Force's case in a bad light. How should SWAPO 
POWs be treated? University of Witwatersrand Professor of 
law, Professor Dugard, examined this question in depth. 
The South African and South West African Defence Forces have as 
one of their objectives, the capturing of insurgents in order 
to bring them before the courts. In one such court case, 
giving evidence in defence of the accused insurgents, Professor 
Dugard .summoo. up the situation with the following comments: 
1. In order to fully understand the international legal frame-
work surrounding the South West African issue, it is essen-
tial to keep abreast of developments in the United Nations 
and other international bodies. International Humani-
tarian Law, initially formulated under the 1929 Geneva Con-
vention, applied only to declared wars or to conflicts 
·recgnised by belligerents as amounting to a state of war 
under international law. ( 36 ) 
2. In order to overcome this weakness in the Geneva Convention, 
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 introduced a common 
article which extended the conventions to "armed conflicts" 
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even if a state of war is not recognised by one of the 
parties. The principle underlying the specific prohi-
bitions on murder, cruel treatment and torture contained 
in that article, was that those persons taking no part 
in ho~tilities, including surrendered combatants, the 
wounded and sick, were in all circumstances to be treated 
humanely. ( 37 ) As South Africa acceded to the 1949 
Geneva fonvention on 31 March 1952 consequently, this 
specific article should govern the treatment of SWAPO 
(38) 
members. 
3. United Nations Proclamation 1514 of 1960 declared that 
colonialism in all forms is illegal. Resolution 2621 of 
1970 was adopted to stipulate that members of nati6nal 
liberation movements should be treated as Prisoners of War, 
while Resolution 3103 declared that armed conflicts in-
volving struggles of peoples against colonialism and alien 
domination were to be regarded as international armed 
conflicts. (39 > There is no doubt that these actions 
intended that South West Africa, too, would fall within the 
ambit of Resolution 1514 of 1960, which declared all forms 
of colonialism illegal, and by implication, SWAPO's struggle 
as being legal. ( 40) 
4. A Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law was called by 
the Swiss Government in co-ordination with the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in 1974, to revise the 1949 
Geneva Convention in terms of armed conflicts and national 
Liberation movements. However, South Africa did not attend the 
\ 
I I 1 
final session of the Conference and did not sign the sub-
sequent protocol. Therefore, in strictly legal terms, 
South Africa is not bound by treaties other than the 1949 
Geneva Convention ~igned in 1952. Nor is it obliged to 
confer prisoner of war status on SWAPO members. (4l) 
However, two issues need to be mentioned. SWA / Namibia is 
seen as a territory with a definite international status, 
which is not even.denied by South Africa, and any major con-
flict in the Territory should likewise be regarded as having 
international status. There is also the fact that South 
Africa's presence in the Territory had been deemed to be illegal 
thereby conferring full international support to the cause and 
struggle of the South West Africa People's Organisation. <42 ) 
In conclusion, a number of points can be made concerning the 
Security Forces' presence in the Territory. Although con-
elusive proof is, in the nature of things, hard to establish, 
there is mu~h ~ircumstantial evidence that points to a pattern 
·of brutality and violence towards the local populace. It 
would be surprising if this were not the c~se, seeing that, 
invariably, insurgent wars whethei in Algeria, Vietnam, or 
Rhodesia were characterised by great brutality on both 
· .d (43) s1 es. Since both sides see their activities as just and 
legal, it would not be entirely justified summarily to brand 
and reject the Defence Force as "an army of occupation", even 
though this would appear to be the view shared by locals and 
outsiders alike. In all fairness, due consideration should be 
paid to the overriding motivations behind the South African 
Defence Forces' war-effort in SWA I Namibia. · 
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SECTION 2.3 
SOUTH AFRICA'S SECURITY POLICIES: 
VIEWPOINTS OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA 
To offer plausible arguments in defence of South Africa's 
militctry presence in South West Africa/Namibia (SWA/Namibia) 
is no easy task. For one reason ,I South Africa itself very 
. I 
aptly could be described as the world's leading country in socio-
poli tical conflicts(l). while for another, SWA/Namibia forms 
only part of, although a vital one, South Africa's broader 
S h Af . . d . . t . ( 2 ) out ern rican security an economic stra egy. It is 
important to view the Territory as an integral part of such a 
broad Southern African perspective, as it could be considered 
a positive new front in the alleged onslaught against South 
Af 
. ( 3) 
rica. 
National Party policies evoke much.criticism both in South 
Africa and SWA/Namibia, yet, it appears that the Government 
remains generally indifferent to it. Due to South Africa's 
present political dispensation that structure and command the 
entire society, generate confusion amongst the media and public 
alike, it so happens that SWA/Namibia is a further "grey Area" 
surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty about how the Govern-
ment sees the Territory in its future policy for Southern 
Africa. 
In particular, one finds two general views-on the SWA/Namibia 
issue, neither of which is very accurate or dependable. Trends 
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in the international view of the Territory, a view based· 
largely on facts, impressions and bias of outsiders, depicts 
the South African Defence Force as a brutal repressive force 
illegally occupying the Territory. The second view is that 
presented by the Defence Force and Government 
· spokesmen. Unfortunately, developments within SWA/Namibia 
often contradict the validity of statements made by these 
spokesmen, ·as is clear from the opinion of the churches cited 
I 
in the,preceding section. 
Political scientists and professional observers who wish to· 
understand the SWA/Namibia problem in its entirety must study 
not only political developments within the Territ6ry, but also 
the South African political climate, its government ;and 
1 . · <
4 ) . 11 h f' . h b d h po 1c1es , as we . as how t ese 1 t into t e roa er Sout ern 
African picture. For convenience and clarity I have divided 
and selected from this vast quantity of material what I consider 
three areas of priority. .Section Two, 1, 2 and 3 deal .. broadly 
with matters directly related to the SWA/Namibia issue. whiie 
Section Two, 4 focuses on Angola and its "linkages" to SWA/ 
Namibia, and Section Two, 5 briefly outlines the broader 
Southern African perspective. Due to the tremendous complexity 
and overlap of material of these sections, the aim is to be as 
brief as possible without omitting too much information or pers-
pective. 
Earlier quoted theories on guerrilla warfare described SWA/ 
Namibia's socio-political situation ~s a revolutionary situa-
tion, exercising direct influence on both Territorial and South 
117 
Af . . ( 5 ) rican security. Mention also has been made of the poli-
tical, economic, historical and emotional overtones attached 
to, and forming part of, the ties between the two countries. 
As for legitimacy, Government and Defence Force spokesmen 
' I regularly manipulate the media in attempting to mould a more 
favourable external opinion of the South African Defence Force 
and its military activities North and South of the Cunene 
R
. ( 6) 
iver. 
Within the Territory attempts have been made to win the "hearts 
( 7 ) and minds" of the local population groups through a programme 
known as the Civic Action Programme (CAP). The intention of 
the CAP has been set out very clearly in a paper by the Supreme 
Military Commander of the Territory, General Charles Lloyd, in 
1979. 
"To secure through administrative and socio-
economic action, the good will, support and 
co-operation of the local population by 
1. alleviating friction points, grievances 
and dissatisfaction; 
2. improving'the standard of living; and 
3. giving the local population something 
worthwhile to defe~d in the revolutionary 
war." ( 8) 
At the same time the Defence Force utilises the opportunity to 
demonstrate to the local population that they are there to help 
and protect them. ( 9 ) The Civic Action Programme consists of 
. . . 
the use of military servicemen in non-military forms of service, 
but always as members of the South African Defence Force. ,They 
work as teachers, engineers, legal, agricultural and financial 
advisers, doctors, dentists, veterinary surgeons, lecturers, 
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administrative personnel and even as traders and directors of 
. . (10) 
tourism. 
The extent of success achieved by the CAP is not quite clear, 
as it is still active in a number of fields. However, for 
various reasons, one can safely assume that it has met with 
moderate success only: 
1. The Ovambo-ipeaking region remaihs grossly underdeveloped 
and has to undergo a long developmental process before it 
will be able to adapt to the modern values and standards 
now introduced. 
2. The decades of bush war, suffering, misery, and the fact 
that SWAPO still draw the larger part of its support from 
the Ovambo-speaking population. surely have had an adverse 
effect on the progress of the CAP. Brutalities and atro-
cities committed by members of the Security Forces did not 
further its cause eith~r. 
3. On the other hand, SWAPO is also known to be ruthless 
towards locals suspected of informing on its activities. 
They are normally accused of being puppets of the South 
I 
African armed forces, and executed on the spot as traitors 
to the Namibian people. The local inhabitants are there-
fore, caught between the two conflicting forces, which 
leaves them little choice for wholehearted s~pport for 
either of them. 
To overcome this dilemma, the Defence Force implemented a 
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rather "ingenious" method to .overcome the animosity of the 
local population. They were provided with a new, more accept-
able cause to identify with, at least ·from a Security Force 
point of view. Unde~ the effect of Proclamation No.AG.131, 
sixty-seveh military units were transferred to the authority of 
the locally residing Administrator-General, a major move towards 
the establishment of a multiracial local South West Africa 
1erritorial Force (SWATF). (ll) Al~hough Proclamation AG.131 
came into effect on 1 August 1980, it did not involve the with-
drawal of the South African defence forces from the Territory. 
The creation of the SWATF would appear to be attributable to 
two overriding reasons. Firstly, to function as the backbone 
of local security after independence, by filling the security 
vacuum left by the withdrawal of South African forces; 
I 
secondly, and.possibly more importantly, to establish an offi-
cial armed force within which members of all the Territory's 
(12) 
population groups can participate freely. 
The latter aspect derives its importance from its multiracial 
h t All . d B 1· Cl 3 ) 1 . . 11 c arac er~ units an atta ions are mu ti-racia y 
composed with no form of discrimination or ~partheid amongst 
rank-and-file recruits, while the command structure is still 
predominantly comprised of white officers. In the period 
1981-1982, more tha~ 30% of the troops doing border duty in 
the northern Operational area were drawn from SWATF ranks. (l 4 ) 
Reference must be made to the earlier discussed Police Task 
Force K with its large Ovambo-membership. Major-General 
Geldenhys stated that SWAPO had lost approximately 2 000 men 
through "desertions" during the first six months_ of 1979 (lS), 
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all of whom, in the form of "turned"(l 6 ) insurgents, joined 
security force ranks. It would then appear as if SWAPO's 
central source of support was badly mauled in the process of 
local militarisation, as defence force spokesmen insist that 
since the early 1980s, SWAPO has had to rely largely on the 
bd . f b 1 . h . f . h . k . (1 7 ) a uction o young Ovam o to rep enis its ig ting rans. 
Yet, local reaction to the establishment of the SWATF was not 
I 
favourable either. The Damara Executive Committee, for 
example, totally opposed a multiracial Territorial Force based. 
upon compulsory military service. The Committee felt that 
such a step would cause an escalation in the ongoing population 
exodus especially amongst young people; that the war 
would take on a civil character where fellow Namibians would 
kill one another; and that it could easily jeopardise sensitive 
developments in the settlement talks. (l 9 ) Despite such criti-
cism from various sources, local news media regularly described 
the outstanding services voluntarily performed by the non-white 
members of the SWATF. 
Other spill-over effects resulted from Proclamation 131. The 
multiracial nature of the SWATF is bound to be advantageous to 
the formation of a broader pro-South African attitude amongst 
. . . f . . f h 1 1 1 · (l9) a signi icant cross-section o t e oca popu ation. This, 
it is hoped, will have a stabilising effect on the country and 
its peoples. Since conscription for non-whites is not yet 
compulsory, the SWATF acts as last resort for employment, for 
. ( 20) 
the estimated 30 000 to 75 000 unemployed in 1982. 
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General Lloyd, Supreme Military Commander in the Territory, 
recently explained the status and role of the SWATF during 
the actual independence period: He said that the development 
of th~ SWATF was an intricate part of SWA/Namibia's indepen-
dence process, and that it would form the basis of the new 
state's defence force. There would be a temporary demili-
tarisation of the SWATF immediately prior to independence, 
1hough, this would .. only last for the duration of the indepen-
dence campaign. After the election the constitution would 
provide for a defence force which would incorporate the SWATF 
. . k d ( 21) as it is nown to ay. · To reassure the local white popula-
tion group, General Lloyd emphatically stated that personal 
( 22) 
weapons would not be hande::'i over to UNTAG supervision, nor - ·, 
would UNTAG control arms and ammunition handed in for custody. 
He assured this group of the public that he personally cleared 
those issues with General Prem Chand, the officer who would 
command the UNTAG (United Nations Transition Assistance Group) 
peace-keeping force. 
The central question of this section undoubtedly should focus 
on the reasons that inspired this ~ilitarisation of the SWA/ 
Namibian society. Is the South African Government purely 
·' interested in securing its economic interests in the Territory, 
or, are there deeper underlying reason~ for South Africa's per-
sistent occupation of the country? Clearly this question is 
of a multi-faceted nature, and, since we are dealing with two 
dynamic communities which interact on various levels, there 
cannot, therefore, be one correct answer to this question. In 
addition to over-simplification, one must guard against omitting 
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the importance of historical ties between the countries, an 
error frequently committed. 
The existence of extensive economic dependency of SWA/Namibia 
on South Africa, must be a further factor of importance to 
South African policy makers who would much prefer to have a 
"moderate" rather than a "radical" government in Windhoek, as 
it will ensure easier access to the Territory's markets and 
primary .products, and hence, maintain such dependency. 
Despite the fact that SWA/Namibia's economy is largely export-
orientated, and that the larger part of these exports ~s for 
the South African market( 23 >, two qualifying statements need to 
be made. 
Should South Africa, for one reason or another, lose its 
economic assets in the territory, there is no way that it will 
seriously affect or hamper South Africa's economic well-being 
as was clearly stated in the introductory economic section. 
Furthermore, the existence of future trade relations between 
the two countries need not necessarily have to be of an 
exploitative nature. The true state of affairs is that SWA/ 
Namibia, and not South Africa, is dependent on the aid and 
economic interaction with South Africa, and will suffer more 
severely from the severance of these ties than the latter. 
Although South Africa profits from its economic relations with 
SWA/Namibia, the.Territory is, in purely national economic 
terms, a liability for South Africa. (24 > 
The South African Government and local white population in 
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particular, place much emphasis on the alleged 'security-
linkages' between the two territories. <25 ) The existence of 
these security relations is by no means fictitious. It is 
widely agreed that SWA/Namibia at present, next to South 
Africa,. is the second last remaining "vestige" of white 
supremacy riot yet engulfed by Africa's era of African 
N t ' l' (26) a iona ism. However, once SWA/Namibia attains inter-
nationally recognised independence, South Africa automatically 
. I 
will become the next focal point in the African nationalist 
struggle. Quite possibly Namibia would open-up as the last 
f t . th . . S th Af . ( 2 7 ) new ron in e campaign against ou rica. 
For these reasons it is to be expected that the South African 
regime will do all in its power to prevent a 'hostile' regime 
from coming to power in Windhoek. A SWAPO Government, backed 
by the Soviet Union( 2S), is often equated with a 'hostile 
regime', and, therefore, seems to imply that South Africa 
would not accept a SWAPO Government in the Territory. This 
view is correct as far as the "communist" element is concerned. 
On the other hand, Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, on numerous 
occasions·has stated that his government would welcome SWAPO 
rule in Windhoek, provided that the organisation came to power 
through its participation in 'free and fair' democratic elec-
t . h ld . h. h ( 2 g) A h . d t ions e wit int e country. s Mr Bot a sai a a 
Cape Congress of the National Party: 
"Any political party·that·takes part in a con-
stitutional, peaceful way, will be allowed to 
go to the polling booth with i·ts supporters 
and they have the right and possibility of 
winning the election. My attitude would be to 
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accept the verdict of 'the people of South 
West Africa but I am not going to allow 
foreign inteiesti to foiit-~ .. minority 
government with guns on the majority of 
the people of South West Africa." (30) 
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SECTION 2.4 
ANGOLA, THE CUBAN QUESTION AND 
.THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA LINKAGE 
CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
In 1979 some 32 000 Cuban troops were in Africa(l), concen-
trated primarily in Angola and Ethiopia. Cuba's leadership 
publicly emphasised the role of Cuban civilians engaged in 
development work in Africa, although the civilian personnel 
were outnumbered four to one by the military personnel active 
in Africa. A Research Paper compiled by the United States. 
National Foreign Assessment Centre, on Communist Aid activi-
ties in non-Communist less-developed countries, provided more 
acurate, but averagely higher, estimates on Cuban activity on 
the continent. See Appendices I - III. 
Ethiopia, in 1979, accommodated 13 000 Cuban troops, while 
some 19 000 enjoyed Angolan hospitality by the close of the 
1970s.( 2 ) With 14 000 defence personnel and only 5 000 economic 
technicians in Angola the Cuban presence clearly is not aimed 
at the reconstruction of ·the country's economic infra-structure 
but rather for reasons of security. 
Apart from Cuba's milit~ry and economic ties with Africa, 
Cuban· 1eaders frequently point ·to Cuba's historical links with 
Africa since the slave trade, so that allegedly, more than half 
of Cuba's population are desceridants of freed slaves, (mainly 
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of West African origin). Cuban President, Fidel Castro, 
uses this historical linkage to identify Cuba with African 
National 
( 3 ) 
causes such as the elimination of white 
minority rule in South Africa. He has described Cuba as a 
"Latin-African" nation. However, domestic realities in Cuba 
suggest a different picture. Cubans of African descent are 
seriously under-represented in the Council of State, Council 
of Ministers, and the Cuban Communist Party's Central cpmmit-
tee, where, in 1980, they had only 8% of the seats. ( 4 ) 1 
Cuba's involvement in Angola is only part of an historic trend 
in Cuban foreign policy. After Castro's seizure of power in 
1959, Cuba quickly identified itself with other revolutionary 
movements. <5 > In 1960 it provided military assistance to the 
Algerian Liberation Front (FLN) in the final stagei of the 
( 6 ) 
Algerian liberation struggle. Links were established 
with left-wing opposition groups in several independent 
African states. Several leaders of the 1964 revolutionary 
movement in Zanzibar were trained in Cuba. Activists of the 
banned Senegalese Communist Movement, the Parti Afr:i.cain 
d'Ind~pendence, were arrested in Dakar, 1~65, on their return 
f ·1· . . . b <7 > d . , 19'69 S l rom mi itary training in Cu a , an in. . enega com-
plained about the discovery of pamphlets originating from Cuba 
that incited anti-government activities in Senegal. In 1966, 
Cuba's Embassy in' Accra was shut down following _the disclosure 
that Cuba was training Ghanaians in guerrilla activity, aimed 
at restoring the deposed President Nkrumah to power. 
During the 1970s, these activities were increasingly replaced 
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by direct support for radical governments and causes. {B) 
Cuban troops, supported by massive deliveries of Soviet 
weapons, were decisive for the MPLA victory over the rival 
National Front for the Liberation of Angola {FNLA) and the 
National Union for the Liberation of Angola {ONITA), in the 
civil war that erupted in the wake of the Portuguese with-
drawal from Angola in November 1975. ( 9 ) 
Extensive Cuban involvement is also noticeable in the Horn 
of Africa. Prior to 1975, Cuba's military presence in East 
Af . 1 1 . 1 . . . . . . S 1 . {l O ) rica was arge ya mi itary ~raining mission in oma ia. 
The overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in 1974, 
and the introduction of a radical regime in Addis Abbaba 
resulted in the presence of Cuban troops in Ethiopia. (ll) By 
late 1980, the Ethiopian forces, with Soviet-Cuban assistance, 
( 12) 
had effectively expelled Somali armies from the Ogaden. 
However, some 13 000 Cuban troops remained in Ethiopia as a 
symbol of the Communist country's support for the present 
Ethiopian regime. 
This brief historical analysis illustrates that Cuba's military 
presence in Angola is by no means a new phenomenon to Cuban 
policy-makers. (l 3 ) It is also noticeable that Cuba 1 s involve-
ment in Africa is in broad agreement with Soviet policies in 
Af . {14) rica. During the Rhodesian independence_struggle Cuba 
adopted Soviet policy in directing most of its assistance to 
Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) which the 
Soviet Union supported in preference to Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZAND). (15) On the other hand, unlike 
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the Soviet Union, Cuba has recognised the Sahara Arab Demo-
cratic Republic as well as provided personnel to the Polisario 
guerrillas who are fighting Moroccan forces in the Western 
Sahara. Nevertheless, both the Havana and Moscow Governments 
adopted the same stance on the Angola-SWA/Namibian issue. 
In September 1982, Mr Richard Ovinikov, Soviet representative 
1
. to the United Nations, addressed a letter to the United 
Nations Secretary-General, Dr Javier Perez de Cuellar, in 
which he pointed out the 'unrelatedness' of the Namibian and 
Angolan questions. The Bulletin of the Africa Institute 
suggested that such a "hard line" approach from the Soviet 
Union was to be expected as a Cuban withdrawal from Angola 
la d . 1 ' fl . . ( 16 ) W. h t t wou irect yin uence its interests. it respec o 
SWA{Namibia the Soviet Union bluntly advocates a straight 
"transfer of power to SWAPO" as its ideal solution to the 
( 1 7) 
country's problems. The Soviet leadership appears to be 
firm in its position on the SWA/Namibian Angolan I Cuban 
deadlock, even after a meeting between Dr Chester Crocker and 
the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Leonid Ilychev, on 7 
December 1982, where these issues were discussed. (l 9 ) 
CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA 
The precipitate departure of 400 000 Portuguese combined with 
the civil war between .the three internal national parties, 
the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA; led to the collapse of.much of the 
basic infra-structural scaffolding .- administrative and 
community services, transport and communication systems 
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. ( 19) needed to ensure the continuity of state and society. 
It is further known that without extensive Soviet-Cuban aid, 
the present MPLA Government in Luanda would have found it 
impossible to gain control of the government in 1975 and to 
maintain this control. Soviet-Cuban backing still remains 
t . 1 f. . t . l ( 20 ) M A t . L H d f essen ia or 1 s surviva . r n onio enque, ea o 
the Angolan Department of Foreign Affairs, himself affirmed 
that the MPLA Government in Angola by now would have ~ollapsed 
I 
if it was denied the support of the Soviet-Cuban backbone. (2l) 
This amounts to a foreign element directly and decisively 
intervening in Angola's domestic affairs, even though it takes 
place at the invitatibn of the host government. 
During February, 1982, Angolan President Dos Santos declared 
in a national speech that, "during the Second War of Libera-
, tion", it was the socialist countries that gave Angola massive 
support to face up to South African aggression. 
he continued, 
11 
• • • the sophisticated military technology 
that we (Angola) possess cannot be handled 
without careful training from these socia-
list countries. 11 ( 22) 
To this day, 
As far as the Angolan Government is concerned, it is clea~ 
that Cuban presence in the country has always been considered 
a purely domestic matter, completely unrelated to the issue of 
SWA/Namibian independence. 
The Luanda-Havana view, however, needs careful examination; 
even though the rest of Southern Africa, except South Africa, 
\.... 
UNITA and a number of local SWA/Namibian parties, share this , 
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view. On 4 February, 1982, a joint statement released by the 
Angolan and Cuban Governments reaffirmed ~heir unchanged posi-
tion on Cuban presence in Angola until after the implementa-
t . f N . b ' . d d ( 2 3 ) h ' h. b . ion o ami ian in epen ence , w ic must e in accordance 
with UN Security Council Resolution 435. This position was 
publicly maintained throughout 1982, even after the two-round 
and much controversial Cape Verde Islands talks between South 
African and Angolan high-levef government delegations, during 
December 1982 and early 1983 .. <24 > 
The Frontline states frequently declared themselves in favour 
of continued Cuban presence in Angola until such time as 
R 1 . 435 h b f' l . l d . N 'b' <25 > eso ution as een irm y imp emente in ami ia. 
Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and outspoken Frontline 
spokesmen, Mr Salim Salim, voiced Southern Africa's mutual 
concerp about the Reagan Administration's pro-South African 
approach, warning that a strong US-SA linkage could seriously 
·jeopardise affairs in Southern Africa. Early in 1982, 
Angolan officials informed the United States Government that 
the Cubans would remain iri Angola until .the implementation of 
. ( 2 6) Resolution 435, and, that the issue was no~-negotiable. 
Between 7 and 9 June 1982, Angolan Government representatives 
and news agencies as far apart as Dar-es-Salaam and New York 
confirmed prolonged Cuban presence as well as the strengthening 
of the Cuban contingent before October 1982. The Luanda 
Authorities further .staterl that the CUban presence also acted as 
an internal insurance policy to maintain the "status quo". 
The Havana Government, on the other hand, indirectly acknow-
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ledged the existence of a SWA/Namibia-Angola linkage and 
publicly stated that discussions on Cuban withdrawal would 
start as soon as Namibia achieved independence, and providing 
that South African aggression against Angola ceased complete1~<27) 
Havana most certainly links the SWA/Namibian and Angolan 
situations,· while the Angolan Government, on the other hand, 
ac~epts the UNITA threat as the overriding motive behind the 
(28) 
Cuban presence. The MPLA Government points out that 
Soviet-Cuban aid is vital in its effective resistance to ONITA, 
and .must be retained until UNITA is defeated. <29 ) 
The Havana/Luanda claims require closer examination. Not 
only are the issues, the SWA/Namibian Angolan "linkage", 
and the real reasons for Cuban presence in Angola, very 
important in deciding the validity of claims from both oppo-
nents and supporters, closer examination will also. shed light 
on the changing trends in regional security. The main 
. 
emphasis being placed on what would be described the 
"linkage" issue and the Cuban question. 
THE FIRST ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR 
From the following analysis it will become clear that the 
presence or second Angolan civil war between the MPLA, with 
Cuban assistance, and UNITA, with its South African aid, was 
not instigated by South Africa at all. The reason for this 
'war of liberation' should be sought in causes within Angola 
itself. The analysis is further aimed at providing evidence 
in support of the theory that Cuban military presence is still 
135 
aimed at keeping UNITA at bay, and not as generally believed, 
fending off SADF ·threats to Angolan security. It will also 
be argued that some form of "linkage" between the two countries 
does exist, but that the South West Africa People's Organisation 
is closely related to this "linkage". 
In 1961 Jonas Savimbi committed himself to revolutionary 
activities by joining and becoming the FNLA's foreign minister,
1 
while the diverging interests of the central Angolan people 
- ( 
and growing hostility between the FNLA leader, Holden Roberto 
and Savimbi, led to the latter's breakaway from the FNLA in 
1963/64. This led to an Ovimbundu movement organised by 
S 
·, b. ( 30} av1m 1. (In 1967 Savimbi was expelled from Zambia after 
directing attacks on that country's copper ore ~arrying Ben-
guella railroad. He then spent eight months in exile in 
Cairo. (3l} Late in 1966 Savimbi finally committed himself 
to the Angolan bush, personally leading the struggle and 
organising the UNITA movement until after the 1974 coup. <32 ) 
In this he is neither marxist not capitalist, not even a black 
revolutionary, but an Angolan patriot fighting for the freedom 
I . 
. · ( 3 3) of the Ov1mbundu people. 
Prior to independence the FNLA was supported primarily by 
moderat~ neighbouring African states, especially Zambia, 
Tunisia, the Ivory Coast and Senegal( 34 ), while _UNITA remained 
unrecognised and received help only from Egypt with China con-
. b . f. . l . d d t . . 'f · 1 · · ( 35 } tri ut1ng inancia a1 an raining aci 1t1es. In 
The Angolan Revolution, Vol .. II. Exile Politics and Guerrilla 
warfare, 1962-1976, John Marcum asserts that after adding up 
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aid provided by China, France, Great Britain, West Germany and 
others, it is reasonable to conclude that the FNLA and UNITA 
received roughly the same amount of aid that the CIA estimated 
the MPLA received from the Soviet Union 
dollars throughout October 1975. <36 ) 
about 80 million 
The Angolan civil war began in October 1975, one month before 
independence, between the three internal factions, the MPLA, 
I 
FNLA and UNITA. <371) During October-November 1974 and early 
in 1975 Cuban troops, supported by massive deliveries of 
Soviet weapons, arrived in Angola, aQd this proved to be a 
decisive element ending the first phase of t~e civil war in 
( 3 8 ) 
favour of the MPLA. In the wake of the withdrawal of the 
Portuguese colonists and mounting tension between the internal 
factions, South Africa's Defence Forces made use of the "low-
risk" opportunity to mount its first major military incursion 
into Angola to smash both the MPLA and SWAPO and to secure the 
future for "moderate" alternatives in Angola and Namibia. <39 ) 
This incursion stopped short of Luanda( 40) under the backlash 
of much international condemnation of South Africa's militaris-
tic activities. 
I 
It is important to notice the strong possibility of a conven-
tional c6nflagrat~6n between South African and MPLA/Cuban 
forces. Fortunately this has not happened, even though 
military contact between these forces has occurred on several 
. ( 41) occasions. During March 1976 the South African Defence 
Force withdrew from Angola for reasons other than military 
defeat. (41) The SADF did not suffer defeat in Angola, nor 
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did the Cuban troops and their so-called "Stalin Organs", 
(mobile 122 mm rocket launchers), inflict much impression or 
damage on the South African forces. The primary reason for 
South Africa's withdrawal could be ascribed to the fact that 
the MPLA with the assistance of Soviet-Cuban aid, had defeated 
both the FNI.A and UNITA militarily during February-Mar~h 1976. <43 ) 
Furtherrrore, the SADF's incursion was believed to have been in 
co-ordination with strong American support behind the scenes(44 ), 
which eventually, when the need came, did not materialise. 
America's failure to support South Africa's activities, either 
diplomatically or materially, would appear to have been a 
further decisive factor in South Africa's troop withdrawal. <45 ) 
South Africa withdrew during March 1976, while 13 000, later 
increased to 19 000, Cuban soldiers failed to follow suit. <
46
) 
They remained in Angola as token support for the ruling MPLA 
Government that came into power at that time. 
The Clark Amendment passed during the 1976 or ''First Angolan 
Civil War" effectively brought an end to official American 
support to revolutionary movements, which was specifically 
aimed at curbing United States military 6r finan~ial support 
to the ONITA movement. According to reports ONITA and the 
FNLA enjoyed extensive support from the CIA (Central Intelli-
gence Agency). <47 > The·FNLA has since disintegrated, with 
many of its former members joining up with UNITA. F~om 1976, 
ONITA, under the leadership of Savimbi, took up the "Second 
Civil War" in order to liberate Angola fro!!! MPLA domination. 
unaided, UNITA's military cause was doomed to·failure, as was 
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the case with the MPLA's military wing, the FAPLA, which 
needed Soviet-Cuban support before being able to subdue the 
FNLA and UNITA. 
On the other hand, extensive South African aid, since the own 
withdrawal in 1976, greatly contributed towards UNITA's ability 
t t . · · t 1 <40 ) . h . t h 1980 o con inue its resistances rugg e rig tin o t e s, 
thereby enabling UNITA to achieve certain successes. 
. I 
It must 
be stressed, and not surprisingly, that UNITA and South Africa 
are in close agreement on the present state of affairs in 
Angola, and to a lesser extent on the SWA/Namibian issue. As 
a result, it has· become quite clear that UNITA, with its aid 
from South Africa, was by no means a spent force in Angola. 
The movement might have lost the short term stakes against the 
Soviet-Cuban backed MPLA during 1975/76, but this certainly 
did not impl~ its military impotence in the long term.< 49 ) 
By the early 1980s Savimbi claimed UNITA control over large 
parts of central and southern Angolan provinces, such as 
Cuando Cubango, Moxico, Bie, Huambo, Benguela, and the southern 
parts of Cuanza su1< 5o), while provinces free from UNITA acti-
vity were, Luanda, Lunda, Zaire, Guanza Norte, Uige and Moca-
The areas under UNIT~ were by no means under total 
control as contacts with FAPLA and Cuban soldiers were and are 
constantly being made. Flimsy evidence as it may be, groups 
of UNITA prisoners of war occasionally handed over to the 
International Red Cross, unanimously.affirm UNITA's virtual 
d d . . f h' h . ( 
51 ) unoppose omination o t e sout ern provinces. 
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UNITA's continued functioning since 1976, not even to mention 
its prominent upsurge in the 1980s, is in pure military terms, 
truly astounding, given the extensive assistance from the 
Soviet-Cuban elements to the MPLA . . Yet this feat could not 
have been performed without South African aid. Dr Savimbi, 
when interviewed, never concealed his willingness to accept 
such aid whenever offered< 52 > however, once his acceptance 
of South African aid becamr known, his movement's struggle for 
credibility and recognition from the international community 
became doubly arduous. 
Nevertheless, South African aid to UNITA's military effort is 
effective on various levels. It was alleged that the South 
African Defence Force had established at Bagani, in northern 
SWA/Namibia, a base for the training of UNITA and ex-FNLA 
. (53) 
soldiers who were to return to Angola to resist the MPLA. 
Captain Jose Belmundo, a. Portuguese and "self-proclaimed" 
former member of the SWATF's 32 Battalion, revealed that not 
only is 32 Battalion a mercenary unit comprising Angolan 
refugees, but that it frequently operated in support of UNITA 
whenever it ran into ·trouble. <54 > Defence Force spokesmen, 
iri rhetorical fashion, denied these allegations. However, 
the fact of the matter is that more informed people; such as 
those who have actually served in the Defence Forces, are 
convinced that not only 32 Battalion, but also Battalion's 
31, 33 and 34, all are crack 'recce or mercenary' units exclu-
. 1 h d · h · · · ·d 1 <55 > sive y c arge wit special operations insi e Ango a. 
In addition to training facilities, UNITA is further supplied 
with food, transport; fuel, and logistics and military intelli-
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gence. The arms and ammunition.supplied to UNITA, it is said, 
are those captured by South Africa in its raids into southern 
Angola. 
THE UNITA - MPLA CONFRONTATION 
Savimbi has on occasion stated that UNITA is becoming 
increasingly dissatisfied with SWAPO's aggression in southern 
Angola .. During April 1982, Dr Savimbi accused SWAPO of being 
gradually more in co-operation with the MPLA government in 
Luanda, because SWAPO soldiers increasingly encroached on 
UNITA-controlled territory to harrass UNITA supporters. 
Previously, he pointed out, good relations existed between 
UNITA and SWAPO but this changed when the MPLA came to power. 
SWAPO now aligned itself with the MPLA, while it was UNITA 
which previously made possible SWAPO raids into SWA/Namibia.(56 ) 
On another occasion when sixteen of UNITA's POW's were set 
free, on 4 April 1982, Savimbi said that ONITA harboured no 
ill feelings towards SWAPO and did not wish for military con-
frontation between the two movements, as the MPLA, and not 
SWAPO, was the enemy of UNITA. He said, 
"I am in control of this side.bordering your 
country (SWA/Namibia), presently, there are 
two wars waging in the area South Africa's 
war with SWAPO and UNITA's war with the MPLA. 11 (57) 
John Marcum agreed with this poLnt when he point~d out the 
ethnic kinship relation ·between UNITA, -largely -rallied around 
Ovimbundu support and loyalties, and SWAPO, which is reliant 
on Ovambo support. ( 5 8) > 
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On 5 April 1982, Savimbi reiterated UNITA's dedicated commit-
ment to continue with the civil war until the MPLA agrees to 
an election similar to the one being demanded in SWA/Namibia. 
He pointed out the irony in the MPLA Government's demand for 
'free and fair' elections in Namibia, but itself being un-
. 11 . h ld h f d f . l . . l ( S 9 ) wi ing to o sue a ' ree an air' e ection in Ango a. 
In fact, prior to 1980, elections were held only where MPLA 
t t ff . · tl t stable and mature. ( 60) s rue ures were su icien y s rong, 
Early in 1983, Savimbi acknowledged 
"UNITA gets a lot of support from various 
countries, but that the only door to get 
that support into Angola is through 
Namibia." (61) 
Thus UNITA is of the opinion that South West African indepen-
dence could complicate its guerrilla war against the MPLA. 
Even more serious is UNITA's. difficulties in obtaining either 
support or recognition from the.West. Savimbi expressed 
personal fear of the Western n~gotiators not rating UNITA as 
f h b k . ( 62) f . a orce tat must e ta en·into account. Ater meeting 
with the then US Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, 
Savimbi recounted that he was.left with the impression that 
the US Government demands reconciliation between UNITA and the 
MPLA as "part and parcel" of a Namipian independence settle-
t 
( 63) 
men . The United States does not recognise the MPLA 
Government in Luanda; and, with the coming to power of the 
Reagan Administration, there was a strong revival of campaigns 
. to have the Clark Amendment repealed. If successful, it 
would again enable the United States to support movements such 
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as UNITA. Furthermore, US relations with South Africa are 
. ( 6 4 ) 
considered better than ever before. In the light of the 
United States' "binary goals" in SWA / Namibia·-, and Angola it· is 
surprising that it has not adopted a more favourable public 
approach towards UNITA and its ethno-nationalist cause. 
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN ANGOLA 1982 
Meanwhile the "two Wars" had been raging on, causing more 
destruction in Angola than in SWA/Namibia. Noted historian 
and author on African affairs, Robin Hallet, after a visit to 
Angola, concluded that 'outside South Africa' the FPLA was the 
strongest military force in Southern Africa, thereby implying 
that UNITA's chances of toppling the MPLA regime as remote. ( 6S) 
Similarly, the presence of Soviet-Cuban elements in Angola 
h b . f . 1· (66) as ecome an omni·nous " a1 t accomp 1 11 • 
By 1981, the joint FAPLA/Cuban forces numbered just under 
40 000 men approximately 20 000 FAPLA 's ( 6 7 ) and approxi-
( 68) . mately 19 000 Cubans without any real reserves. An 
estimated force of 23 000 well-armed men; b~t without adequate 
transportation, is deployed with a specific two-fold strategy: 
to protect the central production centres and at all costs to 
avoid contact with South African incursion forces. The Cubans 
on the other hand, are centred around the country's oil 
installations, primarily to prevent sabotage attacks from 
UNITA(G 9 )' and, they are also involved in the training of FAPLA 
recruits. It is important at this stage to stress the Cubans' 
non-combatant role in relation to invading South African forces. 
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.since the 1976 "incident" no extensive clashes have occurred 
between Cuban and South African forces. 
It would then logically follow that ONITA and not the South 
African D~fence Force is the FAPLA and Cubans' real opponent(~) 
by implication placing some doubt upon the linkage of the 
SWA/Namibian and Angolan/Cuban issues. UNITA's forces 
number between ten and thirty thousand men( 7l), roughly divi-
sible into three sections a guerrilla section, an urban 
guerrilla section and a semi-regular section, which normally 
operate in restricted groups smaller than 300 men. It stands 
to reason, and as Hallet rightly pointed out, that ONITA is un-
likely to topple the MPLA by military means while the latter is 
. ( 72 ) 
supported by the Soviet - Cuban elements. That is, for 
as long as the Soviet-Cuban support to the MPLA/FAPLA conti-
nues, it will be unlikely that the Second Angolan Civil War 
r 
will be brought to a conclusion. 
THE CUBAN QUESTION 
The situation boils-down to the Cuban ques~ion. Cuban 
presence proved decisive in the maintenance of the power-
balance in Angola as it was known by the close of 1982. 
Furthermore, the issue of linking together the issues of SWA/ 
Namibian independence and the dep~rture of the Cubans from 
Angola resulted in a deadlock in the negotiations surrounding 
these issues. Although it was the Reagan Administration 
which introduced the question of Cuban departure from Angola, 
in 1982(73), the South African Government eagerly took hold of 
this opportunity to further stall SWA/Namibian independence. 
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Opponents of "linkage" view the issue as a strategy of South 
Africa, to further delay SWA/Namibian independence. The 
Cubans, they believe, are in Angola for the purpose of en-
. b h .. d . d · ·1 - · <74 ) suring ot its omestic an nationa security , more 
specifically, to fend-off South African threats to Angola's 
national in{egrity. For the supporters of "linkage", the 
South African Government, the Reagan Administration and to an 
extent the UNITA movement, two furth~r factors ar~ brought 
into account. Finally, the Cubans, as a foreign 1element, 
directly intervene in the domestic affairs of an already un-
stable state, and by so doing, create a situation where the 
governing body is kept in power by artificial means, and not 
as a result of public popularity. Secondly, it so happens 
that this government, the MPLA, freely and voluntarily supply 
the South West Africa People's Organisation with base facili-
ties without which the latter orgnaisation's liberation 
struggle would have been much more difficult. 
A number of quotations from a speech by Dr Chester Crocker 
neatly summarises the situation. These extracts are from the 
opening excerpt of the second session of the hearings on Dr 
C k . . . . { 
75 ) I d f · 11 . roe er's nomination. treas as o ows: 
"That the end of the Zimbabwe conflict is only 
the beginning of a new set of challenges for 
the United States, {US); and Western' policy. 
In the short to medium term these will pro-
bably centre on the closely intertwined con-
flicts in SWA/Namibia and Angola. So great 
is the overlap between these two wars; in f·act ,· · 
that outsiders sometimes have a problem 
deciding which is the key to the other. The 
Carter Administration and many observers in 
Europe and Africa prefer t~ operate as if the 
Angolan Civil War were simply an extension of 
South Africa's battle with Angolan and Zambian 
based guerrillas of SWAPO." . ( 76) 
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In this view Angola should be considered a fully-fledged member 
of the Front Line States grouping, a diplomatic partner whose 
co-operation in the search for a Namibian settlement is essen-
tial. Washington would probably already have recognised the 
MPLA Government, were it not for the domestic political reper-
cussions of being seen to accommodate yet another Soviet-Cuban 
'fait accompli' and to legitimise the large communist presence 
. (77) in Angola. 
This liberal school of thought believes that the only way to 
get the Cubans out is by stopping the regular South African 
raids into Angola and by obtaining reconciliation between the 
MPLA Government and its opponents in central and southern 
Angola. Presumably a SWA/Namibian settlement would accom-
plish both objectives, since ONITA, as this school argues, 
would lose South African support that is critical to its con-
tinued anti-MPLA struggle. By such reasoning it follows that 
the Soviet-Cuban presence-is somehow justified or legitimate 
until SWA/Namibia is settled and UNITA finally defeated. 
A different view of the situation is held ~y many centrists 
and conserva~ives in America and Eur6pe, as well as by the 
governments of China and most pro-Western Arab states. That 
is, that Angola is the logical focal point for policy. It is 
in Angola, after all, that anti-communist forces are actively 
engaged in .trying to liberate their country from the new 
imperialism of Moscow, and raising doubts in many Angolan minds 
about the benefits of the socialist alliance. <7B) 
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( 79) This school of thought,of which Dr Crocker is an advocate , 
argues that this process of disenchantment with socialism 
should be encouraged, with the aim of evacuating the Cubans in 
order to facilitate a genuine political reconciliation between 
the MPLA and ONITA. As for SWA/Namibia, while a settlement 
is important there, it will not by itself end the Angolan con-
flict because Savimbi is by no means an instrument of the 
South African Government. Savimbi could continue to operate 
with the active support of other African states and sympa-
thetic governments elsewhere. Accordingly, the West should 
back ONITA, until such time that the MPLA is prepared to nego-
tiate and expel the communist forces from Angola. SWA / Namibia 
d . h. . . d 1 . t t . (8)) accor ing to t is view, is a separate an ess impor an issue. 
However, there are flaws in the logic of both views. There 
is little doubt that Savimbi's ONITA could survive the loss 
of logistical co-operation it now receives from South Africa, 
assuming that his important African, European and especially 
his Arab supporters do not desert him. Hence, the Angolan 
problem will not go away just because SWA/Namibia is settled, 
as the liberal school would like to believe. Moreover, it is 
difficult to see how a meaningful reconciliation between the 
MPLAand ONITA could occur if the latter was first weakened 
"decisively, or, for that matter, for as ·1ong as the Soviet~ 
Cuban elements remain in Angola actively supporting the MPLA 
against ONITA. This would be a reconciliation between victor 
and vanquished. According to the conservative school the West 
has few reasons for suppor~ing such.a reconciliation, given 
UNITA's anti-Soviet record and strong ethno-nationalist support 
in some areas of the country. (83) 
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The Cubans are not too popular amongst the Front Line States 
either. US Vice-President, Mr George Bush, after visiting 
seven Southern African states during November 1982, concluded 
that, 
·" .... while black leaders object publicly to 
linking the Cuban issue to SWA/Namibia inde-
pendence, there definitely is private flexi-
bility." (84) 
"Af . " h . d d. d C b . .A l ( 85 ) r1cans , e sa1 , " 1 not want u ans in ngo a." 
Mr Bush thereby corrctly pointed out the ambiguity between the 
"private" and "public" considerations of Front Line, and other, 
African leaders. 
Cuba, the Soviet Union and Angola strongly maintain Cuba's 
benevolent intentions in Angola, especially in ensuring the 
. (86) country's security from South African threats. Fidel 
Castro personally stated that the Cuban troops would strongly 
resist any invasion of the country by South Africa, and would 
remain in Angola until South African forces pulled out of 
SWA/Namibia. ( 87 ) It would appear a~ if Castro is open to 
question on both counts. Firstly, the South African Defence 
Forces' strategy of conducting limited military incursions 
into Angola was not in the least affected by the presence of 
Cuban troops, as these forces, since 1976, have never had 
serious clashes.( 88 ) The SADF's policy from the outset was 
aimed at avoiding. contact with the Cubans in order to prevent 
a possible ~ajor conflagration, and ironically, ·as stated 
earlier, the Cubans themselves went out of their way to avoid 
. h . d. h Af . . f ( 8 9 ) contact wit 1nva 1ng Sout r1can orces. 
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CUBAN PRESENCE CONSEQUENCES FOR ANGOLA 
Ango~a undoubtedly is the hardest hit, and-suffered most, under 
the hardships and devastation brought about by the "two wars" 
currently being fought in Southern Africa South Africa's 
pursuit of SWAPO insurgents in southern Angola, and UNITA's 
resistance to MPLA rule. Not only did Angola suffer the 
collapse of its economic infra-structure in the productive 
southern and central provinces( 90), it suffered also a huge 
~ . 
loss of life, a tremendous outflow of its population, invest-
ment capital, and technological expertise.· The country 
further surrendered a large part of its territory to the con-
duct of active ongoing guerrilla warfare, which negated proper 
reconstruction of the economic system's full potential. 
Other than an all-out conventional war, relations between 
Angola, South Africa and SWA/Namibia could hardly deteriorate 
further than the low level reached by the end of 1982. For 
seven years a state of limited war existed between Angola and 
South Africa, even though the latter's military activities in 
southern Angola were directly aimed at incapacitating SWAP0.< 9I) 
Invading South African forces caused extens~ve damage to the 
southern Angolan economic infrastructure; without any form of 
retribution. ( 92 ) Add to this So.uth Africa's aid to UNITA ( 93 ) 
and the hostile anti-South African attitude of the ruling MPLA 
Government in Luanda becomes quite understandable.· 
This state of affairs contributed to Angola's eno~mous 
defence expenditure: half of its annual budget is channeled 
towards the military sector while extensive use is made of 
149 
Soviet-Cuban aid as well. The almost complete communist 
. ( 94 ) 
presence and involvement would appear to be more detri-
mental than benefici~l to the country's distorted balance-of-
. . ( 95) payments situation. David Lamb, Bureau Chief of the 
Los Angeles Times, after a visit to Angola in 1982, described 
Soviet military presence in Angola as evident as the large 
scale destruction in all southern provinces. The Soviet 
Union, in his opinion_, moved quickly into Angola to capitalise 
on the ·regional instability, as well as to mount pressure on the 
MPLA Government not to accept Western proposals on either 
Angola or SWA/Namibia. <96 ) The Soviet Union obviously 
realised the inherent danger to their interests, ·both in 
Angola and in Southern Angola, should a Western inspired 
Angolan settlement, coupled with a SWA/Namibian settlement, 
come about. ( 97 ) 
East European diplomats, such as GDR ambassador Dieter Klinger, 
in 1980, informed their Western counterparts that one of the 
reasons for Angola)s weak economy, is the payment demanded 
by Moscow for the military equipment delivered to the MPLA/ 
FAPLA since, and prior to, independence in 1975. <98 ) Portu-
guese officials estimated Angola's debt to the Soviet Union as 
high as two milliard rand, which syphons off the greater per-
centage of revenue derived from Angola's fish harvest and oil 
production as payment.· Exact economic figures.are uncertain, 
but they estimated the maintenance cost to the Angolan Govern-
ment of every Cuban as high as R600 per month, thereby adding 




As pointed out earlier, it is wrong to argue that SWA/Namibian 
independence would drastically, if not completely, reduce the 
need for Soviet-Cuban military assistance, because settlement 
there would not necessarily imply a reconciliation between the 
warring Angolan factions, and, it would also be contrary to 
S · ' . . h' . (
99 ) N t . . l h ov1et interests int is region. o surprising y ten 
is the Soviet Union's attempts to influence the Angolan Govern-
ment away from a possible severance 
1
of economic relations 
I 
between the two countries. In the 1 advent of an internal 
Angolan reconciliation, it is obvious that the need for Soviet-
Cuban military aid may become redundant. In order to prevent 
total alienation, Moscow, in January 1982, offered the Angolan 
Government an additional two milliard rand in financial aid for 
economic projects scheduled well into the 1990s(lOO) an 
offer which, according to an Angolan Government official, was 
declined. 
Significant in terms of . Angola's economic relations, was the fa< 
that 69% of Angola's trade in 1980 was conducted with the West, 
( 101) and only 14% with Cuba and Eastern Europe. This imbalance 
in trade relations may prove decisive in An_gola's future East-
West relations, Angola already declined to tie itself to long 
term commitments with the Soviet Union, while business commit-
ments between Angola and American multi-nationals, on the 
other hand, grew considerably during 1980. For example, -the 
United States Export-Import Bank guaranteed a loan of 96,9 
million dollars for the purchase of oil drilling equipment by 
Sonangol, the Angolan State oil company, and Cabinda Gulf Oil. (l02) 
Gulf Oil is the United States' major economic interest in 
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Angola, with royalty and tax payments to the Angolan Govern-
ment accounting for 50-60% of government revenue in 1976, 
which indicated Gulf's strong incentives to co-operate with 
the MPLA Government. (l0 3 ) While the Carter Administration 
withheld formal diplomatic recognition, because of the Cuban 
troop presence, American business interests, notably the oil 
industry, were rapidly expanding relations with Angola.(l0 4 ) 
I 
During December 1981, Angolan President Dos Santos, for the 
first time declared himself willing to enter into negotiations 
with the United States on Cuban and SWA/Namibi~n related 
issues Western diplomats arguing that Angola desired a 
hasty settlement in SWA/Namibia in order to be left alone with 
its own domestic problems, while Soviet diplomats attached more 
value to his private condemnation of the United States for 
interfering in Angola's internal affairs. 
It appears as if the MPLA regime is willing to adopt a moderate 
stance for as long as prospects for a negotiated Namibian 
settlement exist, but, should they recede, Luanda can be 
expected to revert to its earlier hostile stand even more 
so if the suspicion grew that the United States and South 
Africa were co-operating in support of Savimbi's UNITA forces 
and consequently, to invite even more support from the 
Soviet-Cuban bloc. (l0 5 ) One certainty, however, is that 
Moscow and Havana can offer only the instruments of repression, 
war and liberation, and not the instruments of development that 
. d . · d · · (1()6) African lea ers in general have identifie as the top priority. 
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In December 1981, President Dos Santos admitted that Angola 
was in a strong bargaining position, with the Soviet Union and 
the United States as primary buyers. Contrary to· Moscow's 
attempts to win Angolan favour through economic aid, Washington 
required both a Cuban withdrawal and an internal settlement 
before US recognition of, and economic aid to, the Luanda 
. (10 7) 
Government would be forthcoming. By the end of 1982 it 
was no secret that Angola was experiencing severe economic 
difficulties, yet, neither Moscow nor Washington surfaced as 
highest bidder. 
Furthermore, statements made by the Angolan Government, during 
1982, and subsequent events resulted in its position becoming 
more obscure and ambiguous. A joint press comunigue released 
by the Havana-Luanda Governments on 4 February 1982, reiterated 
that the Cubans would remain in Angola for as long as South 
Af . . d / . b. d . d d A 1 t · ( l O 8 ) rica occupie SWA Nami ia an inva e ngo an erritory. 
This attitude was publicly- maintained throughout 1982, even 
after _the first round of the controversial Cape Verde meeting 
held in total secrecy between the South African and Ahgolan 
. (109) delegations. This meeting was a clear indication of 
Angola's willingness to negotiate with South Africa despite its 
public pronouncements. 
New possibilities 9pened up with President Earnes' visit to 
Angola during April ·1982. , It ensured Angola of Portuguese 
assistance in the restoration of its coffee, sisal, sugar and 
cotton production, with the revival.of some of the basic indus-
tries. (110) Such efforts, however, are negated by South 
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Africa's incessant military raids into southern Angola and 
the continuation of the Second Civil War. Economic recon-
struction and development are unlikely to meet with any sub-
stantial degree of success until these difficulties are 
resolved to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. 
THE RELATIONSHIP· BETWEEN ANGOLA AND SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA 
In conclusion, the discussion will focus on what have been 
described as the "Angolan SWA / Namibian linkage". The 
purpose is two-fold: to determine whether such "linkage" 
actually exi~ts, and to place the entire debate in broader 
perspective. It is important to remember that the practical 
side of the issues related to the Angolan and SWA/Namibian 
situations is more complicated than a mere theoretical dis-
cussion. 
Dr Crocker referred to the overlap and intertwining of the 
conflict situation in SWA/Namibia and Angola as being of such 
magnitude,· that outsiders sometimes had a problem deciding 
. (111) 
which was the key to the other. That a relationship or 
"linkage" between the two countries exists, is beyond doubt , 
but, what was less clear, was the nature and extent of this 
linkage, and the influence it would have on the future of 
these countries. 
"Non-linkage" and its advocates; the Soviet Union, Cuba, 
proponents from Eastern Europe, the. United Nations, and the 
majority of independent African states, and the MPLA Govern-
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ment in Luanda, has been examined above and needs little more 
discussion. Attention must instead be paid to setting out 
arguments. and evidence in support of linkage, and to discuss 
the nature of this linkage. Needless to say, South Africa, 
the Reagan Administration, ~ome local SWA/Namibian parties, 
and UNITA's Savimbi, are the foremost, and possibly the only, 
defendants of linkage. 
During March ! 1983 a press report in The Cape Times quoted 
a number of statements by the head of the security police, 
Lieutenant P.J. Coetzee, who addressed a symposium on 'Marxism 
and South Africa'. Lieutenant Coetzee alleged that the 
African National Congress (ANC) had become an integral part of 
the Soviet Union's strategy against South Africa and the West 
and that this onslaught against South Africa had entered a new 
( 112) 
phase which.embodied three areas : 
1. To isolate South Africa in every conceivable way, parti-
cularly from its natural friends in the West. 
2~ To create a black-white confrontation in the country in 
order to hasten ~nd facilitate a Marxi~t take-over. 
3. To define and intensify guerrilla attacks against 
· . South Africa, because it is the visible showpiece around 
(113} 
which the hearts and minds of the people revolve. 
The ANC and PAC are seen as th~ centra1-bpponents· of the-south 
African regime. These organisations, in the South African 
G . b d f d . d - 1 f · cn4) overnment 's view, em o y the orces an i eo ogy o communism. 
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The most important aspect of the external element of opposi-
tion to South Africa, is the armed struggle waged by SWAPO 
forces against South African presence in SWA/Namibia, with 
the ANC, PAC and Black Consciousness African Revolutionary 
Army as internal opponents to the Republic of South Africa. (llS} 
The Soviet Union is undoubtedly the dominant communist factor 
in Southern Africa, and has established itself as the chief 
patron of SWAPO, as well as reinforced its long-standing ties 
with the ANC. (ll 6 } The South African Government sees Cuba 
as the Soviet Union's principal ally on the African continent , 
and its Angolan-based military personnel as instrumental in the 
inconspicuous advance of communism in Africa. They are viewed 
as posing a real long-t~rm danger to South African and SWA/ 
. 'b' . (117} Nami ian security. 
The Cubans are pledged to defend the MPLA Government in Angola, 
which is supposedly faced by two security threats: South 
Africa, whose troops were stationed on Angola's boder with SWA I 
Namibia, and Savimbi's UNITA, whose guerrillas operate in the 
. (118} south-central region. Yet such claims are by no means 
foregone conclusions~ It has· been pointeq out that a SWA/ 
Namibian settlement will not necessarily resolve t.he Angolan 
conflict and it is equally important to stress the Cuban's non-
combatant role in relation to the South African forces. The 
Cubans in fact are.involved only in defending the country's 
oil installations from UNITA attacks(ll 9 }, and in training 
FAPLA recruits. It would appeai as if UNITA, and not the SADF 
. (120) . 
is the FAPLA/Cuban's real opponents. Although there were 
approximately 19000 Cuban combat troops in Angola, they were 
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not actively engaged against South African troops during any 
of the fighting in 1980 and early 1981. (l 2lJ Over the past 
few years the MPLA Government has repeatedly stated that the 
Cubans will remain in Angola until UNITA- is defeated. (122 ) 
With Cuban support, Angola has provided arms, training, and a 
safe haven for SWAPO insurgency forces. South Africa in 
turn had used this tacit support as justification for both 
I 
. (123} 
ground and air attacks on southern Angola. , Territorially 
Angola fulfilled a vital role in ·swAPO's military campaign, 
·from its inception in the early 1960~( 124 ) right into the early 
1980s Zambia ceased to play an important part in the insur-
. (125) gency struggle since SWAPO' s forces moved to Angola in 1976. 
The MPLA, in turn, supported the organisation and voluntarily 
aided SWAPO through allowing the organisation base facilities 
. . 
which were used as a springboard for its insurgency offensives 
into SWA/Namibia. As a result of the SADF's counter-
insurgency activities, the SWAPO bases were subsequently moved 
to central and northern Angola where greater security from 
South African attacks existed. (126 ) Nevertheless, the impor-
tant point; as argued by South Africa, was that if th~ MPLA 
was denied its Soviet-Cuban military support, it could well 
' lose i:ts politic al power to a more "moderate" or· approachable 
group such as,UNITA. This could then lead to SWAPO losing 
h 1 f f . . d . ·1· . (127) t e pat orm rom which it con ucts its mi itary campaign. 
The broad argument in favour of linkage is based on indirect 
reasons. As opponents of linkage correctly argue, the 
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presence of the Cubans in Angola is a domestic matter unrelated 
to SWA/Namibian independence. Indirectly, however, it is as 
a result of Cuban support that the MPLA is in power and able 
to supply SWAPO with base facilities. For the South African 
government the Cubans also represent part of the communist on-
slaught against South Africa and SWA/Namibia. For the inde-
pendent observer, it is SWAPO and its activities in southern 
Ang91a, and not the Cubans as such, which ties together SWA/ 
Namibia and Angola. For example, it is known that SWAPO/PLAN 
and the MPLA/FAPLA make use of the same logistics, communica-
. (128) . · 
tions, intelligence and security networks , which, for the 
past few years, have been set up under Cuban instruction. 
SWAPO's military campaign then depends not only on MPLA co-
operation, but also on Cuban goodwill and military technology. 
Whatever the outcome of negotiations on SWA/Namibian indepen-
den~e, there is certain also to be extensive discussion on 
Angola's internal affairs.· While An9ola is not in the pro-
cess of becoming indendent, as is SWA/Namibia, it is f~ced with 
difficulties of equal magnitude. Besides extensive damage done 
by invading South African forces, Angola'i.own economic recon-
structi.on and political tranqui~lity can only come about after 
a reconciliation between UNITA and the MPLA. Not only is 
such a reconciliation unavoidable, it is also bound to involve 
the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. In ter_ms of SWA I 
Namibian independence, a repor~ from the Angolan news agency, 
Angop, quoted Angola's Minister of Inteior Affairs, Lieutenant 
Colonel A. Rodrigues, as saying that Angola has not yet ••turned 
its back on talks" concerning SWA/Namibian independence, despite 
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the cutting short of South Africa-Angola's second round of 
face-to-face talks at the Cape Verde Island, during February 
1983. At this stage it is, however, ,clear T\'lAT the 
South African Government will continue linking SWA/Namibian 
independence to a Cuban. troop withdrawal. 
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COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS 





























































Minimum estimates of number present for a period of one month 
or more. 
+ Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed 
Countries, 1979 and 1954-79, National Technical Informa-
tion. Service, Springfield, USA, 1979, pp.15. 
++ Ditto. pp.10 
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APPENDIX II 
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: MILITARY AID TO NON-COMMUNIST 
COUNTRIES. {LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 1955 - 1979) 
MILLION US DOLLARS+ 
Agreements Concluded Equipment Delivered 
Total USSR. Eastern China Total . USSR 
Eastern 
Europe Europe 
'lbtal 52 TIO 47 340 . 4 285 l 145 39 610 35 340 3 405 
1955 7 705 :S 875 935 265 6 110 5 060 840 
1970 1 265 1 150 50 65 1 095 995 75 
1971 1 790 1 590 120 80 1 050 865 125 
1972 1 925 1 690 155 80 1 365 1 215 75 
1973 3 045 2 890 130 25 3 340 3 135 130 
1974 6 460 5 735 635 90 2 460 2 225 210 
. 1975 4 000 3 325 635 40 2 425 2 040 285 
1976 6 035 5 550 345 145 3 520 3 085 330 
' 
1977 9 260 8 715 475 75 5 125 4 705 345 
1978 3 155 2 465 555 135 5 965 5 400 470 
1978 8 750 8 365 250 140 · 7 205 6 615 525 














+ Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed 
Countries, 1979. and 19-54 - 79, National Technical Inf or ma-
tion Service I '.Springfield USA, 1979, p.13. 
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++ Communist Aid Activities, in Non-Communist Less Developed 
Countries, 1979 and 1954-79,· National Technical Informa-
tion Service, Springfield USA, 1979, p.14. 
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APPENDi'X III 
COMMUNIST. TRAINING OF LDC MILITARY PERSONNEL 
IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1955-1979 + 
Total USSR Eastern Europe 
Total 55 080 45 585 6 345 
/Africa 18 900 14 420 1 760 
tNorth Africa 4 150 3 580 555 
Algeria 2 410 2 195 200 
Libya l 595 1 310 285 
Other 145 75 70 
Sub-Saharan Africa 14 750 10 840 1 205 
Angola 60 55 5 
Benin 30 30 
Cameroon 125 
BU~undi 75 75 
Congo 1 005 505 85 
Equatorial Guinea 200 200 
Ethiopia 1 790 1 290 500 
Ghana 180· 180 
Guinea 1 305 885 60 
Guinea-Bissau 100 100 
Mali 420 360 10 
Mozambique 480 400 30 
Nigeria 825 790 35 
Sierra Leone 150 
.somalia 2 585 2 395 160 
Sudan 550 330 20 
Tanzania 3 005 1 970 10: 
.Togo 55 
Zaire 175 
Zambia 250 190 




















+ Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less D~veloperl Countries 
1979 am 1954- 79, National Technical Information Service, Springfie] 
USA, 1979, p.16. 
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SECTI0N. 2.5 
A SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE: THE REDUCTION 
OF SOUTH AFRICA'S REGIONAL DOMINATION 
Throughout the course of Section Two, I repeatedly referred 
to South Africa's administrative, and especially its mili-
tary, involvement in SWA/Namibia and neighbouring Angola as 
merely.forming part of its broader overriding security and 
economic policies followed towards the rest of Southern 
Africa. In conclusion of Section 5, I want to expand this 
view by placing South Africa's position of regional domina-
tion in an all-encompassing Southern African perspective. 
This will include a brief analysis of the counter-measures 
enacted by the Southern African states to minimise South 
African domination. 
An article in the ·Financial Mail (l) stated that the economic 
consequences of peace in 'Namibia' itself, assuming that a 
negotiated settlement means a complete end to South African 
involvement in the Territory. The current cost of South 
' 
Africa's military and administrative engagement in SWA/Namibia 
is estimated to be about Rl.35 billion per annum. <2 > Pure 
military costs for South Africa ~ere estimated at R400 million 
a year in the late 1970s, reaching R600 million in 1980. <3 )~ 
Yet, despite such hard economic realities, for South Africa 
there is a further side to the financial ledger. 
Strategically Namibian independence would cause the removal 
174 
of South African forces from battle stations near Central 
Africa, and almost certainly, many observers would argue, 
install the black nationalist movement that South Africa has 
been trying to crush for the almost 20 years while at 
the same time depriving the continent's last white bastion of 
its last buffer state. (4 ) (South Africa had already been 
rudely awakened by the stripping away of the Portuguese 
imperial buffer; the achievement of independence in Angola 
I 
and Mozambique in 1975 and Zimbabwean ~ndependence in 1980.) 
These "unpredicted" events largely explains why the Botha 
government and its predecessors appeared permanently schizoid 
on the question of SWA/Namibia, and, why m~ny analysts still 
cannot believe in its willingness to carry out. any proposed 
settlement agreement in the Territory.(S) Besides, granting 
the Territory independence on international terms, which 
more than likely would mean a SWAPO Government coming to powes 
is bound to h~ve negative domestic repercussions for the South 
African government. 
On June 3, 1982, the Prime Minister, however, reiterated his 
government's wish for stability in South West Africa, stating 
that his government would not stand in the way of its 
attaining independence. He further stressed the need for an 
internationally recognised solution and not merely an internal 
settlement reached amongst the local parties and South Africa. 
As he phrased it at Durban on 5 August 1979, 
"I have repeatedly indicated in the past that 
the South African Governmen~, as well as 
leaders of South West Africa, attach great 
value to an internationally acceptable solu-
tion. We went far to make this possible." (6) 
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On a number of occasions the South African Government acknow-
ledged that SWAPO would have to be included in a genuine 
l t l 
. (7) 
sett emen so ution. Prime Minister Botha stated on 19 
October 1978, that 
" .. ~ any politic.al party that takes part in 
a constitutional, peaceful way, will be 
allowed to go· to the polling booth with its 
supporters and they have the right and 
possibility of winning the election." (8) 
Though; in the same breath pointing to a number of precon-
ditions that must be met before independence would be 
granted. These included a system of checks-and-balances 
aimed at ensuring that: 
1. South Africa would not be faced with another hostile 
neighbour along the Orange River, 
2. That the strategic integrity of South Africa on the sub-
continent, vis-a-vis the ANC and Eastern Bloc, would be 
reinforced by the United States, with or without the direct 
or official support of a SWAPO-controlled Nambia(g), 
3. ANd, the assurance (from th~ Western Negotiators) of 
Constitutional guarantees for a Bill of Rights protecting 
inter alia multi-party democracy, private property, an 
independent judiciary, and minority groups in a post-
. d d N .b. (lO) in epen ent ami ia. 
SWAPO AND THE ANC: THREATS TO SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY 
The relationship between SWAPO (South West People's Organi-
sation), the ANC (African National Congress), and the 
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inherent "communist threat" attached to these organisations 
has become a regular topic of discussion over the past.few 
( 11) · years. The South African Government especially had 
. 
long objected to such a relationship, thereby projecting the 
fear of a pro-ANC attitude once 'Namibia' becomes indepen-
dent. Ori the other hand, it is necessary to bear in mind 
that the government's view of a "communist threat" differs 
from that of leading academics on the Territorial issue. 
Totemeyer and Serfontein, amongst others, perceive this 
phenomenon rather as the emergence of black nationalism. (l 2 ) 
Published evidence, such as joint ANC-SWAPO press communiques 
mutually organised conferences and seminars, confirm that 
contact does, in fact, take place between these organisations. 
One of the more notable examples being the National Conference 
in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of 
Southern Africa, convened in New York between 11 and 15 
October 1981. This conference, jointly summoned by the ANC 
and SWAPO, and attended by about 1000 delegates from all over 
Afri-ca, called for greater ·mutual co-operation, solidarity 
· (13) and support amongst · all progressive African states. For 
example, in 1977 a meeting took place between thiee African 
nationalist leaders: Joshua Nkomo, Sam Nujoma and Oliver 
Tambo, and Fidel Castro, to discuss what role Cuba could play 
. h . . PU PO d 1 . b . 1 ( 14 ) in t e respective ZA , SWA an AW:: i eration. strugg es. 
past co-operation between the ANC and SWAPO amounted to 
mutual support and solidarity in local and international 
diplomatic circles, aiming to mount as much pressure on 
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South Africa as possible, to win international acclaim, 
recognition and financial support. However, their efforts 
at urging on Western sanctions did not meet with much 
success as South Africa proved to be an elusive opponent, 
strongly ~eliant on its abundance of strategic mineral 
resources to counteract international isolation. (South 
Africa is often described as the Saudi Arabia of minerals.) 
Politically and militarily the ANC and SWAPO have a mutual 
enemy in the South African government from whom they seek to 
liberate themselves. (l 5 ) The documented history of SWAPO 
further suggests that par€ of the organisat~on's founding 
roots are traceable to· · South Africa and to the ANC, as 
11 
••• during the 1950s many Namibians went to 
South Africa where they worked on contract. 
A large number of them went to Cape Town 
where they came into contact with the ANC of 
South Africa and other parties opposed to 
white minority rule. There they came to 
recognise the need for an organisation 
which could represent the interests of the 
people. 11 (16) 
The South African Government is convinced that these his-
torical links between SWAPO and the ANC still exist and that 
they will continue in the future until both· South Africa and 
( 1 7) 
SWA/Namibia are ruled by black governments. The govern-
ment also believes that both organisations are strongly 
communist orientated, a view in which they have the support 
of a number of outside bodies. For example~ a report· of the 
United States Senate Sub-Committee, presided over by Senator 
Jeremiah Denton, found that the Soviet Union and its allies 
had achieved "alarmingly effective" control over the banned 
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African National Congress and SWAPO. Evidence brought 
before this Committee suggested that 
" . . . the original purposes of the ANC and 
SWAPO have subverted to suit Soviet aims in 
Southern Africa". (18) 
These fin~ings were disturbing to the South African Govern-
ment which fears a stronger linkage between the ANC and 
SWAPO once Namibia becomes independent. 
The President of SWAPO, Mr Sam Nujoma, when interviewed in 
Paris during November 1980, affirmed these fears when he said 
that SWAPO and the ANC in a joint endeavour had brought poli-
tical awareness to the peoples of both countries, and that 
this process political awareness to the peoples of both 
countries, and that this process was progressive in both 
'b' d S h f . (l 9 ) Nami ia an out Arica. Mr Moses Garoeb, SWAPO's 
Secretary-General, on the other hand, tried to negate the 
fears of a strong future ANC-SWAPO linkage, when he pointed 
out that SWAPO is fully aware of the great importance of 
racial appeasement after independence, and that the actual 
transition towards independence should ta~e place as peace-
fully as possible. <20 > ·As spokesman of the organisation, he 
went on to say that SWAPO would not provide or allow ANC 
military bases in the Territory after independence, and that 
SWAPO would strive towards maintaining correct ~nd hearty 
l t . . h S h f . ( 21 ) re a ions wit out Arica. 
Despite extensive dependency relations between SWA/Namibia. 
and South Africa, and the real danger of massive retaliation 
179 
should SWAPO allow ANC bases in an independent Namibia, the 
South African government is still sceptical of such promises. 
Fearing that SWAPO would backtrack on these as soon as inter-
nationally recognised independence is attained, by then 
welcoming ANC cadres to set up organisational facilities in 
Namibia. These would then be used in directing the final 
onslaught against South Africa. The government further 
fears greater Soviet involvement in this onslaught.· 
dices I-:-III of Section 5. 4 presented figures prepared by the 
United States National foreign Assessment Center which 
reflects a definite increase in Soviet aid activities in 
Southern Africa since the early 1970s.) 
SOUTH AFRICA: DESTABILISATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies warned that 
an escalation of the SWA/Namibia conflict could prompt greater 
Communist Bloc involvement and lead to a widening war in 
Southern Africa deteriorated markedly during this period and 
that the prospects for reducing tensions during 1982/83 were 
minimal. In the co'urse of 1982 it indeed. became evident 
that South Africa had intensified its pre-emptive counter-
insurgency warfare, through heavy and prolonged attacks 
against targets deep insipe Angola, as well as mounting 
attacks on suspected ANC headquarters in other neighbouring 
Southern Africa might in fact hope to provoke Cuban forces 
into entering the SWA/Namibia war~ This would fulfil South 
Africa's self-serving claim that the Namibian struggle was 
not one of national liberation, but part of a Soviet Grand 
Design for Southern Africa. (23) 
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Furthermore, anxieties are mounting rapidly in Western 
capitals over Pretoria's long-term intentions in Southern 
Africa, and that it may actually be trying to topple some 
regimes. During 1982 no fewer than seven of South Africa's 
neighbours accused it of trying to destabilise them 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. 
Internationally, it has been suggested that Pretoria's real 
motive, particularly in Mozambique, is to create such tur-
moil that the Cubans or Russians or some other communist 
government will be asked for assistance, and that South 
Africa would then look to the West, and especially the 
A . f . t" (24) mericans, or 1nterven ion. A United Nations Commission 
has found ·south Africa guilty of c6mplicity in the abortive 
Seychelles coup, while Lesotho's King Moshoeshoe II, in his 
address to the UN Security Council, has accused South Africa 
of trying to overrun neighbouring states and rule them as 
colonies in its 'constellation of Southern African states'. <25 > 
Lesotho is the third Southern African state where South 
Africa quite o~enly used its armed forces to ~aid across the 
border, (see Appendix II of Section 2.5), the others being 
Angola and Mozambique. All these cases have been justified 
on the grounds that anti-South African guerrillas, notably 
ANC cadres, have been o·perati ve from bases within these 
countries. Prime Minister Botha made it clear that South 
Africa will not tolerate its neighbours allowing their terri-
tories being used as springbo?rds for insurgency attacks 
against the Republic. <26 > 
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There is also a considerable body of evidence, and wide-
spread conviction in Africa, that Mr P.W. Botha's forces are 
giving material support to a variety of dissident guerrilla 
groups in other states of Southern Africa, especially in 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe, with the aim of destabilising their 
governments. Consequently, Western government officials are 
now beginning to suspect that SWA/Namibia too, may fall into 
the pattern described as 'segmented destabilisation'. <27 > 
This view is supported by the thinking of many local and 
international observers, news agencies and political 
observers. For example, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, leader of 
Inkata and the Black Alliance ind the most formidable black 
leader in the local legal political arena, outrightly named 
Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho as victims of "a 
deliberate and calculated" process of destabilisation< 29 >, 
while the London Times in an editorial on August 2, 1982, 
numbered various incidents in which South African involve-
ment was suspected among these were: the murder of Dr 
Ruth First in Maputo; the activities of the Mozambique 
National Resistance ·movement; the anti-FR~LIMO guerrilla 
movement in Mozambique; the attempted coup in the Seychelles 
during November. 1981, and a raid into Zimbabwe in which 
three South African soldiers were killed. <29 > (See· Appen-
dix II of Section 2.5.). 
The concept 'destabilisation' came into general ·usage during 
the second half of· 1981. Linguistically destabilisation is 




ponents of a society or Various societies. In a SATV 
interview the South African Minister of Defence, General 
Magnus Malan, defined destabilisation as: 
" actions aimed at creating a situation 
in a country whereby you can disrupt the 
country or overthrow the government". ( 30), 
Yet, surprisingly, he denied allegations that South Africa 
is pursuing a policy of destabilisation of its neighbours. 
In realistic terms, however, General Malan cannot otherwise 
but deny all destabilisation allegations: Though, such 
denials, in effect, do not succeed in overriding the solid 
evidence suggested destabilisation activities. 
Prime Minister Botha reflected that South Africa's "sphere 
of influencell extends to all its neighbours in Southern 
- f · ( 31 ) - -h. 1 h ff. . l O . . . f .A r1ca , w 1 et e country's o 1c1a ppos1t1on 1s o 
the view that this sphere of influence should be put to good 
use, that is, that destabilisation would be immensely dis-
advantageous for South Africa, it would complicate SWA/ 
Namibian negotiations, and besides, if the economies of these 
neighbouring countries could settle down a.s a result of South 
African help, they could become even more closely linked to 
South Africa. 
THE FRONT LINE STATES AND THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
CO-ORDINATION CONFERENCE: MINIMISATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN 
INFLUENCE 
The Front Line states, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
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Botswana and Mozambique, have repeatedly pledged their full 
support to the SWA/Namibian independence movement( 32 >, 
including assistance in the military struggle, even though, 
as set out in the Lus~ka Manifesto of 1969, they would 
prefer a peaceful negotiated settlement. During November 
1981, Tanzanian Ambassador Mr Paul Rupia, reiterated the 
Front Line States' approach towards SWA/Namibia in the UN 
General Assembly, i.e. 
1. independence for the Territory in accordance with UN 
Resolution 435 (1978), 
2. to allow Namibians themselves to decide on their Consti-
tutional future, 
3. ensure democracy and Human Rights for the entire popula-
tion, and 
4. to resist any attempts at blackening SWAPO's popular 
. b'l' (33) image or accepta 1 1ty. 
While early in February 1982, Tanzania's government, speaking 
for all Front Line members, accused the West, and particularly 
the United ~tates, of co-operating with South Africa in 
stalling on indepenence for Namibia. The Sunday News 
reported that 
11 
• • • the West has over the past months been 
coming up with proposal after proposal, 
giving South Africa room for stalling on the 
Territory 11 • ( 34) 
Since becoming independent themselves, all the Front Line 
States have been engulfed by a wide range of internal political 
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conflicts {party versus party) elite versus the masses) and 
. bl {35) severe economic pro ems. In addition, South Africa 
has deliberately weakened their ability to assist SWA/Namibia 
by an offensive which involved supplying so-called resistance 
movements with weapons {Angola Mozambique); restricting the 
passage of essential commodities {Zambia); direct military 
invasion_ (Angola); q continuous campaign of anti-government 
propaganda .(Zimbabwe); and overt economic control through 
Customs Agreements and inclusion in the Rand Monetary Area 
(Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland). <36 ) The Front Line 
states responded to these measures through the creation of the 
Southern African Development Co-Ordination Conference (SADCC). <3 
While it would be incorrect to suggest that SADCC was designed 
solely in reaction t6, or as counter-move, to South Africa's 
( 3 8) 
proposed constellation of states , it is seen as a regional 
grouping designed to promote Southern African economic libera-
. h h d. d d 1 1 · · · · <39 > h t1on t roug co-or 1nate · eve opmenta 1n1t1at1ves , muc 
as the Front Line states are facilitating political libera-
tion from South Africa through diplomatic initiatives and 
political solidarity. ( 40 ) Its members include: all the 
internationally recognised black ruled states of Southern 
Africa, namely Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Namibia with 
reserved membership~ This Front Line grouping. is faced 
with the dominating economic and military :power of South 
Africa. With the exception of Angola( 4l) and Tanzania, all 
these states function within the complex ~eb of an established 
dependency relationship with South Africa. Therefore, no 
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one can doubt the enormity of the future trails to be over-
come by SADCC, however, it is unrealistic to ignore the 
fact that within a decade South Africa's secure cordon of 
white dominated buff~r states has been stripped away. 
Within the Republic itself the growth of black political 
consciousness; highly visible acts of sabotage; persistent 
ANC infiltration; black labour unrest,and studen~ protests, 
have become more evident. Neverth~less, it is often argued 
that Mr P.W. Botha's 'constellation of states' was largely 
a defensive effort post-dating the initial steps towards SADCC 
or that SADCC came into existence as a result of Mr Botha's 
. . (42) 
'constellation of states' idea. It is true that the 
reduction of economic dependence, particularly, _but not only 
on South Africa, played an important role in the establish-
I 
ment of SADCC, though, SADCC is possibly best perceived as 
an ongoing process of regional economic development as well 
as the disengagement from-dependency relations which will 
assume different forms and imensions according to changing 
circumstances. SADCC goals are the promotion of economic 
·independence, the establishmnt of equi tabl_e economic integra-
tion, mobilisation of regional resurc_es, the solicitation of 
international support for these objectives, and as SADCC 
leaders have gone to great lengths to emphasise, the avoidance 
of confrontation with South Africa as the result of carefully 
d . d . t t . <
43 ) esigne economics ra egies. 
Development co-ordination implies the consolidation and 
linkage of efforts across national boundaries. In his opening 
186 
speech as Chairman of the July 1981 SADCC Summit meeting in 
Salisbury, President Quett J. Masire of Botswana made these 
significant remarks:: 
"I have no doubt that our decision to decen-
tralise SADCC programmes is the correct one. 
Decentralisatio~ means that, as SADCC grows, 
it will become increasingly visible through-
out the region. SADCC's visibility, I trust, 
will not be measured by physical assets, but 
by activities and achievements of direct bene-
fit to our people." f44) 
In ac.cordance with this strategy there has been a di vision of 
responsibilities corresponding to the interests, resources, 
and to a lesser extent, the capabilities of member-states. 
The present distribution of responsibilities is as follows: 
1. Angola energy policies 
2. Botswana arid lands cultivation 
foot-and~mouth disease control 
headqua~ters of the SADCC Secretariat 
3. Lesotho land utilisation and soil conservation 
(with Zimbabwe) 
4. Malawi fisheries and wildlife 
5. Mozambique - transport and communication 
6. Swaziland manpower development and training facili-
ties 
7. Zambia development fund proposals 
mining 
8. Tanzania industrialisation P,rogr am mes 
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9. Zimbabwe food security plan 
land utilisation and soil conservation 
(with Lesotho) 
. t t . 1 d . . 1 · ( 45 ) air ranspor , inc u ing regiona airport 
SADCC members admit that they are poor at present, but insist 
that their potential is tremendous. The organisation has 
repeatedly indicated that an independent Namibia would be 
encouraged to join its ranks, and a South Africa under 
genuine majority rule would ·also be welcome. <4G) (SWAPO, 
the ANC and PAC have consulted with SADC for some time, and 
were in fact invited to participate actively in a seminar on 
SADCC organised by Botswana~s ruling Democratic Party in 
Gaberone during October 1981. )< 47 > In particular 'Namibia's' 
strategic and economic resources would be a significant addi-
tion to the SADCC camp. It is virtually certain that a 
SWAPO regime would join once it attained power~ 
In summary, several major roles of SADCC deserve special 
emphasis. The grouping is primarily concerned with creating 
foundations of economic power within each _participating 
nation and the region as a whole. Specific and substantive 
ventures dispersed among member states, but co-ordinated to 
assure maximum regional impact, are the primary mechanisms. 
If successful the SADCC approach will make slow.but tangible 
strides towards reducing dependency and open new alternatives 
to interaction with South Africa. <48 ) 
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APPENDIX I 
MAJOR SADF OPERATIONS AND RAIDS 













August 7-22, 1982 
October 1982 
Operation "Cobra" Angola 
Raids on Oshitotwa Zambia 
Operation "Cassinga" Angola 
Strikes into Southern Angola 
Occupation of South-Western Zambia 
Operation "Smokeshell" Angola 
Operation "Carnation" Angola 
Operation "Protea" Angola 
Operation "Daisy" Angola 
Operation "Super" Angola 
Purgatory Raids Angola 
Extensive Purgatory Raid~ ihto Arigola 





INCIDENTS OF ACTUAL AND ALLEGED SOUTH AFRICAN 







T9e Lesotho Government accuses the Govern-
ment of South Africa of harbouring dissidents 
I 
of the Lesotho Liberation Army 
(Die Suidwester 23 October 1981 
Reuter) 
Sap a 
Robert Mugabe accuses South Africa of insti-
gating attacks oo Zimbabwean arms and ammuni-
tion dumps, and of the recruitment of anti-
government dissidents. 
(Die Suidwester 3 February 1982 Sapa 
Reuter) 
Zimbabwe, Angola and Zambia complain to an 
EEC fact-finding commission about South 
Africa's destabilising activities in Southern 
Africa. 
(Die Republikein 4 February 1982 
Reuter) 
Sap a 
A quarter of the Zimbabwean Air Force des-
troyed by dissidents, with strong rumours 
that South African military personnel master-
minded the attack. 
(The Cape Times 26 July 1982) 
Three South African Defence Force members 
shot dead du~ing an unauthorised mission 
into Zimbabwe. 






Western nations react sharply in condemnation 
of the SADF 's aggressive actions against 
Lesotho-based members of the ANC, 2? ANC 
casualties were recorded. 
(The Cape Times 14 December 1982) 
A series of synchronised pre-dawn raids by 
Swazi police and troops to detain members of 
the ANC clearly indicate Swazi's desire for 
peace with South Africa and its military 
forces. 
(The Cape Times 17 December 1982) 
The abortive Seychelles' coup (November 1981) 
is possibly the best example, illustrating 
to what extremes the South African govern-
ment is willing to go in the enactment of 
its policies. 
The infamous "month of the hawks" during 
which South Africa demonstrated the crippling1 
hold it has over the Zimbabwean economy. In 
the form of direct and indirect destabilising 
measures such as the severance of trade 
links, recall of South African locomotives 
and wagons, as well as the non-renewal of 
40 000 Zimbabwean workers' contracts in South 
Africa. 
(The Economist, July 16, ,'1983, Vol.288, 
No.7298, London) 
"Operation Bits and Pieces" on six ANC tar-
gets based in Maputo by the South African 
Air Force; South African Minister of 
' 
Defence, GeneraL Magnus Malan, stated that 
it had been a retaliatory measure for the 
car-bomb attack by the ANC in cen~ral Pre-
toria during May 1983. 
(The Argus, 23 May 1983, and Frontline, July 




A South African remote-controlled reconnais-
sance plane shot down over Maputo while it 
was on 'an information-gathering trip. Such 
information is used by the Military ~ntelli-
gence branch of the SADF to plan future 
attacks against ANC bases in neighbouring 
countries. 
(The Cape Times, 2 June 1983) 
South African Foreign Minister, Roelof Botha, 
I in Parliament, disclosed that nine meetings 
had been held with five nefghbouring states 
in the past six months. These meetings 
took place, he said, to discuss issues of 
"bilateral concern" and issues of concern to 
Southern Africa as a whole. 
(The Cape Times, 18 June 1983) 
192 
REFERENCES: Section 2.5 
1. Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 16 July 1982 
2. Footnote: This figure includes direct and indirect subsidies, 
budgetary aid, estimated military expenditure, and the labour 
earning of the soldiers fighting in northern South West Africa/ 
Namibia~ 
3. Contemporary Africa Record, Vol.XIII 1980~81 p.8727 
4. Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for United 
States Policy, b.15 
5. Op.cit. p.16 
6. P.W. Botha's speech in Durban on 5 Au'gust 1979 
7. Abrahams, 0. Strategic Options in the Namibian Independence· 
Dispute, Centre for African Studies, Perspectives on Namibia: 
Past and Present, No.4/1983, (University of Cape Town Press, March 
1983), pp.111~112 
8. P.W. Bothais speech tn Cape Town on 19 October 1978 
9. Du Pisani, A. . Prosp~cts for an International Settlement, Centre 
for African Studies, Perspectives on Namibia: Past and Present, 
No.4/1983, (University of Cape Town Press, March 1983), p.132 
10. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek}, 2 October 1981 
. . 
11. The concep_t of a ''total'national strategy'' is i~ fact the officially 
. .P!'esen.ted _counte~~stra~egy to the ~.'total· ~nsl~1.J-ght~·:aim at the \ 
Republic of South Afrilca. Some Foreign Policy Implications of 
South.Africa's ''Total National Strategy~;,, p.2. 
12. Totemeyer, G. South West Africa/Namibia, '{Randburg, Focus Suid 
Publishers, 1977), pp.71~74 
. . 
13. Windhoek Observer;·(Windhoek),.22 August 1981 and 3·october 1981 
'. 
193 
14. Cuba: The New Communist Power ih Africa, in The Horn of Africa 
in Continuing· Crisis, pp.149'-150 
15. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol.XIII 1980-81 pp.A3 and 4 
'. 
16. Namibia: SWAPO Fights for Freedom, Edited by the Liberation 
Support Movement, (Oakland, United States of America, LSM Infor-
mation Centre, 1978), p.100 
17. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol.XIII 1980-81 pp.A3-4 
18. The Cape Times, (Cape Town), 22 November 1982 
19. Windhoek Observer, (Windhoek), 29 November 1980 
20. Abrahams, Op.cit., p.112 
,21. Die Suidwester, (Windhoek), 15 November 1981 
. 22. By attacking the ANC and its neighbouring bases, South Africa was, 
General Malan Minister of Defence, suggested, taking preventative 
action. Beeld, 17 February 1981 
23. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek), 13 May 1982 
24. Geldenhuys, 0. Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's 
''Total National Stategy'', pp;23':""24 
25. The Cape Times, (Cape Town), 18 December 1982 
26. Debates of the House of Assembly, 1 May 1980, col.5296 and 5297 
27, The Cape Times, (Cape Town), 18 December 1982 
28. The Cape Times, {Cape Town),, 2s,september 1982 
29. London Times, 28 ~ugust 1982 
194 
30. The Cape Times, (Cape Town), 13 October 1982 
31. Ibid. 
32. Abrahams, 0. Op.citi, 122 
33. Die Republikein, (Windhoek), 25 November 1981 
34. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek), l February 1982 
35. Abrahams, 0. Op.cit., p~l23 
36. Geldenhuys, D. The Constellation of Southern African States and 
the Southern African Development Co-Ordination Council: Towards 
A New Regional Stalemate, The South ·African Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, (Braamfontein, January 1981), pp.16-20 
37. The Namibian Review, No.25 July/August 1982, Edited by K. Abrahams 
Windhoek 1982 p.9 
38. Geldenhuys, D. The Constellation of Southern African States and 
the Southern African Development Co-Ordination Council: Towards 
A New Regional Stalemate, pp.16-22 
39. Op. cit. p. l 
40. The Origins, Deve 1 opment and Achievements .of SADCC, in Libby R. T., · 
· The Front Line State~ of Africa: A Small Power Entente, unpublished 
paper, May 18 1977 
41. Grundy~ K. W. South Africa in the Po 1 i ti cal Economy. of Sou~hern 
Afri'ca, t.n .. Internattonal Politics· tn Southern Africa~ (Editor) 
Carter·G.M. and O'Meara P, (United States of Amertc·a, Indiana 
University Press, 1982), p. 15l 
42. Breytenbach, W.J. The Constellation of States: A Consideration, 
(Johannesburg, 1980), p',81 
) . 
195 
43. The Se~ond SADCC Summit Meeting, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's 
Opening Address, {Salisbury, 10 Juliy 1981), p.10 
44. Dr Q.K.J. Masire, Opening Statement by the Chairman, SADCC Summit 
Meeting, {SaHsbury, July 1981) 
45. Geldenhuys, D. Op.cit., pp.22-24 
46. Op.cit. p.37 
47. Botswana Daily News, 27' October 1981 
48. South Africa International, Vol.13 No.2 October 1982, {The 
South African Foundation, 1982), p.93 
196 
SECTION THREE 
LOCAL POL I t 1-'C S 
1 .. 
l 97, 
SECTION' 3 .1 
POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
WITHIN SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA: 
INTRODUCTION TO THE 1970's 
In more than one respect did the 1970s highlight a turning 
· / 
point in South Africa's relations-:.wi th South West Africa/ 
Namibia (SWA/Namibia) and the International Community. 
Firstly, it was during 1971 that the International Court of 
Justice officially condemned South Africa's continued 
presence in the Territory(l); secondly, ·the General Assembly 
declared South Africa's administrative presence there as 
illegal, ordering the immediate withdrawal of both its adminis-
trative personnel and military forces; and thirdly, the wide-
spread Ovambo labour unrests during 1971/72 demonstrated the 
1 k 1 l 'd . . h h . l'b t'. t' 1 <
2 > B ac peop e's soi arity wit t e ongoing i era ions rugg e. 
Yet, significant as these developments might have been, they 
'· . 
failed to culminate in South Africa's departure from the 
Territory . In fact, by the close of 1974 it was possible 
. clearly to identify two mainstreams within the development of 
SWA/Namibian affairs: 
©n the one side we had the S~uth West Africa People's Org~ni-
sation (SWAPO) and the International Community·~un~ted under ~he 
United Nations banner ardently striving towards attaining 
domination and control over local political developments, in 
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order to establish an independent Namibia based on the prin-
ciples of majoritarian democracy. On the opposing side was 
the South African Government, the·local National Party and their 
ethnically-based concept of an independent South West Africa/ 
N "b" (3) ami ia. 
For the purposes of this section of the dissertation the 
central focus
1
will be on the South African point of view with 
its ethnic bases. In Section 4 the South West African 
People's Organisation (SWAPO) will be discussed in detail. 
To do this contextual analysis properly it is necessary to 
briefly review the history of the Territory during the entire 
period under South African occupation, since this will indi-
cate a line of continuity in South Africa's ethnic approach 
which became progressively manifested during the 1960s, 1970s 
and early 1980s: 
1. Between 1915 and 1920 South West Africa was under the military 
rule of the Union. of South Africa ( 4 ), after which,· in 1919 I 
1920, it was placed under South African mandate by United 
Nations approva~ and this lasted relatively undisturbed 
until 1945. (5 ) One can safely state that South Africa's 
' ·L 
concern towards the Territory, between 1915 and 1945, was 
~xpansionist, although very little.exploitation of natural 
resources or iocal industrial development took place. 
2. During the late 1940s and 1950s South Africa's inter-
national status, due to its institutionnlised Apartheid 
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policy, suffered drastically from being the originator 
and co-drafter of the mandatory system 
the political scapegoat and outcast. ( 6 ) 
South Africa became 
Naturally, this 
had an adverse effect on how South Africa's involvement in 
South West Africa was perceived on both the local and 
international political fronts especially if one takes 
into consideration that opposition to colonialism emerged. 
in the 1940s and 1950s when traditional leaders started to 
submit petitions to the United Nations urging direct 
intervention in~the So~th W~st-African issue. ( 7 ) 
3. Earlier events, such as South Africa's attempts in 1945, 
1946 and 1947, to manipulate the United Nations in favour 
of incorporating the Territory as a fifth South African 
province, illustrated the government's desire to keep 
South West as closely linked to South Africa as possible. (S) 
Although these attempts were fruitless, the idea of 
incorporation was not ab?ndoned completely; as reaffirmed 
in 1949 when the Nationalist Government gave White.South 
West Africa direct representation in the Parliament of the 
Union of .South Africa. (The SWA Affairs Amendment Bill 
allowed for six elected White members in the Union Parlia-
ment.) And in 1950, the then South African Foreign 
Minister, Mr E. Louw, openly denied any considerations of 
withdrawing South. Africa's administration from the Terri-
tory. 
4. From the late 1950s and eatiy 1960s South West Africa 
acquired greater significance for South Africa, not only 
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economicilly, but also politically and strategically. (9 ) 
South West Africa, together with Angola and Mozambique 
under Portuguese colonial rule, and the then White-ruled 
Rhodesia, became one of ·the so-called 'bastions' against 
th f . . Af . t. 1. (IO) e era o progressive r1can na 1ona ism. The 
encroaching "communist threat" also became a by-word 
during this period. 
5. For the same period, 1952-1962, the relation bet~een 
South Africa and the United Nations on the issue of 
South West African independence remained indecisive and 
unchanged. In 1962, however, the government chose to 
initiate the appointment of the so-called Odendaal Commis-
sion for the purpose of devising a five-year 'modernisa-
tion programme' specifically aimed at boosting non-white 
d 1 t . th. th T . t (ll ) eve opmen w1 1n e err1 ory. It would be 
accurate to state that the initiative, in terms of 
administrative and poli~ical developments within the 
Territory has remai_ned in the hands of the South African 
Government ever since. The Commission tabled its recom-
mendations in the .South African Parliament on 27 January 
1964. ' 12 >· 
The ethnically-based 'homelands policy' devised by the Oden-
daal Commission coincided with the government's ultimate aims 
£or the Territory's independence. The Commission suggested 
the creation of separate 'homelands or reserves' for each of 
the eleven ethnic groups, which roughly cor~esponded to the 
traditional areas occupied by themC13) only the Whites were, 
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not . d t . f. ( 14) assigne o occupy any spec1 1c area. Within the 
'reserves or homelands' the othe~ groups were expected to 
develop to their maximum socio-political potential, while they 
could still engage in economic contract activities within the 
so-called White areas, mostly the towns, but were expected to 
return to their homelands after the fulfilment of their con-
tracts. Unlike their South African counterparts these home-
lands w~re not destined to attain ultimate independence beyond 
a small 1measure of self-government. {See Appendix I for a. 
graphical illustration of these homeland boundaries.) 
It was the Odendaal recommendations that laid the basic founda-
tion for the Territory's ethnically-based constitutional future 
so ardently pursued during the 1970s. {lS) Except for the 
regional allocation of ethnically-based homeland territories 
very little had been done to implement the Commission's recom-
mendations at the time it was tabled. Only in 1974, with the 
collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and the subsequent 
radical change in the power structure of Southern Africa, did 
a new sense of urgency arise over the constitutional future of 
.South West Africa. {1 6 ) Zimbabwean indepen,dence in 1980 
added to the pressures on the Territory's future. {Incidentally, 
as from 1968 the Territory became known in international circles 
as Namibia, though for the purpose of this dissertation and 
until independence is attained, it would be more correct to 
refer to the country as South West Africa/Namibia SWA/ 
Namibia.) 
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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS LEADING UP TO THE INTERIM ADMINISTRA-
TIVE STRUCTURE: ETHNICITY IN THE 1970s 
Having presented a brief background to the 1970s one can 
now look at·the political and administrative developments 
that have taken place within SWA/Namibia since the beginning 
of this period. Particular attention will still be apid to 
what ha~ been described as the 'South African initiative'. 
Until April 1974, the local National Party continued to 
elect members for direct representation in the South African 
Parliament. The National Party, its Constituent Assembly 
and supporting Bureaucracy was the supreme political bodies 
in the Territory. In terms of multi-ethnic policies the 
National Party supported the separate-development recommenda-
tions of the Odendaal Commission as well as closer ties with 
South Africa. (l 7 ) 
However, by September 1974 the local National Party decided 
that 'the time had come to speak to the other population 
groups', thereby adopting a sudden and radically different 
approach. The leader of the Nationalist Party, Mr A.H. du Plessis, 
announced that "a constitutional conference would take place", 
while fellow Nationalist. member, _Mr D. Mudge, stressed that 
"only tribal authorities and not· political parties would be· 
allowed ~o participate". (lB) It was speculated that this 
change in policy had come about only as a result of pressure 
(19) 
from the South African Government , and that four major 
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factors led up to the talks in 1974: 
1. the protracted dispute between South Africa and the 
United Nations over SWA/Namibia's future; 
2. Pretoria's overall Bantustan programme; 
3. the change in the balance-of-power after the collapse of 
the Portuguese colonial empire; and 
4. the liberation struggle in the Terriiory itself.< 20 > 
Nevertheless, this was when the "Turnhalle" was born in con-
cept, ~nvolving talks between the leaders of all the major 
population groups to work out a "compromise" for existing 
political problems and to advance suggestions for future con-
stitutional developmenis.< 21 J On 1 September 1975, the 
Turnhalle Conference convened for the first time. As only 
tribal authorities were allowed to participate including 
fifteen delegates from the unpopular Ovambo Authority 
the Conference failed to draw representatives from parties such 
·as SWAPO, SWAPO-D, SWANU and NIP. They objected to South 
.Africa "staging" the exercise, and felt that the proceedings 
would not lead to true political independence. The absence 
of these parties was also the reason why the Turnhalle Agree-
t d . d t . . . 1 · t · . { 22 ) .men 1 no enJoy 1nternat1ona recogn1 ion. 
-swAPO was, in fact, invited·to-join the~onstitution~l talks 
in Windhoek but turned down the invitation after stating "that 
it is only interested in the transfer.of power directly to it". <23 > 
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As delegates to the Turnhalle were mobilised, SWAPO issued a 
statement condemning it as 
II 
" 
a monumental exercise in Boer-bad 
faith", 
a public relations exercise ... aimed 
at the perpetuation of white minority rule 
under which South African domination would 
continue." ( 24) 
SWAPO's European Representative, Mr P. Katjavivi, made it 
clear that the
1
organisation would not participate in pre-
independence elections and talks unless: 
1. they were held on non-ethnic lines; 
2. they were controlled by the United Nations; 
3. South Africa abandoned its plans to establish an ethnic-
based Turnhalle interim g6vernment; and 
4. South Africa's security forces were first withdrawn from 
the territory. C25 > 
The Credentials Committee under the Rehoboth leader, Dr Ben 
~ Africa, worked out the composition of the delegations.· The 
White, Coloured, Rehoboth ~aster, tavango, E~st Caprivian, 
and the Ovambo groups were ·_represente::l by elected bodies. 
The Herero, Nama, Damara, Tswana and San were represented by 
elected·and appointed delegations of varying size. (See 
Appendix II for delegations to· the Turnhalle. -) In a Bruckner 
De Villiers Report it was pointefr~ut-that the selection of the 
delegations was "a highly individuous exercise to make a fair 
selection of· truly representat'ive delegates -to the Conference", 
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and that one can 
" ... in all fairness, hardly see how else the 
authorities could have ·gone about constituting 
a relatively representative body of delegates 
from all sections of the population." 
Furthermore, 
II in the end, the credentials of the 
various delegations passed muster with 
apart from SWAPO the most critical of 
all parties concerned." ( 26) 
Although it was delegates from the White group who introduced 
the larger part of the draft outline that led to the Turn-
halle Agreement in 1977, it was by no means a simple process. 
Decisions had to be made on a basis of complete consen~us and 
( 2 7) not a mere show of hands. During the first plenary 
session unanimous agreement was reached only upon a formal 
Declaration of Intent.' 28 > (The Declaration of Intent is 
reproduced in Appendix III.) Most incidents of dissension 
resuled from the very nature of the composition of the Con-
ference, as it was usually delegates representing dissenting 
. (29) parties who caused most disagreement. 
Despite the exclusion of SWAPO from the Conference, the·, 
believe amongst non-white participants indicated that they 
viewed the creation of an interim government as the first 
step towards including SWAPO in the country's future consti-
tutional order. ( 30) · A Conference statement released on 18 
August 1976, announced an unanimous agreement on the establish-
ment of a multi-ethnic interim government for SWA/Namibia, with 
31 December 1978 as proposed date -ior independence. ( 31 ) 
I 
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At the close of the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference in 
March 197; a petition was submitted to the South African 
· Government for the establishment of an interim government for 
the Territory, based on.:the Turnhalle Agreement. Arid to 
app~ove an interim constitution which, according to Mr A.H. 
du Plessis, the then leader of the local National Party, 
.would become, "with only minor changes", the permanent consti-
t t . f .. d d N 'b · . ( 
32 ) u ion or an 1n epen ent· am1 1a. The ~reposed consti-
tution envisaged a three-tierd government consfsting of a 
Central Authority on the first-tier, Representative or Ethnic 
Authorities on the second-tier and Local or Municipal Authorities 
on .the third-tier.< 33 > ( See the flow diagram -<:Jf Appendix ,IV 
, which sets out the composition of the proposed Central 
Authority. ) 
The first-tier was made up of a mutli-ethnic Ministers Council 
and National Assembly, the second-tier of eleven ethnically~ 
based Representative Author~{ies, with the third-tier allowing 
for Municipal Councils supposedly under control of the 
different population groups. In reality, white towns stayed 
. d h . . ·. . 1 . 1 ( 3 4 ) A f th dd . t f th . un er w 1te mun1c1pa counc1 s. ur er o 1 yo is 
multi-ethnic three-tierd set-up was that the second-tier 
. authorities were in no way answerable to the first-tier Central 
Government. ( 35 ) Section Three, 2 and 3 deal with these 
issues in greater detail. 
After the conclusion of the Turnhalle Agreement, 1977, all 
that remained to be done was the actual 'preparation' of the 
Territory, its people's and institutions, for an internally 
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settled independence declaration. It was also necessary to 
find a suitable figure-head to act as symbolic leader to 
direct the country during the interim period prior to inde-
pendence. The preparation for indeperidence involved the 
abolition of all forms of institutionalised racial discrimina-
tion and ·to set up a multi-ethnic government structure that 
would ensure the continuation of a moderate multi-ethnic 
go1ernment after independence. 
I 
The first task, removal of institutionalised discriminatory 
.measures, was performed by Judge M.T. Steyn, the first South 
Af . Ad . . G l . d . h . T . ( 3 6 ) rican m1n1strator- enera to res1 e int e erritory. 
In terms of the second task, a suitable figur~-head was found 
in the person of Mr Dirk Mudge, former member of the National 
Party, who, after an unsuccessful attempt to take over the 
leadership of the National Party, broke away from the Nationalist 
· Party to establish his own Republican Party in December 1977. 
(This party had only white members.) After the split in 
the National Party ranks Mr Mudge had to £ight a reargu§rd 
action amongst his own supporters ih order to accept limited 
power-sharing on a multi-ethnic basis. 
In July, Judge M.T. Steyn was appointed as first Administrator-
General of SWA/Namibia. Administrative steps enacted by 
Steyn "prepared" the country for inde.pendence, through the 
removal of apartheid legislation from the statute books. 
'This resulted, in theory at least, in an integrated multi-
racial society. ( 3 7 >. In practice, however, inequalities and 
". 
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apartheid based upon ingrained dfferences in wealth between 
(38) black and white remained unchanged. Despite tremendous 
socio-political problems created and erttrenched by a history 
of colonialism, there still is no denying Steyn's achievements. 
Apart from abolishing apartheid legislation, he also issued 
'the proclamation that led up to the December 1978 elections.. ( 39 > 
It was in 1978 that the South African Governments' initiative 
nearly came to fruition. Government spokesmen addressing 
the International Community pointed·out that the Territory 
and its people's were ready for, and in fact desired, their 
independence. For instance; on 25 April 1978 the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs addressed a ~etter to the ambassadors of 
the Western· Governments stating that, 
"Having now been advised by the Administrator-
General that he has consulted the various 
political parties and church organisations in 
the Territory and that he was satisfied that 
the (Turnhalle) proposals are acceptable to 
the majority, he has· recommended acceptance 
by the South African Government." 
.Furthermore, 
"The people of South West Africa are ,· 
anxiously and impatiently awaiting their 
independence which has been promised them 
not later than the end of this year (1978) 11 • (40) 
On another occasion;·addressing the Unit~d Nations Security 
Council, 2 7 'July 19 78, Minister Roel of ·Botha said: 
"Very soon South West Africa will be indepen-
dent. The people of the Territory demand 
it: it is their will and inalienable right 
We (South Africa) have repeatedly 
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stated that we recognise the separate 
international status of the Territory and 
that it is our goal to bring it to full 
independence,·and as we stated as far back 
as 1967: 'The people themselves will ul-
timately decide." · ( 41) 
In March 1973 Prime Minister John Vorster stressed the need 
for the peoples of South West Africa to gain experience in 
self-government, as it was an essential part in promoting the 
right to self-government. 
I 
Piime Minister Vorster again 
expressed the wish of the Government to "bestow" independence 
on SWA/Namibia on 20 September 1978, when, at a press con-
ference, he said: 
"I reiterate, South Africa always has 
accepted the principle that it is for the 
people themselves to determine their own 
future. It is not for the Secretary-
General or United Nations or any other 
entity to delay the process leading to 
self-determination and independence. 
The Cabinet in its deliberations yesterday 
{19 September 1978) concluded that the 
people of South West Africa, in accordance 
with their wishes, would have to be given 
the opportunity to elect their own represen-
tatives. This will be done on the basis of 
universal adult suffrage in country-wide 
elections in order to establish unequivocally 
who has the right to speak for South West 
Africa." (42) 
Now in 1983, looking back over the five years since those 
remarks, it is clear that they amounted to little more than 
empty rhetoric as the Territory and its people still seek 
~ndependence. What is equally clear is that at that stage in 
I. 
· .time the South African Government had been of the impression 
that it could successfully settle the .SWA/Namibian issue on 
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the basis of an ethnically structured government dispensation, 
initially devised by the 1964 Odendaal Commission Recommenda-
tions and further expanded by the 1975/1977 Turnhalle Con-
ferences. The ·DTA itself consisted of eleven different 
parties representing all ethnic groups. 
Obviously these plans had gone seriously awry, in 1978 the 
government had reason for optimism in the proposed elections 
I 
in Dece~ber 1978, purportedly based on one-man one-vote and 
universal suffrage. This optimism would appear to have been 
well-founded as the 1978 election proved to be a massive boon 
for the South African initiative as a vast majority of the 
electorate supported the multi-ethnic Democratic Turnhalle 
Alliance, under the leadership of Mr Dirk Mudge, as the most 
"popular" party in the Territory. The DTA won 41 of the 
seats'.in the Constituent Assembly, the National Party, under 
its AKTUR banner won only 6 seats. The DTA received more 
than 82% of all votes cast, thereby assuming a clear majority 
( 43) , in the Constituent Assembly. 
The opposing view, held by SWAPO,the United Nations and 




can be described as a humiliating 
defeat for western diplomacy", 
a major se~-back for the United Nations' 
attempt to settle-the problem through nego- ~ 
tiation". (44) 
Nevertheless, in December 1978, South Africa was again 
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challenged to act when Sam Nujoma confirmed SWAPO's accep-
tance of the United Nations elections provided for under 
Resolution 435 (1978),: challenging the South African Govern-
ment to allow such elections to take pla~e. (45 > The South 
African Go~ernment, in March 1979, responded that the United 
Nations would not be permitied in SWA/Namibia on March 15, 
and also launched a series of raids agaisnt SWAPO bases in 
Angola and Zambia. ( 46 > 
The Constituent Assembly, as part of the transitional pro-
cess in the establishment of the Central or first-tier 
government of the proposed interim dispensation, was con-
verted to a Natio~al Assembly in May 1979. During this 
conversion process 15 additional seats were added to the 
existing 50 seats, reserved for those parties who did not 
participate in the 1978 elections, howev~r, these seats were 
never occupied. The Central Authority for the "interim 
period" was completed with ·the coming into existence of .the 
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APPENDIX II 
DELEGATIONS APPROVED BY THE TURNHALLE 
CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE 
Delegation No. of Population % of total Delegates Population 
Basters 12 19 000 2.2% 
Whites 2 99 000 11.6% 
Bushmen 2 26 000 3.0% 
Carpivians 8 29 000 3.4% 
.Damaras 26 75 000 8.8% 
Hereros 44 63 000 7.4% 
Kavangos 5 56 000 6.6% 
Na mas 26 37 000 4.3% 
Coloureds 11 32 000 3.8% 
Ovambos 15 396 000 46. 5% 
·Tswanas :' 5 3;5 000 0.6% 
156 837 000 98.2% 
Figures for population are taken from South West Africa 
Survey 1974, published by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of South Africa. 
made in 1974. 
They refer to estimates 
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APPENDIX III 
DECLARATION OF INTENT 
That, in the exercise of our right to self-determination and 
independence, we are voluntarily gathered in this Conference 
in order to discuss the Constitutional future of South West 
Africa; 
That we most strongly condemn and reject the use of force or 
any improper iriterference in order to overthrow the existing 
order or to enforde a new dispensation; 
That we are firmly resolved to determine our future ourselves 
by peaceful negotiationd and co-operation; 
That, mindful of the interdependence of the various popula-
tion· groups and the interests of South West Africa in its 
entirety, we intend to create a form of government which will 
guarantee to every population group the greatest possible say 
iri its own and national affairs, which ·will fully protect the 
rights of minorities and which will do right and justice to 
all. 
AND FURTHER WE DECLARE: 
That we are resolved to devote.continuous attention to social 
and economic conditions _which will best promote the welfare, 
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interests and peaceful co-existence of all the inhabitants of 
South West Africa and their posterity. 
That we are resolved to exert ourselves towards the promo-
tion of and deference towards human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of all without discrimination merely on the basis 
of race, colour, or creed. 
I . 
We THEREFORE RESOLVE: 
(a) to draft a Constitution for South West Africa as soon 
as appropriate and if possible within a period of three 
years. 
(b) to devote continuous attention to measures implementing 
all the aims specified .in this declaration. 1 
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THE INTERIM DISPENSATION UNDER PROVISION 
OF PROCLAMATION No.AG.8 REPRESENTATIVE 
AUTHORITIES PROCLAMATION 1980 
The constitutional dispensation for SWA/Namibia effective 
during the 'interim 1period' prior to independence had been 
elaborate, complicated and in effect, greatly confused. The 
'new' dispensation as outlined by the second Administrator-
General, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, during the first week of June 1980, 
was destined to·leave even the informed observer flabbergasted. 
In Dr Viljoen, Chairman of the Afrikaner Broederbond, the 
Administrator....:. General's post saw a sharp "upgrading". His 
goals were two-fold; to work towards a more acceptable image 
for the DTA amongst _blac_k SWA /Namibians, and to "rebuild a 
unified white position through his Broederbond connectio~s". (l) 
The resultant structure of government-, (or rather governments) 
was hierarchical in its power base and quite top heavy at 
that. It must be noted that the structure of government to 
be set out in the subsequent pages came into effect in mid-
1980 and-remained functional until early in 1983, when a 
number of fundamental changes came into .effect, including the 
aboli\ion. of the Central Government and its replacement by 
the Administrator - General's office and five so-called 
Advisory Committees. 
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At the tip of the governmental pyramid, and still in supreme 
control, was the South African Government which retained 
control over foreign affairs, overall defence of the country, 
and with determining po"wers over the future of the country 
with regard to international negotiations. On a slightly 
lower level, the direct representative of the South African 
Government within the country, the Administrator-Gener~l: 
~ho had a veto right in the final stages of legislation; 
retained certain legislative and constitutional authority; 
retained his status as arbiter between the different levels 
of government, and retained his authority pertaining to the 
civil service. 
Next in line was the Ministers Council which had been 
deprived of advisory functions in favour of executive powers. 
The Ministers Council, composed of a Chairman and eleven 
·members elected from the ranks of the National Assembly, 
operated on a collective basis and not on an individual port-
folio basis. The Ministers Council had in effect jurisdic-
'tion over affairs under the continued control of the 
Administrator - General". Legislative powers were centred in 
the National Assembly that became elected in terms of the 
1978 elections held under the _auspices of South Africa 
(for the duration of its one and only term this body had been 
dominated by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance). It retained 
legislative powers, while sharing certain aspects of these 
powers with the Administrator· - General. 
Separate from the Central or first-tier government, as set 
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out above, was the second-tier or Representative Authorities 
which were ethnically organised and in effect amounted to eleven 
different 'ethnic governments'. The various elements of the 
interim government will be discussed separately and in greater 
detail, but strictly in accordance with the provisions set out 
in Proclamation No.AG.8 (1980). 
THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL 
The Administrator-Genral (AG) had extensive executive powers 
over the Central and Representative Authorities, as well as 
arbitrating powers between these different levels of govern-
ment with South Africa and often enough with the Western 
Contact Group on matters concerning the political indepen-
dence of the Territory.Q) The executive powers of the AG, as 
supreme executive official of the government, covered a wide 
range. Due to the importance of these, some detailed exami-
nation is required: 
~- The Administrator-General may issue different procla~a~. 
· tions in:respect·6f different (representative) legisla-
t . th 't' ( 3 ) 1ve au or1 1es , 
2. With reference to any particular legislative authority, 
issue different proclamations in respect of different 
subjects falling under a defined matter and defined in 
' 
the proclamation concerned; .and determine different 
d · f d. f h b · <
4 > ates in respect o if erent sue matters or su Jects. 
( This clearly meant that the AG had "Napol·eonic" powers 
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vis-a-vis the Representative Authorities on both execu-
tive and legislative levels.) 
Subject to the provisions of Proclamation No.AG.8 (1980) and 
the constitution of the Representative Authority established 
for any population group, the Legislative Authority of such 
. groups may make laws, to be called ordinances, in relation to; 
any matter defined in the s~id constitution with the consent 
.of the Administrator - General previously obtained. ( 5 ) Thus, 
Representative Authorities could not ·make laws/ordinances 
without the consent of the Administrator - General. 
Furthermore, the Legislative Authority of a population group 
may not make any ordinances under which the following laws 
are amended or repealed: 
(a) Section 38 of the South West Africa Constitution Act, 
1968 (Act 39 of 1968), of the Parliament of the Republic. 
(b) Proclamation 181 of 1971 of the State President. 
/ 
(c) The National Assembly Proclamation, 1979 (Proclamation 
AG.21 of 1979), of the Administrator_~·General; or 
(d) any other law in force in the Territory or any part there-
of immediately before the date referred to in sub-section 
(2)(b)(II) of Section 14 or make any ordinance which is 
inconsistent with this Proclamation or the Constitution 
of the relevant Representative Authority. (6 ) And any 
ordinance assented to by the Administrator-General shall 
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. 
be promulgated in the Official Gazette of the Representative 
Authority concerned in accordance with the constitution of the 
Legislative Authority which passed such ordinance.{?) 
THE MINISTERS COUNCIL 
The first interim Central Government, {functional until 18 
January 1983), was comprised of a Ministers Council, National 
Assembly and an assisting Administration. The first of 
July 1980 marked the inauguration of an autonomous multi-
ethnic Ministers Council, in principle ·established on 28 May 
by the second SWA/Namibian Administrator-General, Dr Gerrit 
Viljoen. The establishment of the Ministers Council was 
officially promulgated in a Government Gazette Extraordinary 
on July 12 and 13 1980, while Mr Dirk Mudge, Chairman of the 
DTA was proposed and unanimously accepted as the first Chairman 
of .the Ministers Council, a position he maintained until the 
disbandment of the Ministers Council and National Assembly in 
January 1983.(B) The Ministers Council consisted of twelve 
members inclusive of a Chairman. Although the ordinary 
· members were not fully fledged ministers with portfolios they 
did receive ministerial salaries. 
Membership to the Ministers Council was restricted to the 
leaders of the el~ven ethnically-based parties affiliated to 
the DTA, which had won ~he majority of seats in the National 
Assembly. This configuration of the Ministers Council 
caused much dissatisfaction and eventually led to its disband-
ment in January 1983. <9 > 




While the Ministers Council functioned, decisions were made 
collectively on a consensual or majority vote basis. All 
powers vested in the Administrator-General, (the supreme 
executive official}, by legislation, were executed by or on 
behalf of the Administrator-General, or his administrative 
departments. The Ministers Council could make decisions on 
specific matters, but these decisions had at all times to be 
flrubber .-stamped" by the Administrator-General. 
Legislation drafted by the Ministers Council, on relevant 
issues, still had to be approved by the Administrator-General 
who retained the supreme legislative power officially and 
directly vested in him by the South African State President.· 
He could refer draft legislation back to the National Assembly 
as well as to the ethnic Representative Authorities for recon-
sideration, or,_ as previously mentioned,he had the power to 
' 1 I t I 1 ' 1 t' ( lO } ·s1mp y ve o egis a ion. 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
The National Assembly was composed of 50 members, first 
elected in 1978 to a Constituent Assembly which was converted 
into a National Assembly in May 1979. Unfortunately the 
1978 DTA election victory and the 'unofficial interim' govern-
ment structure was not we1comed by the majority of the Terri-
.tory's population, since neither SWAPO nor SWANU, the more 
powerful Black political parties, chose not to participate in 
' 
the activities surrounding the electioneering, composition and 
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functioning of the Ministers Council and National Assembly. 
However, prior to the 1978 election South Africa and the 
participating internal parties agreed that the "government" 
resulting from this ele.ction would not be official as such, 
but would rather function as "interim" government that would 
formulate an independence constitution incidentally a task 
the . "ruling DTA government '1 failed to perform. 
The National Assembly had both ~xecutive and legislative 
powers: the executive powers were vested and executed by the 
Ministers Council which was elected from the ranks of the 
National Assembly. The first session of the National 
Assembly had been devoted to the Bill on the Abolition of 
Racial Discrimination Urban Residential Areas and Public 
Amenities. The aim was to make it possible for all SWA/ 
Namibians to purchase houses in all proclaimed residential 
areas and to remove restrictions on the use of libraries, 
hotels, restaurants, halls, ·rest-camps, theatres, places 
o~ned by private persons, the government and municipalities, 
which were erected for public use. Unfortunately, persons 
' 
from non-white groups were limited by financial means to 
make full use of these facilities and concessions. 
Whites living in the country were upset at the decisions of 
the National Assembly, and the first day the National Assembly 
discussed the Bill ~n Racial.Discrimination approximately 1000 
whites demonstrated against its abolition outside the Turnhalle 
building. Other people felt that the National Assembly failed 
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to approach the real and serious problems such as unemploy-
ment, housing shortages, the high cost of living, educational 
d h 1th . h t ( 11) an ea services or ages. 
As unoffici~l interim institutions, the National Assembly and 
Ministers Council were limited in the tasks they could per-
form. · Most of which could only be performed by a genuine 
independent government. The South African Government was a 
severe impediment to these political bodies. For example, the 
introduction of an educational system equal in all respects for 
both Black and White, could only be introduced by a truly 
independent government . 
. THE ADMINISTRATION 
The Ministers Council had been served by an Administration 
'· 
which was departmentalised for increased efficiency. Each 
·department was headed by a Secretary who had the status of 
Permanent Secretary. There were Secretaries of Manpower and 
Civic Affairs; Finance; Justice; Agriculture and Nature 
Conservation; National Health and Welfare; 'National Educa-
tion; Post and Telecommunications; Water Af~airs; Roads 
and Transport; Constitutional Development and Defence. In 
theory these departments were supposed to put into practise 
the policies of the Ministers Cou·ncil, in practice they were 
not responsible to the Ministers Council, .. but rather to the 
Administrator General. 
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THE REPRESENTATIVE AUTHORITIES/ETHNIC GOVERNMENTS 
Subordinate to the Central Government was the second-tier 
governments or Representative Authorities which functioned on 
an ethnic basis, (these synonyms are reflective of the same 
bodies). As with the Ministers Council and National 
Assembly the idea of regionally based ethnic authorities was 
not original but originated from the 1964 Odendaal Commission 
Recommendations, providing for eleven "native Nations". (l 2 ) 
The Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in SWA 
ACT of 1968, outlined the creation of the first six "Native 
Nations", ( or regional authorities) and authorised the est a-
.blishment in each of a Legislative and Executive Council. 
This act provided for the establishment of regional authorities 
·· in Ovambo, Kavango, East Caprivi and the Rehoboth Gebiet, while 
Bushmanland and Namaland each got an Advisory Board, while a 
Coloured Advisory Council was elected and the Whites being 
. represented by their Leg isl a.ti ve Assembly. (l 3 } This state 
of affairs continued basically undisturbed until 1980 when 
these ·~omelands' were replaced by the second-tier Re~reseri~ 
tative Authorities system, which was expanded and facilitated 
in great detail by Proclamation No.AG.8 of 1980. 
The ~epeal of Act 54 of 1968 and replacement by the Represen-
tative Authorities ·.Proclamation of 1980 'of£icialised' but not 
'legitimised'. the state .ot' affairs .pr.ior.to.19.83; i.e., 
52.(1} Subject to the provision of subsections (2} and (3} 
and of the Constitution of the Representative· Authority contemplated 
\ . 
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in subsection (2), the Development of Self-Government for 
. . (14) 
Native Nations in SWA Act, 1968, is hereby repealed. 
(3) Notwithstanding the repeal of the said Act in any part of 
the Territory, any law ·which was made under any provision of 
that Act or was under any such provision deemed to have been 
so made, and was in force in. the relevant part of the Terri-
tory immediately before such date and which is not replaced 
by or inconsistent wit~ the relevant Constitution mentioned in 
that subsection, shall 'continue in force until repealed by a 
t h . (15) compe ent aut ority. 
As mentioned earlier, under the Representative Authorities 
Proclamation, 1980, Hereroland, Kaokoland, Kavango, East 
Caprivi, Ovambo and.the Rehoboth Gebiet, were provided with 
Representative Authorities. While groups legally allowed to 
establish Representative Authorities included the Baster:, 
Bushmen, Coloured_, Damara ·, Herera , Kavango . , Nama.i., 
. Ovambo:· , Tswana:. and the White with a Representative 
Authority defined as inclusive of a Legislative and Executive 
Authority: 
(i) Legislative Authority 
At least once every financial year of a Representative 
Authority there had to be a session of the relevant 
Legislative Authority. These Legislative Authorities 
had to, from time to:time, adopt standing rules and 
orders not inconsistent with Proclamation No.AG.8 or 
with its constitution, for the regulation and conduct 
of its proceedings and despatch of business, for the 
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passing, entitling and numbering of ordinances and for 
the presentation to the Administrator-General for his 
consent. (l 6 ) 
Therefore, subject to the provision of Proclamation 
No.AG.8 the Legislative Authorities of the respective 
population groups may make laws, to be called ordinances 
I 
in relation to any matters defined in the Proclamation 
and any matter in the particular Constitution, but with 
the consent of the Administrator~General previously 
bt · a n 7) · H. · t • • · ·a·· ·f ' · o a1ne. . e may in urn veto or issue 1 ferent 
. . 
proclamations in re:spect of the drafts presented by the Legislative 
Authorities. 
(ii) Executive Authority 
Subject to the provisions of Proclamation No.AG.8, 1980, 
the administration of the affairs of a population group· 
in relation to the matters specified in the Proclamation 
shall be carried out by the Executive Authority of that 
population group as from the date on which the Legisla~ 
tive Authority of that population group becomes 
empowered, by virtue of Section 14(2) of AG.8 to make 
ordinances in relation to that matter. (l 9 ) Section 
14(2)(a) reads that the Legislative Authority of a 
population group shall come tnto operation on a date 
/ 
to be determined by the Administrator-General by Pro-
clamation in the Official.Gazette: 
1. Proclamation No.AG.12 (May 1980) converted the 
White Legislative Assembly into a White Represen-
tative Authority. 
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2. Proclamation No.AG.14 (May 1980) provided for a 
Coloured Representative Authority. 
3. Proclamation No.AG.23 (June 1980) converted the 
Ovambo Legislative Council into a Representative 
Authority. 
4. Proclamation No.AG.29 (June 1980) repealed the 
I 
Eastern Caprivi Legislative Council Proclamatibn 
of 1972 and established a Representative Authority 
for the Caprivian:. 
5. Proclamation No.AG.26 (June 1980) repealed~the 
Kavango Legislative Council to make way for a 
Representative Authority. 
6. Proclamation No.AG.32 (June 1980) revived the 
existing Damara Representative Authority Proclama-
tion and confirmed that the duties, powers and 
functions of the Chiefs and Headm~n would remain 
in force. 
7. Proclamation No.AG.35 (June 1980) converted the 
existing Nama Council into a Representative 
Authority. 
8. _The Baster would continue in terms of the Self-
Government for Rehoboth Act of 1976 and the existing 
system (Baster Council, Kaptein and Kapteinsraad) 
would be retained. 
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9. With regard tb the Bushmen the Administrator-General 
had decided that the existing nominated authorities 
(Advisory Council) would continue functioning as 
their repres~ntative. (An official Bushman Council 
was envisaged before the close of 1982.)° 
10. Legislation for Representative Authorities for the 
Herero and Tswana were expected to be promulgated 
I 
before the close of 1980. (l 9 ) 
Membership to these Representative Authorities was limited 
to either the Legislative or Executive Authority, nor could a 
person be a member of the first-tier National Assembly and a 
member of the second-tier Representative Authority at the 
same time. It was also not possible to be a member of more 
than one group's Representative Authority, however, it was 
possible for a member of one population group to become a 
Representative Authority member of .another population group. 
For instance, Mr Werner Neef, member of the White population 
group had in fact be~n elected by ~he Ovambo Executive 
Authority as one of its members in the National Assembly, 
while he was also a member of Peter Kalangula's newly esta-
blished. multi-raci~l Christian Democratic Alliance fo~ 
S . l J . ( 20) oc1a ust1ce. 
Subject to the provisions.of laws on government service in a 
region, an Executive Authority could all6cate the powers, 
duties and functions to be performed or exercised in ~espect 
of the different matters on which the competent Legislative 
234 
Authority may make ordinances, to different administrative 
divisions, and could assign and allocate the administration of 
the different divisions to the members of the Executive 
. ( 21) 
Authority. An Executive Authority could enter into an 
agreement with one or more other Executive Authorities or 
with the Administrator-General providing for the exercise or 
performance on such terms and conditions as may be agreed 
upon, of any power, duty or function conferred or imposed in 
terms of any law upon the first-mentioned Executive Authority 
or upon any other such Executive Authority or Administrator-
( 22) 
General, as the case may be. 
Obviously then, the replacement of the Development of ·self-
~pvernment for the Native Nations of SWA Act of 1968 by the 
Proclamation on Representative Authorities,. 1980, revised and 
modified the suggestions of the Odendaal Commission Recommen-
/dations. Each person still remained under the supervision of 
his Ethnic Representative Authority ±n all matters regarded as 
being import~nt to that ethnic group .. Those matters under 
the control of the Ethnic Represent~tive Authorities were 
rather extensive and of such a nature that a.single unifying 
nation-building programme was quite out of the question. 
Subject to the provisions of Section 14 of Proclamation 
No.AG.a, 1980, the following were included under the powers 
of the Representative Authorities: 
Item 1: The acquisition, alienation, gra~~. transfer, occu-
pation and possession of land or any right to land. 
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Item 2: Farming settlements on communal land. 
Item 3: The provision to members of a particular population 
group of education of any standard up to and 
including the standard ordinarily required for an 
examination for the tenth standard. 
Item 4: 
Item 5: 
The provision of health services to the members of 
a particular population group. 
. I 
The provision to members of a particular population 
group of social welfare services. 
Item 6: The provision of sub-economic or subsidised housing to 
the members of a particular population group. 
Item 7: Matters having as their object the promotion of art 
and culture in relation to the particular population 
group, including c~ntrol over art galleries, 
theatres, libraries, museums and archives. 
Item 8: Civil. defence and local security. 
Item 9: The subservience of Paramount .Chiefs, Chiefs and 
Headmen to the Administrator-General. 
Item 10: The administration of justice in accordance with the 
traditional laws _and customs observed by tribes or 
communities. 
Item ll: Election of members for the Legislative Authority, 
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and the registration of members of the particular 
population group as voters, who are also eligible to 
stand as candidates in an election. 
Item 12: Direct taxation of the members of the particular 
population group. 
Item 13: The collection of and the control over all revenue 
and monies I accruing to the Representative Authority. 
Item i4: The raising of loans by the Executive Authority with 
the prior consent of the Administrator-General. 
Item 15: Estimates of revenue and expenditure. 
Item 16: The provision of local services, including supplies 
services, buildings, works, accommodation and trans-
port. 
Item 17: The appointment, training and promotion of officers 
and employees in the service of the Representative 
Authority. 
Item 18: The provision of services for members of other popu-
lation groups. 
Item 19: The execution of agreements with other Representative 
Authorities·or the Administrator-General. 
'Item 20: The imposition of penalties, and provision for the 
forfeiture of property, for the purpose of enforcing 
. ( 2 3) 
any law made by the Legislative Authority. 
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SECTION 3.3 
LOCAL REACTION: THE INTERIM STRUCTURE, 
OFFICIALISED BUT NOT LEGITIMATE 1980 - 1983 
rt is both possibie and plausibie to draw a two~foia aistinc-
tion in reactions monitored to the ethnically-based dispensa-
I 
tion provided for by Proclamation No.AG.8. In the first 
instance attention will be paid to those parties and groups 
who saw themselves as standing outside this structure, where-
after the focus will shift to those parties who chose to function 
within this structure, paying most attention to the Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance and to a lesser extent to the local 
National Party. The overriding intention being the analysis 
of the 'changing moods' towards the interim structure of both 
groups. 
From the outsetj 1979/1980, the interim dispensation met with 
considerable local opposition, coming especially from those 
quarters not actively drawn in~o, or participating in, its 
procedures. Initially, both the National Assembly and 
Ministers Council enjoyed some measure of popular support, 
but strictly from those parties and groups who opted for par-
ticipation in the formulation and continued functioning of 
these bodies. The other parties preferring non-participation 
never credited-the National Assembly and its Ministers ·Council 
with the slightest measure of righteousness, acc.eptability or 
legality. Moreover, criticism towards the interim structure 
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emanated not only from the so-called left, but surprisingly, 
also from sources located to the right of the political spectrum . 
• 
1. The local Herstigt& Nasionale Party (HNP) was completely 
against any form 6f territorial independence and actually 
pledged for stronger bonds with South Africa. (l) To this 
end Mr Sarel Bekker, leader of the HNP, withdrew his party 
from the National Assembly on 18 March 1982 after tabling 
an unsuccessful motion calling 'inter alia' for the dis-
bandment of the National Assembly and a return to the 
system of government in the Territory as it had been ten 
years previously. (2 ) (Since the HNP had only a small 
measure of support from the White voters and very little 
real influence on the actual governing of the country, in 
the strictest terms, it only.had to be accommodated con-
stitutionally as an existing minority group.) 
. 2. On the other hand, the more influential local National 
Party in fact participated and supported Proclamation 
No.AG.8 in all its stages of formulation, but after the 
outcome of the December 1978 elections, which ended in a 
landslide victory for the DTA( 3 ), a situatio~ of confron-
tation between the NP, the DTA and South African Govern-
ment slowly but surely emerged, with the latter being 
accused of allegedly "selling out" the White population 
f S h W f . / N . b. ( 4 ) A lt f th o out est A rica , ami ia. s a resu o · e 
DTA Ministers Council's 'unsatisfactory functioning' the 
National Party constantly resisted the allocation of more 
. . 
executive powers to the Ministers Council, arguing that 
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more powers would not lead to greater political unity or 
stability in the country. And moreover, from the 
Nationalist viewpoint the Ministers Council did not have 
the full confidence of all the popula~ion groups. (S) 
3. From the· more moderate Federal Party camp came a soli-
tary call for reconciliation between Black and White. 
Feqeral Party leader, Advocate Brian O'Linn, rejected any 
I 
form.of UDI-type settlement on the 9rounds ~hat such a 
settlement would be.utterly useless as it would not enjoy 
international recognition, instead, an internal settle-
ment would only lead to a further polarisation between 
the extreme left-and right of the political spectrum, 
and more than likely betwee~ Black and White.(G) 
Mr O'Linn's view was that only a fraction of the Territory's 
population,notably the Whites, was in favour of limited 
independence, while an overwhelming majority favoured full 
. t . 11 . . d . d . d ( 7 ) Th t . interna iona y recognise in epen ence. · a is, 
SWAPO (external) the SWAPO-Democrats {internal), the 
three major Black .churches, the Damara Raad, the Coloured 
Labour Party, NIP, SWANU, the Namibian Christian Democrats, 
{ 8) 
the CDA as well as the Federal Party. 
"- 4. In The Voice of ·swAPO-D, Number 5 of 9 August 1979., the 
SWAPO-Democrats stated explicitly that it viewed th~ 
National Assembly as "an iristi:tution without any value;· 
as a body which is in no way representative of the 
Namibian people and as an Assembly without any real 
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power". ( 9 ) In a further article published in a later edi-
tion of The Voice of SWAPO-D, Number 6 of 9 January 1980, 
this view had been reiterated in somewhat stronger terms, 
i.e. 
"It is imperative that we firmly and vigo-
rously reject the whole concept of second 
tier ethnic authorities established on 
ethnic lines and we must warn the country 
of the dangers for us, as a nation, in-
herent in such a form of government." (10) 
(The primary objection being that the system of ethnically 
based second-tier authorities frustrated all efforts at 
building a single united Namibian nation.) 
5. In a letter to the Windhoek Observer Mr Peter Katjavi vi, 
a Central Committee member of SWAPO, wrote that he 
regarded.the Ministets.:council,as -~merely a:mutli-colotired 
rubber stamp for continued South African control of Namibia", 
while members of the other internal Black parties saw it 
as a blatant move towards an internal settlement and, 
therefore, a stumbling block in terms of an international 
settlement. ( 11 ) 
6. SWANU also frequently attacked the Turnhalle dispensation, 
the Ministers Council and National Assembly included,. as 
a political and economic burden which the Namibian nation 
could no· longer ·afford. any. Mr M. Katjivongo, SWANU's 
President, al~o called for the disbandment of· the.Turnhalle 
dispensation and its Executive Authority with the rein-
statement of full powers in the Administrator-General 
until such time as an internationally recognised indepen-
dence could be attained. <12 > 
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7. The Damara Raad, established in 1971 with the assistance 
of the South African Government, since 1975, due to 'South 
Africa's and the local White's intransigence', started to 
move away from co-operation with these groups. In 1981 
the Chairman of the Damara Executive Co~mittee, Mr Justus 
Garoeb, expressed strong disagreement with the composition 
of the Ministers Council and the National Assembly which 
h di. d t . 1 . t. . t. t t. n 3) e no recognise as egi imate ins i u ions. 
Instead, the Damara Raad ascribed to 'free and fair' elec-
tions ~n accordance with Security Council Resolution 435 
for the establishment of a truly representative and legi-
. (14) 
timate government. 
'8. It was not only local Black and White parties that voiced 
their objection to the so-called interim dispensation. 
Strong criticism was also forthcoming from the Western 
( 15) Contact Group. It viewed the establishment of a 
Ministers Council as an.unnecessary complication to their 
task of finding an acceptable solution and it also raised 
questions about South Africa's intentions. The Western 
Contact Group refused to recognise the Ministers Council 
just as they refused to recognise the National Assembly 
set up in the Territory after the internal elections in 
December 1978. (lG) 
·- . .: I 
ATTITUDINAL CHANGES WITHIN rHE DEMOCRATIC TURNHALLE ALLIANCE 
In contrast to the outspoken Black and White par~ies standing 
outside active government involvement, it was interesting and 
244 
at times bemusing to take note of the changing local political 
climate since 1980; especially those attitudinal changes 
taking place within the then ruling DTA circles. Initially, 
prior to 1978, th~ DTA strongly campaigned for the ethnically 
based interim dispensation as set out by Proclamation No.AG.8 
hailing it as the only workable system for a country as 
diverse in population as SWA/Namibia. For this view the DTA 
government, after 1978, had to endu1e much criticism for 
defending institutionalised racism. 1 As predicted by Brian 
O'Linn, leader of the Federal Party, Proclamation No.AG.8 was 
bound to encounter increasing difficulties as it institution-
alised racism and ethnicity and provided for the division of 
. functions between first and second-tier government in crucial 
h d . h 1th . d . . 1 (l 7 ) areas sue as e ucat1on, ea services an agr1cu ture. 
It then came as some surprise that the •ruling' DTA government, 
slowly but surely, altered its position towards Proclamation 
No.AG.8, initially because of the supremacy and dominating 
·powers of the South African appointed Administrator-General 
··.and later as a result of the general and overall· unaccept-
ability of this Procl~mation. At first, members of the DTA 
dominated Ministers Council demanded. that the Administrator-
General transfer the educational, health and agricultural 
functions of the second-tiei Representative Authorities to 
the first-tier Central Government members of the Ministers 
Council, such as Mr K. Riruako, even threatened to resign 
unless this demand was met. (lB) 
This DTA demand for the transfer of second-tier functions to 
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the first-tier continued right into 1982, when the Ministers 
Council extended its demands, calling for the third-tier 
Municipal Councils to be brought under the direct authority 
·of the Central Government. (All these demands were made in 
order to improve the effectiveness of the Ministers Council, 
however, none were met.) Chairman of the Ministers Council, 
Mr Mudge, even went as far as setting an ultimatum that 
unless Pfoclamation No.AG.8, a South African product, was 
changed in its totality, the South African Government could 
no longer rely on the complete co-operation of the DTA. 
This demand, made in the form of a DTA motion in the National 
Assembly on 25 November 1981, marked the beginning of a 
widening rift between the DTA and the South African Govern-
ment, with serious consequences in the latter half of 1982. (l 9 ) 
(Since the formation of the Christian Democratic Alliance of 
Mr Peter Kalangula, the DTA was slowly pushed into the back-
ground in favour of the new CDA. The South African Govern-
ment viewed the CDA and its ·black Ovambo leader as more 
suitable material for building an anti-SWAPO front.(2))) 
Mr Danie Hough, third Administrator-General residing in the 
Territory, reacted to this ultimatum by stating the "con-
stitutional" nature of the interim Proclamation No.AG.8, of 
1980, saying that it was not open for rediscussion or sudden 
alteration, since all the internal parties who participated, 
and especially the DTA, had accepted Proclamation·No.AG.8 at 
h . f . f 1 . <21 > t e time o its ormu ation. In a press statement re-
leased on 27 November, 1981, A.G Hough explicitly stated that 
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Proclamation No.AG.8 would remain as it was, as any changes 
to it would result in a loss of confidence amongst local 
parties directly referring to the National Party, as very 
few of the other internal parties supported the principles 
behind this Proclamation. <22 > 
· In the meantime the DTA Ministers Council experienced pro-
gressively more opposition from local parties not directly 
represented in this body. For example, on 3 March 1982, the 
Baster, Damara and National Party Whites requested the 
Administration-General, Hough, to dissolve the M~nisters 
Council on the grounds of this body not being representitive 
of the true leaders and having no support from these respec-
tive population groups. <23 > (Being a multi-ethnic coali-
tion party the DTA did have a Baster, Damara and .White 'leader', 
·in subsequent ethnic elections these leaders turned out not to 
have the true majority support of these respective groups.) 
This unrepresentativeness of the Ministers Council was an 
important contributing factor in the Administrator-General's 
decision to disband the Central Government in January 1983. 
During the latter half of 1982 it became more obvious that 
the three-tiered government structure was under great pressure 
from various internal and external sources with wide specula-
tion that it would not.survive until the end of that year, 
1982. At that·stage none of the internal parties, including 
the ruling DTA, pledged full support to this interim dispen-
. <24 > d h f ht th f" . f th t" 1 sation , an t e act ta e irst term o e na iona 
Assembly was due to expire on 21 November 1982, did not con-
tribute towards greater optimism. 
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The DTA dominated Ministers Council and National Assembly lost 
a great deal of its popular~ representation and support. 
-Early in March, 1982, the local National Party withdrew its 
representatives from the National Assembly and was closely 
followed by the loca1 Herstigte Nasionale Party. <25 ) Former 
DTA President, Peter Kalangula, left both the DTA alliance 
and the National Assembly during August 1982, primarily 
because of his personal.dissatisfaction Wfth the ethnic 
character of Proclamation No.AG.8 (1980) as well as the DTA's 
. b'l' . 1 h' P 1 . ,, <26 > apparent 1na 1 1ty to a ter t 1s roe amat1on. These 
leaders were all united in_ the view that the DTA government 
was not only unrepresentative, but also politically bankrupt, 
incapable-of altering Proclamation No.AG.8 or of offering a 
viable alternative solution. 
'Ironically, the DTA had no need to advance a more viable 
solution. Developments both locally and in South Africa 
suggested that the South African Government was already 
. ·engaged in ·"manufacturing" alternatives not only to DTA 
domination in the National As.sembly, but also to United Na.tions 
Security Council Resolution 435, (1978). <27 >_ In August 1982, 
the then Administrator-General, D. Hough, emphatically denied 
any allegations of a possible so-called 'internal settlement', 
stating that such claims (made by local and foreign observers) 
were devoid of any truth, and that the South African Govern-
.ment was still working towards implementation of Resolution 
435. He added that there was a substantial deg~ee of con-
frontation 'between the Central and Representative Authorities, 
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and that he and his "advisors" were, in fact,. considering 
alternative measures in an 'attempt' to introduce a more 
acceptable system of government for the interim period prior 
. . ( 28) 
to independence'. 
To this end a summit meeting was held during August 1982 on 
Hough•s farm, near Pietersburg in the Transv~al, which was 
atten9ed by Mr Hough, the South African Prime Minister, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and a number of the local ethnic 
leaders, most notably those five leaders not represented in 
the National Assembly. Considering later evidence it became 
obvious that it was not the first meeting of this kind to find 
alternative solutions in case United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 435 fell through. Two other meetings of this 
nature had taken place since June 1982; one at Oshivello, 
(in Ovambo), and the second at the Daan Viljoen game reserve 
near Windhoek. (Interesting to note the growing rift between 11· 
Mudge and Mr P. W. Botha who ·met in a 'terrifi~. clash' of words 
during the August summit, when the Prime Minister ·Criticised 
Mr Mudge's way of handling the administration of SWA/Namibia.)(29 ) 
Information made available to the local media, since August/ 
September 1982, suggested the occurrence of.regular meetings 
between A.G. Hough, the South African delegation and those 
five ethnic leaders not represented in the National Assembly, 
to sort out the "shortcomings" in both Central and Represen-
tative Authorities, and to work out a possible solution to the 
'unrepresentativeness' of the Central. Government. ( 30) Ironi-
cally these leaders were not represented either because of 
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their non-participation or non-election to the National 
Assembly. They were Mr Peter Kalangula ,(Ovambo}, Mr Justus 
Garoeb (Damara}, Mr Barny Barnes (Coloured}, Kaptein bans 
Diergaardt (Rehoboth Ba~ter) and Mr Koos Pretorius (White}. 
These talks resulted in Prime Minister Botha's request to 
A.G. Hough to submit a framework for. restructuring the 
existing interim structure as 'it was the South African Govern-
ment's view that this dispensation does not promote stability 
. ( 31) and development in the Territory'. Speculation, on the 
other hand, had it that the South African Government feared 
the possible outcome of new elections, should these be held 
after the first term of the National Assembly ended. 
As mentioned before, the first term of the National Assembly 
was scheduled to end on 21 November 1982. It was a 
factor that caused great uncertainty in terms of the political 
and constitutional future of· SWA I Namibia, b~_th in the Terri-
tory and in South African Government circles. Yet, to the 
.surprise of many local and international observers, this did 
not amount to a really· serious crisis, as it was overcome by 
a mere visit to Windhoek by the South African Prime Minister 
Mr P.W. Botha. He simply announced the extension of the 
present National Assembly's term until 28 February 1983. <32 > 
This bold action ·tempor~rily delayed the need for new internal 
elections, but did not succeed in defusing the highly volatile 
political situation existing locally since the latter half of 
1982. Early in June, 1982, the ruling DTA Ministers Council 
....... 
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announced that unless an internationally supervised election 
took place before the close of 1982, it would,by its own 
initiative,stage a new internal election during March/April 
1983, with or without the participation oi SWAPO. <33 > 
This announcement obviously caused some anxious moments as 
it was soon stopped by the South African Government which 
ruled that 'a decision taken at Cabinet level' completely 
rejected-the possibility of such an election taking place.< 34 > 
Instead, the government decided to expand the personnel of the 
Administrator-General's office, as well as to restructure the 
interim government di~pensation. These steps, the government 
.~rgued, would not only promote economic and political 
' stability, but would also improve the structure and quality 
of the Territory's administration. <35 > 
The DTA Ministers Council in turn made it explicitly clear that 
.as the ruling party it would not participate in a_".new 
ethnically-based" interim dispensation and in effect demanded· 
a drastic alteration of the existing ethnically-based dispen-
( 36) sation as laid down by Proclamation No.AG.8, 1980. Once 
again .the South African Government refused to ·pay heed to 
this demand, as it had done since 1981, arguing that although 
the DTA had won the 1978 election with a landslide victory it 
had since lost most of its.support, thereby justifying restruc-
turing towards a more representative interim dispensation by 
moving away from the DTA. <37 > 
By the close of 1982 it was obvious that the final break between 
251 
the 'ruling' DTA and the South African Government was not far 
off. As Mr Mudge had put it; 
II it is impossible that the two bodies, 
the Ministers Council and National 
Assembly, ·govern the legislature in~ the 
Territory by means of powers-delegated, 
but revocable at any stage by the 
Administrator --General in whose office 
is vested the true sweeping powers of 
government". (35) 
Thereby implying, as a further severe shortcoming of the so-
called interim structure, that at no stage was there any 
clear and effective separation of powers between the office 
of the Administrator-General and the local Central Government. 
Eventually, during talks held in Windhoek on 27 November 1982, 
the seemingly inevitable happend. A break occurred between 
.the DTA and the South African Government. This resulted 
from a 'verbal shouting match' between the South African 
· delegation, Mr P.W. Botha and Mr Roelof Botha, and th~ DTA 
.Chairman, Mr Dirk Mudge; more specifically between Mr Roelof 
Botha and Mr Mudge. (Apparently Mr Mudge retorted to Mr Botha, 
"I will not allow myself to be shouteq at like 
that by you, I am not a child. You may .be a 
Minister, but.I have been in politics much 
longer than you, and as a result you have no 
right to shout at me", 
then addressing all those present, Mr Mudge said 
"I am now finished with you. It is all over." (39) 
This break between the DTA Ministers Council and the South 
African Government became official in January 1983, when, on 
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10 January, Mr Mudge announced his intention to resign as 
Chairman of the Ministers Council in protest at the handling 
of affairs in the Territory by the Administrator-General and 
the South African Government. As Mr Mudge had put it, 
11 I have taken this decision in pretext at 
the humiliating way in which the 
Administrator-General and the South 
African Government have treated the 
Ministers Council and National Assembly 
in recent times." ( 40) 
Mr Mudge went on to describe his own and the Ministers 




the DTA and I myself have tried over 
the past few years (five years) to build 
up a moderate front, based on co-operation 
between Black and White, to ensure that 
radical el~ments do not take over after 
independence and to prevent racist tenden~i.0; 
cies asserting themselves and making it 
impossible for Whites to stay on after 
independence 11 • ( 41) 
After Mr Mudge's resignation on 18 January 1983·, the Ministers 
Council, as a sign of support for his decision, resigned in 
its entirety, while on the eve of 18 January, the then 
Administratory-General, Mr Hough, proceeded with the formal 
disbandment of the National Assembly as well. In the same 
statement Mr Hough announced that the functions and duties 
of the Central G6vernment would again be vested in th~ office 
of the' Administrator-General~ Thus, ·with one f·ell '"Swoop · -
Mr Hough reversed the process of self-determination started 
in 1978, through the repeal of Proclamation-No.AG.21 of 1979 
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and No.AG.19 of ~980 that provided ior a democratically 
elected Central Government. Mr Hough appointed Mr Jan 
Greebe as Chief Executive official for the Territory, but 
. he did nothing to resolve the real issue of antagonism. 
Proclamatiori No.A§.8 was retained unchanged. 
The situation in SWA/Namibia, between 1975 and 1983, was 
jestingly described by D~nnis Beckett, editor of Frontline, 
I. 
as follows! 
"The 'first big move' was to 'consensus 
government' in 1975, when the Turnhalle 
first loomed large in Southern Africa's 
collective consciousness, or from 'One 
Man One Vote' to 'One Man One Govern-
ment'. With the abdication of the 
Ministers Council in January 1983, the 
slogan was re-adjusted from 'One man 
One Government• to 'One-Man Govern-
ment', when the fourth Administrator-
. General assumed supreme executive and 
legislative powers." ( 42) 
By the end of 1982, it became known that Mr Hough, the third 
-, :Administrator-General of the Territory and successor to 
Dr Gerrit Viljoen, was preparing to lay down his official 
. position to make way for his successor, and fourth Administrator-
General, Dr Willie van Niekerk. Dr Van Niekerk arrived in 
Windhoek in January, 1983, but only took up office early in 
March of the same year. 
~ MAJOR CHANGES TO THE INTERIM STRUCTURE: 1983 
As from the. date of disbandment of the National Assembly by 
AG Hough,· the arrival of his successor, Dr Van Niekerk, and 
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the appointment of Mr Greebe as senior executive official 
the entire interim structure had undergone a number of funda-
mental changes, some of which have already been mentioned: 
1. All legislative and executive powers were reinvested in 
the office of the Administrator-General. 
2. The Representative Authorities or ethnic second-tier 
governments remained unchanged, and only indirectly under 
the control of the Administrator-General's office, as did 
the local or third-tier municipal governments. 
3. The only new addition was the establishment of five 
Advisory Committees of 15 to 17 members each, made up of 
members of the private sector -over which the Administrator-
General would "govern". These Committees were designed 
-~ to assist the AG with the formulation of overall policy 
and planning, specifically concentrating on; community 
services, financial and economic affairs, local govern-
ment, infrastructure and agricultural affairs. 
Dr Van Niekerk emphasised that this committee system was not 
intended as a substitute for democratic government at the 
Central level, ~ although he added :i it would at a later stage 
be employed to "assist" a democratically elected government. 
During the first we~k of March, 1983, Dr Van Niekerk made 
.known the names of the 66 -members from the 'private sector' 
who had accepted invitations to serve on the advisory 
committees. 
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Not surprisingly, general public opinion on the calibre of 
these committee members declaring themselves willing to 
serve, was not one of acceptance or approval. This was 
reflected in the views expressed by members of the public 
in local newspapers. For example, in the Windhoek Advertiser 
they expressed their dismay at the poor representation of the 
private sector among ·those committee members, as well as the 
inadequate representation of dark-skinned citizens and 
Namibians. Of the 66 members only 4 were Black, and only 28 of the 66 
members named on the committees were private sector representativ,es while 
38 were government or semi-state officials. (Dr -A.G. ·van 
Niekerk stated that at least two thirds of the committei 
members would represent the private sector and the remaining 
third the public sector.)< 43 ) 
Considerable dissatisfaction was reflected by Black readers 
as well.· . Only four committee members were· non-white, they, 
therefore, felt·that these committees were very much unrepre-
sentative of their interests. One caller to the Advertiser 
stated: 
"I did not know there were only experts amongst 
the Whites of this country, or are we back in 
the old dispensation where the rule applied 
that Black people were too stupid to think for 
themselves and are only suitable to be the 
carriers of water and hewers of wood?" (44) 
A Black businessman said, 
" it leaves no doubt that we are back to 
White· 'baasskap' and 'domination'". ( 45) 
Wider public opinion, including that of the Whites, 
-. ~ t 
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reflected a feeling of doubt in relation to these Advisory 
Committees, in that they were a re-embodiment of ethnicity 
and that they were, above all, too inexperienced and, therefore, 
inacapable of assisting the new Administrator-General with 
the government of the country. He himself was inexperienced 
in the complexities of the politics and affairs of SWA/ 
·Namibia. ( 46 ) 
Mr Mudge; speaking at a press: conference in Windhoek on 3 
April 1983, after returning from a visit to the United States, 
confirmed the general observation.that an agreement on United 
Nations supervised elections in SWA/Namibia was definitely not 
·a likely possibility in the near future. He said that he 
had gained the impression that no internationally recognised 
progress in present negotiations on the_ constitutional future 
·of the country was in prospect before the end of 1983.< 47 > 
By mid-1983 it was clear that internationally supervised 
elections were not likely to iake place, and it was evident 
that the South African Government would follow through with 
whatever form of settlement it had in mind for SWA/Namibia: 
The government tended to contradict itself with regard to its 
intentions ·for ihe future of the Territory, and its frequently 
-motivated plans for territorial independenceewere often aborted. A .. 
recent example of these contradictions was the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Mr Roelof B~tha's public statement that 
South Africa was definitely in favour of an internationally 
recognised settlement, providing that. this took place only 
after the evacauation of Cuban troops from Angola. 
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It so happened that the government had also set 15 February 
1983 as an ultimatum to Dr Crocker and the Western Contact 
Group to achieve this withdrawal, as failing to do so 'would 
determine whether Resoltition 435 would be implemented or not'. 
Furthermore, the fact that this ultimatum had 
come and gone without a Cuban withdrawal, and in consideration 
of the previously mentioned administrative developments taking 
pl~ce late in 1982 and early 1983, observers were left with 
the impression that the government had settled, for 
the time being at least, for 'new interim' arrangements to 
· (48) 
become effective. It is highly questionable as to the 
duration of this 'new interim' dispensation and whether 
Resolution 435 will be implemented at all. The DTA-dominated 
dispensation lasted for five years. 
Dr Van Niekerk, the fourth Administrator-General, set the 
wheels in m?tion through the announcement of the so-called 
Advisory Committee system that would function by assisting 
the Administrator-General. Dr Van Niekerk further con-
firmed the election of a new National Assembly, the former 
Committee on Constitutional Development, during September/ 
October 1983. <49 ) This 'new' National Assembly would 
replace the defunct DTA-domiriated body which was disbanded by 
AG Hough. (It was AG Hough who designed the new dispensa-
tion at the request of the South African Prime Minister.) 
The local parties were informed that the newly-elected body 
would have 2carte blanche" in terms of its functions and 
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would be able to either write a constitution or alternatively 
decide on the immediate implementation of Resolution 435. (50) 
(Dr Van Niekerk emphasised that Resolution 435 "was still on 
the table".) The new body would be both elected and 
appointed. It would consist of 72 members, 50 of whom would 
-be directly elected in one-man one-vote elections, and the 
remaining 22 members would be appointed on a two-each basis 
by the eleven Representative Authorities. Although 
1
nr Van 
Niekerk did not say it in so many words, it would almost be 
inevitable that any decisions taken by the 'new national 
Assembly' would be ethnically based. 
In June 1983, Dr Van Niekerk made ~t known that the new body 
.would officially be known as the State Council (SC). This 
·proposed State Council had to draw-up suggestions on the form 
and functions of a new interim government - · which would 
function until internationally recognised independence was 
attained; it was not to "administer" or "govern" the country; 
proposals made by the State Council were to be submitted to 
electoral approval by means of a country-wide referendum -
votes to be counted iri total and according to the respective 
/ 
population groups; and the body could be seen as a 
II forum from which all leaders could 
actively involve themselves in the poli-
tical development of the Territory". (51) 
This proposed State Council, initially scheduled to become 
effective in July 1983, encountered difficulties even before 
its formation. The main problem was that of the unwillingness 
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of the broader party-spectrum to participate in this body. 
After lengthy deliberations, initiated by the Administrator-
General and not the local parties, only seventeen parties agreed 
to participate. Thes~ included the DTA and its eleven 
ethniGally based affiliate parties; the National Party; 
the Labour Party; the Namibia Peoples Liberation Front, and 
the Liberation Party. <52 ) 
Notwithstanding the almost 'country-wide condemnation of the 
State Council, Dr Van Niekerk appeared to be committed to the 
· 1 t t' of. thi's body.< 53 ) Th h th bl' t" f imp emen a ion roug e pu ica ion o 
Proclamation No.AG.14 (1983), the Proclamation on the Provi-
sion for the Institution of a State Council for South West Africa 
and Related Affairs, 1983, o.n July 18, Dr Van Niekerk.made the 
official provisions necessary for the establishment of the SC. (S4) 
.Earlier, on July 16, Dr Van Niekerk condemned the "distinctly 
partial·conduct" of the United Nations as "unfounded and 
scandalous" since the "strongest leaders" of the country were 
working constructively in the best interests of the Territory's 
inhabitants and future.(SS) 
This statement he based on the willingness of "seventeen 
"parties'' (previously mentioned) to participate in the proposed 
State Council. This, however, was by no means a true reflec-
tion of the state of affairs within the country . The major· 
. and most important parties refused to participate, and further-
more, Dr Van Niekerk failed to point out that eleven of the 
"seventeen" co-operative parties were, in fact, DTA affiliates. 
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The parties which opted for non-participation included: the 
SWAPO-Democrats; the South West Africa National Union; the 
Namibia Independence Party; the Damara Council; the Christian 
--, 
Democratic Alliance for· Social Justice; and the South West 
Africa People's Organisation. (SG) As these parties were, 
in fact, the larger and more influential ones, their partici-
· pation was absolutely vital before the proposed State Council 
could ever be a truly representative body. 
On 29 June 1983, a unique inter-party conference took place 
in Windhoek when almost the entire party spectrum gathered 
in the same conference room to exchange ideas on the proposed 
State Council. (Present were officials of the AG's office, 
an unofficial SWAPO delegate and delegates from the DTA, SWANU 
and NIP). Some of the more profound statements were uttered 
by Mr Daniel Tjongarero, who spoke in his private capacity and 
not as SWAPO spokesman, and Mrs Othilie Abrahams, member of the 
Namibia Independence Party.: 
Mr Tjongarero viewed the State Council as designed "to take the 
heat off South West Africa", and that the sc_. "will assume the 
responsibilities of the.c6lonial power'' and that it should be 
seen against the background of South Africa's inability to 
carry out its mandate for the country. Mrs Abrahams added 
that "the NIP will not participate in a body that.forms part 
. ··1 . (57) .of the oppressive colonia power". 
To the surprise of all political observers Dirk Mudge, leader 
of the Republican Party, expressed himself in favour of the 
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proposed State Council. He also called upon other parties 
and leaders not to denounce the proposed SC if they "cannot 
· ( 5 8) 
come forward with better alternative proposals". 
Dr Van Niekerk himself appeared to have adopted a "dubious" 
stance on the proposed State Council. In an interview with 
Rapport, he said, amongst other things, that non-participant 
parties will "hurt" their own interests, while the Johannes-, 
burg Beeld quoted him as saying that local politicians mus~ 
start to realise that they, and not himself or the South African 
Government, "needed" the State Council. He added that he 
could easily continue to govern the country until the imple-
mentation of Resolution 435 became inevitable. <59 > 
By July 1983, it was clear ~hat there was considerable doubt 
among political leaders in the country as to whether the 
· ( 60) 
proposed State Council would ever get off the ground. 
·nespite the promulgation of Proclamation No.AG~l4, none of the 
· parties vital to the workability of such a body proclaimed 
their willingness to participate in it. 
In conclusion I want to briefly outline a number of points 
· critical to the entire interim structure as it developed from 
1978 to 1983. Some of these shortcomings have already been 
mentioned: 
1. The introduction to 'section 3. 3. was aimed at corifirmin·g 
the unpopularity of the interim dispensation as provided 
for under Proclamation No.AG.8. Right from the outset 
-------------------~-------
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it had met with considerably more opposition than support. 
Various internal parties with considerable national. 
support amongst Black'SWA/Namibians completely rejected 
and refrain~d from participating in these arrangements. 
Unfortunately, but quite understandably, it is not exactly 
clear just how much 'national' support the interim dispen-
sation enjoyed as these parties referred to above refused 
to participate in (interim) elections other than inter-
national!~ iupervised elections. 
2. In the course of discussions contained in Section 2.3 it 
further became evident that the (first) inter~m dispensa-
tion had gradually lo~t-the larger part. of its already 
limited support, primarily that of the Democratic T~in-
halle Alliance. The DTA had leant a limited measure of 
'legitimacy' to this dispensation. By the· close of 1982 
it was questionable whether any of the internal parties 
supported the (first) interim dispensation at all. (The 
local National Party being the only possib~e exception, as 
AG8 ensured, to some degree, White p6litical participation 
and control over own affairs.) 
/ 
3. In light of these facts, Administrator-General Danie 
Hough's statement on the so-called 'constitutional nature' 
of Proclamation No.AG.8, and sudden alterations to it 
that would 'undermine the confidence of local.parties', 
~-
not only become ridiculous; but ·were also audacious assumptions?: 
stating non-truths as facts. (Gl) Clearly, at no stage 
did the interim dispensation enjoy any form of majority 
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support, be it from Black or White SWA/Namibian voters. 
Nor did it ever resemble what could be described as a 
'formal constitution'. 
Furthermore, in Section 3 attention has been drawn to the 
fact that the South African Government and the local 
National Party have, in fact, master-minded the entire 
interim plan, and that it was by no means the product of 
all the local parties. ( The majority of these parties 
did not participate in the procedures leading to the 
formulation of the interim ~ispensation at all. Appendix 
I outlines the "46"- local parties, some of which existed 
on paper only, with indicators as to those parties who 
did participate.) All these factors in turn placed a 
question mark on the legality of the entire so-called 
interim dispensation. 
4 .. Nevertheless, the (first) interim dispensation, with its 1 ,, 
three-tiered structure, dia exist for a~considerable 
period of time. An yet, if its achievements over the 
past five years, 1978-1983, are considered, one cannot 
be other than disappointed at its dismal failure to bring 
about a responsible government that could reasonably be 
expected to usher the country into an independent. future. 
However, it would - thep be a. DTA-dominated interim govern-
ment. Acknowledgement needs to be made of the severe 
impediments placed on the powers and effectiveness of the 
first-tier Central Authority. These impediments were 
designed and maintained by the South Af~ican Government 
arrl its residing territorial "lackey", the Administrator-General. 
264 
Right from the word go, the effective operation of the 
Central Authority had been hampered by specifically 
.designed clauses and reservations on its powers, con-
tained in Proclamation No.Ag.8. For example, at no 
stage did there exist any clear separation of executive 
powers between that of the Central Authority and those of 
the Administrator-General. What was more, all the first 
tier powers were delegated and could be revoked by the 
Administrator-General at any stage in time by a mere 
stroke of the pen. This was exactly the reason why the 
Central Authority, the Ministers Council and its Chairman 
refused to continue with the puppet show. 
Observers we~e left with the impression~·that the (first) 
interim dispensation amounted to little more than a 
"trial run" by the government to see to what extent it 
could take advantage of the 'ambitious politicians' who 
were in SWA/Namibia. ·Apparently this .experiment was a 
failure as the DTA-dispensation only succeeded in furthering 
the polarisation of antagonism and scepticism towards the 
intentions of the South African regime •. · 
5. Not surprisingly, as past experience has proved, the 
South African Government was not particularly discouraged 
by the failure of. the first dispensation, ,as it simply 
proceeded with p~tting on the cards a second 'interim' 
dispensation. However, the second interim structure; 
consisting of five Advisory Committees under the super-
vision of the Administrator-General and a new National 
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Assembly, formerly known as the Committee on Constitutional 
Development, was bound to be even less popular and unlikely 
to be more successful than its DTA predecessor. General 
reservations centred on the motivation for the virtual 
'loading' of the new National Assembly with (22) ethnic 
representatives. In addition, if the Administrator-
General really planned to implement Resolution 435, then 
in accordance with this Resolution and the so-called Phase 
One of the Western Initiative in particular, the ethnic 
Representative Authorities should, in fact, rather have 
been scrapped. 
6. Scepticism towards the true motives of the the South African 
Government and its Administrator-General further mounted 
in the light of the proposed State Council. Judge J.J.F. 
Hefer, appointed by Dr Van Niekerk as chairman of the 
proposed body, on July 24, stated that the SC would in 
effect continue with the work of the now defunct National 
Assembly. ( 62 ) 
This resulted in further criticism. Despite claims made 
by members of the DTA, Mr K. Kaura and Mr D. Mudge, that 
although the Turnhalle was not a complete success it did 
bring about certain "changes" which must not be con-
fused with the achievements of Administrator-General 
. ( 63) 
M.T. Steyn. The National Assembly and Ministers 
Council were· disbanded ·precisely bec-ause- --of--their -unrepre--
sentativeness, with the proposed SC no real improvement. 
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Political observers were further of the opinion that the 
proposed SC was nothing more than a further attempt at 
keeping SWAPO at bay and to pr~vent the implementation of 
an international settlement. The only "strength" of the 
/ 
proposed body was that it would have "carte blanche" in 
terms of scrapping Proclamation No.AG.8 and implementing 
Resolution 435, if it so desired. <64 ) This did not 
appear to be a sound suggestion, as the proposed body would 
I 
not get international recognition and it might as well be 
replaced with the implementation of Resolution 435 right 
from the start. 
7. Finally, but not less important, as some of.the preliminary 
findings of the Thirion Commission of Inquiry into Govern-
ment Irregularities pointed out, the vastly complicated 
system of eleven ethnic Representative Authorities abso-
lutely lends itself to corruption and mis-expenditure of 
government funds. (65 ) (This commission was expected to 
be finished only by the end o~ 1983.} In addition to 
the devious· activities of govern~ent members, it ~as 
beyond doub~ that the maintenance of eleven separate 
ethnic governments amounted ~o a gigantic drain on the 
Territory's already strained economy, whirih.could hardly 
be afforded without substantial financial borrowings from 
South Africa. . .~his could hardly be described as a heal thy 
state of ~ffairs. 
I 
THE POLITICAL PARTIES, GROUPINGS AND ALLIANCES IN 
SWA/NAMIBIA AT THE TIME OF THE DECEMBER 1978 ELECTION. 
A BRACKETED X INDICATE THOSE PARTIES THAT WERE 
MEMBERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC TURNHALLE ALLIANCE 
AND INITIALLY PLEDGED SUPPORT TO THE 
INTERIM DISPENSATION 
Basters 
.l. Rehoboth Bevryders Party. 
2. Rehoboth Democratic Party 
3. Rehoboth Bastervereniging 
4. Rehoboth.Action Group 
Bushmen 
1. Bushmen Alliance 
Coloureds 
l~ Liberal P~rty 
2. Kleurling Demokratiese-
Volksparty. 
3. Labour Party 
Caprivian 
1. Caprivi Alliance 
2. Caprivi African National 
Union (CANU) ----
(Hans ·.Diergaardt.:} 
(Pieter·. Diergaardt), .· 















1. Damara Council 
2. South West Africa People's 
. Democratic Front, - SWAPDUF 
3. Namibia Peoples Liberation 
Front NPLF 
·4. Damara Action Group 
Hereros 
1. National Unity Democratic 
Organisation NUDO 
2. NUDO Progressive Party 
3. NUDO Youth League 
4. Mbandero Raad 
· 5. Herero Chiefs Council 
Kavangos 
1. Kavango Alliance Group 
2. Kavango Action Group 
Na mas 
1. National Democratic Turn-
.halle Party NDTP 
2. Wi t:boois 
3. Nama Organisation for South 
West Africa NOSWA 
4. The Voice of the People 
5. Nama Council 
Tswanas 
1. Tswana Alliance 
2. Tswana Party 





























1. South West Africa People's 
Organisation SWAPO (Sam Nujoma) 
2. South West Africa People's 
Organisation-Democrats 
SWAPO-D (Andreas Shipanga) 
3. Christian Democratic Alliance 
-for Social Justice CDA (Rev. Peter Kalangula) 
4. Ovamboland Independent Party 
OIP 
5. Democratic Co-Operative 
Development Party DEMCOP 
Whites 
1. Herstigte Nasionale Party -
HNP 
2. National Party 
3. Republican Party 







(H.J. von Hase) 
Alliances, Coalitions and Independent Parties 
1. AKTUR White NP election front 
2. Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 
3. Namibian Independence Party 
NIP 
4. South West African National 
DTA Front 
Union SWANU (Moses KatJiuongua) 
5. Namibian Christian Democratic 
Party NCDP (Hans Rohr) 
6. Namibian National Front 
NNF (Coalition) 
7. Namibia national Convention 
NNC (Coalition) 




.It is important to take note of the tremendous flux in the forma-
tion of parties and alliances in SWA/Namibia. Some of the parties 
am coalitions noted in Appendix I may very well exist on paper 
only. 
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, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLICIES OF 
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION 
Since World War II> colonised and oppressed people throughout 
their freedom. Some the world have been rising to recapture 
I of their struggles have succeeded, many have stopped halfway. 
I . 
But their efforts have provided a wealth of experience from 
which SWA/Namibians can benefit, as their country moves 
d . d d h h . . (l) M b . towar sin epen ence t roug resistence. ozam igue 
June 1975 7 Angola '"""'· November 1975 and Zimbabwe April 
1980
1 
are but a few of the more prominent and important 
examples directly and indirectly related to the last vestiges 
of colonialism. SWA/Namibian independence, pending since 
the late 1940's, is expected, by SWAPO and the International 
Community, before the second half of the 1980's. This would 
put an end to nearly twenty years of military struggle almost 
as ferocious as that of the Algerian people against French 
l . 1 . f Al . (Z) co onia occupation o geria. 
SWA/Namibia, however, differs in ·two important aspects. 
Similar to the white French Algerians, white SWA/Namibian's 
percieve.themselves as permanent settlers in the Territory, 
the majority having been born and bred in SWA/Namibia and not 
• 
immigrants. Secondly, SWA/Namibian independence is unlikely 
to come about as result of a SWAPO military victory ,<3> or due 
to domestic problems of the colonial power, in this case 
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South Africa. Independence, if ~tis to come, will rather 
result from a process of protracted diplomatic negotiation 
between South Africa, the International Community, SWAPO and 
political parties within SWA/Namibia. 
During the 1950s many South West Africans went to South Africa, 
where they worked predominantly as contract labourers in the 
A large number of them went to Cape Town where they 
came into contact with the African National Congress (ANC) of 
South Africa and other parties opposed to white minority rule. <4 ) 
They came to recognise the need for an organ~sation which 
could represent the aspirations of the indigenous peoples. 
Herman Toivo ja_Toivo, Andreas Shipanga, Solomon Mifima and 
Emil Appolus, _all born South West Africans, were the founder 
members of the Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO) in Cape 
Town on 15 April 1959. During 1957, Andreas Shipanga 
promoted the Ovambo People's Congress, but it never became 
formally organised through fear of police repression. (5 ) 
The OPO was the immediate forerunner of the South West Africa 
People's Organisation (SWAPO) which came into being in April 
1960. As the representative of the Ovambo-speaking ethnic 
·group(G), the OPO was initially exclusively motivated 
towards protecting Ovambo interests, with its activities 
.centrally channeled towards resistance to labour repressive 
legislation, influx control through the pass-law system, the 
migrant labour system, and finally to function as a mouthpiece 
for the Ovambo workers. Thus, the OPO was not representative 
of the national aspirations of all the peoples of South West Africa. 
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Between April 1959 and June 1960, the OPO did not attract 
international recognition, despite Mburumba Kerina's early 
attempts, since 1956, to interest the United Nations in the 
SWA situation. It was· Sam Nujoma, the present SWAPO Presi-
dent, who l~ft SWA during MarGh.1960, joining the OPO after 
its formation, who was not only instrumental in changing the 
_OPO into a true Nationalist movement but _also played a major role in 
capturing international recognition for SWAPO and its cause. 
Nujoma and Kerina were responsible for the OPO's adoption of 
d . l' . . . 1960 (B) a new name an nat1ona 1st orientation in June . 
Sam Nujoma left the territory in March 1960 by slipping over 
the then Bechuanaland border, and passing through Rhodesia, 
Tanganyika, Kenya and Ghana enroute to Liberia, where he 
departed for New York, arriving on 12 June 1960. He was 
granted permission to address the. United Nations. In this 
·address Nujoma presented the "Namibian peoples" just cause 
.for freedom and national independence from South Africa, 
"thereby winning international recognition for SWAPO and its 
causef9) Except for a brief one-day visit to SWA on 20 March 
1966, which, incidentally he spent in jail, Sam Nujoma has 
remained in self-imposed exile since 1960. SWAPO was not 
officially declared illegal, but all public meetings have 
been banned since 1963>lO) 
Within six months of SWAPO's formation it had made a tremen-
dous impact by means of peaceful mass demonstrations, in pro-
,' 
test against the removal of black people from their residential 
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area on the southern.outskirts of Windhoek. The organisa-
tion further demanded the abolition of racial discrimination, 
the right of "Namibians" to express themselves freely without 
. fear of reprisal and the end of South African Administration 
of the territory.(ll) From 1959 to mid-1966, the OPOs and 
thereafter SWAPO's declared strategies were based on the 
ideas of Martin Luther King and Mahatma Ghandi, non-violent 
passive resistance, believing that fhe South African govern-
ment would change their views through a combination of internal 
and international pressure, and grant SWA independence. 
Unfortunately, all these peaceful ,attempts were ineffectual. 
SWAPO's . . , activities were also hamperErl by the old traditional 
leadership system in Ov_~mbo _(l 2) Frustrated by the futility 
of this state of affairs, Sam Nujoma and other prominent SWAPO 
members, as well as a mass of rank-and-file supporters opted 
for self-imposed exile in preparation for a military struggle. 
Approximately four to nine hundred Africans went into exile 
during 1961-62}1 ~ In a recent interview with the current 
SWAPO President, it emerged that the actual preparation for 
the military struggle·began as early as 196~, and underground 
organisation had been started even before the establishment of 
the OPO in April 1959 _(l 4) 
In 1963 the first signs of SWAPO's militant tendencies became 
apparent when the first group of Ovambo youths left for 
'official' military training _O.s) After they had received 
training this group of six, armed with Russian weapons, infil-
trated the northern border of SWA between September and 
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December 1965. They established a training base at Ongu-
lumbashe.-in the north-western region of Ovambo, where forty 
to sixty men were recruited for training, before, on 26 
August 1966, a small police force attacked and bbliterated 
the Ongulumbashe base .(1 6)_ 
Initially training took place in Ghana (under Nkrum~), Egypt 
{under Nasser) and also in Algeria after its independence in 
July 1962. Subsequently, training facilities have been pro-
vided by other African countries such as Angola, Zambia and 
Liberia. Soviet Bloc countries such as East Germany, the 
Chines~ Republic, North Korea and the Soviet Union itself 
have provided and are proving extensive military assistance 
in addition to training facilities, instructors, military 
advisers and technicians~l?) 
In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia tried fruitlessly to move the 
United Nations towards direct intervention in the. SWA dispute, 
. (18) 
in order to bring about an independent state. . SWAPO sub~ 
mitted a further request for a UN-supervised referendum. As 
a result the United N~tions General Assembly terminated South 
Africa's mandatory rights over SWA in 1966 .<19) However, it 
failed to take effective steps towards the implementation of 
this decision, thereby illustrating the United Nation's 
inability to pressurise_South Africa towards a settlement of 
' .the SWA issue. This in turn acted as an immediate. spur to 
SWAPO's engagement in an armed struggle po) 
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"We have no alternative but to rise in arms 
and bring about our own liberation, the 
supreme test for our cause." (21) 
This was the declaration of war against South Africa, when 
SWAPO announced its intended military struggle from its head-
quarters in Dar-es-Salaam, on 18 July 1966. In 1968 SWA 
became internationally known as Namibia (henceforward SWA/ 
Namibia)Q~' although there remains a good deal of confusion 
about which name to use, as the Territory's status is still 
uncertain. 
Since the 1970s the guerrilla war has escalated rapidly. 
(This has been dealt with in the section covering the military 
realities of the contemporary SWA/Namibia situation.) At 
this stage SWAPO's President envisages SWAPO becoming a 
single national army; and being a single organisation with 
no separate 'internal' and 'external' wings. 
He stated that the only differerice between the internal legal 
SWAPO-Democrats and the external militant SWAPO is that the 
~ latter has a specific task to perform, to militarily liberate 
SWA/Namibia~whilst the internal SWAPO-D is responsible for 
· r23) 
internal organisation and staging a legal front~ 
The validity of this statement, that SWAPO and SWAPO-.,D con-
stitutes one organisation~ is ~urrounded by a great deal of 
uncertainty, as SWAPo-dr~ l~ad~r, And~~a~·ship~bga; 
explicitly rejects any formal or informal relations with 
SWAP0.~ 4) The Voice of SWAPO-D, mouthpiece of the SWAPO-
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Democrats, even claimed that SWAPO-D is not an entirely new 
party, but.is composed of loyal SWAPO members, representing 
that section of the SWAPO membership that has remained true 
to the original principles and policies o-i. SWAPO .<25) More 
attention will be paid to the issue of SWAPO unity in the 
section dealing with the SWAPO-Democrats, as it is an impor-
tant factor not to be neglected. For·the moment it is 
. sufficient to state rhat SWAPO and SWAPO-D are two distinctly 
separate ·organisatiohs.~ 6) The former, while not officially 
banned, does not enjoy local legal status as does the SWAPO-
Democrats. 
For the purpose of examining SWAPO's historical development 
and policies, it is necessary to look at the various compo-
nents or groups comprising SWAPO as a whole and the role 
played by them in the liber~tion struggle. For convenience 
and clarity SWAPO-D will be excluded from the discussion. 
SWAPO comprises four components or sub~groups: 
1. the external leadership structure undei direct command of 
Sam Nujoma, 
2. SWAPO's Women's Couricil set-up for the political and 
social liberation of SWA/Namibian women, 
3. SWAPO's Youth League, active since the early 1960s, 
4. and PLAN, the military wing of SWAPO. 
PLAN, for the People's Liberation Army for Namibia, will.be 
used instead of the lesser known PLENC (People's Liberation ~rmy 
I 
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for Namibia) .<2 7) Two labour organisations, the National 
Union of Namibian Workers and the Namibia Trade Union Council 
affiliated to SWAPO and SWAPO-D respectively are both illegal 
not being of the ten legally registered unions within 
. < 2 8) the territory, five ·of which are Railway Unions~· . 
The external leadership under Nujoma will be dealt with in-
directly in ·all the following sectiqn~ as this component 
_really is of overriding importance. Turning to the role of 
the women, it must be noted immediately that the non-white 
SWA/Namibian women are participating in the struggle as 
vigorously as the men, though, not ih a military capacity. 
The SWAPO Women's Council has succeeded in drawing thousands 
of SWA/Namibian women, all non-white, into the liberation 
struggle~ 29 ) In the early 1970s women began to take a very 
active part in organising meetings and rallies~ especially 
seeing to it that the SWAPO Youth League held meetings and 
demonstratioris against the South African presence. When 
. the United· Secretary General Dr Kurt Waldheim and his personal 
represent~tive, Dr Alfred Escher, visited SWA/Namibia on 
different occasions during 1972-73, African women came out 
in impressive numbers to urge the United Nation to take imm~-
date and serious measures to assist the SWA/Namibian people 
· · 1 · d d. C3 o) to attain nationa in epen ence. · Since the mid-1970s it 
further became clear that large numbers of African women are 
undergoing military training and are now fighting side by 
side with the men~3D 
Little is known about the SWAPO Youth League, except for its 
I • 
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more militant tendencies. The League emerged as a result 
of a decision made at the first SWAPO Congress held in Wind-
hoek during 1962. It is a self-governing federal body made 
f b th b d . b f. W . - . l <3 2> . up o o mem ers an non-mem ers o S APO itse f , and it 
is primarily geared towards the protection and advancement of 
the interests of the SWA/Namibia youth, especially in the 
educationai sphere. The SWAPO Youth League called upon all 
_ young South Wesi Africans to join in the process of creatin~ 
a revolutionary new social order, totally free from South 
African occupation,; with total social, political and economic 
equality .<3 3) The youth were asked to contribute through the 
organisation of rallies, demonstrations and by assuming their 
rightful position in the economic system, thereby encouraging 
the youth to academic achievementsf34) The SWAPO Yough League 
have beeri described as being militant.~~ Doubless many of 
them joined SWAPO's fighting ranks before or after the com-
pletion of their ~cademic careers. Some of them have been 
lured away under false promises of a better education in 
A l b 1 d 
,b. . . 1 . . . (3 6) 
ngo a, su sequent y expose as eing mi itary training. 
Turning to the People •·s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) the 
. military wing of SWAPO, one finds that, .unlike the Youth 
League, PLAN is not a separate organisation, but constitutes 
(3 ?) 
the vanguard of the liberation struggle. The Central 
Committee and the Nationa~ Executive control the entire armed 
force.· The Commander-in~Chief of PLAN is the President of . 
the Party and he is also responsible for political leadership. 
Under the President is the Deputy Chief Com~ander who is 
commander of the army and responsible for all PLAN operations. 
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The Secretary of Defence and Transport is in charge of all 
logistical operations. Military operations are organised by 
the commanders of different regions, who in turn are respon-
sible for making recommendations to the Secretary of Defence 
d . (38) an Transport. 
PLAN's militants.come from all sectors of the population 
contract labourers, Womer and the youth, the latter being the 
'l. . , h (3 9) . . most mi itant in suppor~ of .t e movement. Military training 
involves both military and political education, taking place 
mainly th~ough oral .~ommunication. The discussion of other 
similar liberation struggles form an important part of this 
training, citing examples such as Algeria, Kenya, Guinea; the 
Congo, and more recent examples, Angola, Mozambique and Zim-
.. (40) 
babwe. 
Briefly, SWAPO/PLAN's military policies since their inception 
~n the early 1960s are as follows: 
1. At a SWAPO National Congress at Windhoek in 1961 it was 
. < J) 
resolved to prepare for the eventual armed struggle. 4 
This initial preparation lasted till 1963 when the first 
cadres left for military training. 
2. The first fully trained guerrillas infiltrated northern 
Ovambo between September and December 1965 to set up 
rural bases for training local people. But they suffered 
defeat in the first armed contact with the Security Forces 
(a police unit), on 26 August 1966 _(4 Z)_ 
3. · on 18 July, 1966, an official declaration of war against 
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South Africa was issued from the SWAPO Headquarters in Dar-
es-Salaam. Further establishment of its guerrilla infra-
structure followed between 1966 and 1969, which had to be 
done despite harsh counter-insurgency measures .~nacted by 
the South African Security Forces. The departure of the 
first large group, some 4 0-00 peasants, to Botswana and 
Zambia, was reported in October, 1968, with others 
following at fairly regular intervals>43) 
4. At the end of 1969, unable to hold its annual national Con-
gress inside SWA/Namibia, SWAPO called together delegates 
from all the organs of SWAPO,including the cells and 
branches inside the Territory. Meeting between 26 
December 1969 and 2 January 1970, the Tanga Congress 
reviewed the progress of the struggle, ~~de changes in 
policies and organisation, replaced and/or re-elected the 
_leadership and strengthened its dedication to the libera-· 
t . f N . b. (4 4) ion o ami ia. 
5. In the early 1970s the party reformed and broadened its 
organisation. The Youth League was to play a prominent 
role iri the struggles which erupted durin'g and after the 
contract workers strike in 1971-72. The Elder's Council 
(to mobilise elderly people and to show them that they are 
also needed) provided for liaison with traditional ,leaders. 
The Women's Council sought to assist the struggle of women 
against their dual oppression as .women and as blacks. 
SWAPO's military wing, originally called the Namibia Libera-
tion Army, was re-organised and in 1973,renamed the People's 
Liberation Army of Namibia, (PLAN) f45) 
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6. The general strike of 1971-72 proved successful. By the 
.end of 1971 it brought most of the major industries of the 
country to a halt _(46) Some 22 500 contract workers from 
towns, mines and work-camps, out of the recorded 43 400 
contract labourers had taken part, of whom about 18 000 
returned to Ovamboland. Thus, over half the recorded 
43 400 contract workers and over 70% of those employed outside 
joined the strike against the contract system. was 
a spectacular culmination of a period of mobilisation which 
touched every corner of the SWA / Namibian society _(4 7) Not 
only was this conducive to military recruitment, it was 
also a major landmark in black solidarity throughout 
Southern Africa. J.H.P. Serfontein recorded the 
departure of nearly 6 000 Ovambo across to Angola on their 
way to Zambia, in 1974.(49) 
7. The collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in 1974-75 
added a new dimension to the SWA I Namibia struggle. ,,!_t 
resulted in greater mobility for guerrillas betwe~n SWA/· 
Namibia and Southern Angola, a relatively safe retreat in 
case of pursul t, as well as a new availabili_ty of base 
facilities for PLAN guerrillas close to ~he Caprivi Strip~~ 
8. Due to severe South African military retaliation PLAN was 
forced to adopt a lower profile between 1976 and 1978. 
Two major· SADF military ihcursions into southern Angola, 
code-named .-''Operat-ion Savana" and· "Operation Cassanga", · 
took place iri 1976 and 1978 respectively. The first 
cases of urban sabotage occurred late iri December, 1978, 
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in Windhoek and Swakopmund, and again in Windhoek in July 
1983.(so) 
9. An escalation in the number of guerrillas infiltrating the 
territory, early in 1979, resulted in South African mili-
tary retaliation and the non-implementation of both the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, as 
accepted by South Africa on 25 April 1978, and the Waldhe~m 
I 
Repor.t ,that scheduled 26 February 1979 as the proposed 
election date. This amounted to a major breakdown in the 
negotiation process, and the continuation of the armed 
struggle. 
10. Beginning in January 1980, PLAN launched a new strategy, 
infiltrating small but specialised insurgent groups with 
definite targets in northern SWA/Namibia. Distributing 
SWAPO pamphlets and propaganda, recruting, gathering infor-
mation and committing more serious acts of sabotage, 
attacking farms, military and police bases as well as 
laying countless landmines. By may 1980, 30 landmine 
incidents, 28 cases of sabotage, 38 civilian casualties and 
9 cases of abduction were reported _(Sl) However, in June, 
1980, PLAN paid dearly for their initial successes. 
"Operation Smokeshell", from 10 to 30 June, dealt PLAN a 
devastating blow. PLAN's casualties escalated by 45%, 
from 915 in 1979 to 1 448 in 1980 _(52) 
11r In 1981, PLAN undertook to ~rastically intensify the war, 
whi.le, on the other hand, General Lloyd of the Security 
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Forces announced, .in similar tones, that the military 
defeat of SWAPO/PLAN was the top priority for 1981. His 
message was clear, servini boih as a justification an~ 




in future it would be militctry policy 
to look for the ant-hill inside Angola 
instead of pursuing individual insurgents." ( 5 3) 
This·new approach, regular "limited" incursions into 
southern Angola, proved more effective than massive but 
infrequent raids. PLAN's casualties increased slightly 
from the 1447 in 1980 to 1493 in 1981, though, in 1981 a 
great deal of military equipment and food-stuffs were cap-, 
tured by the Security Forces. 
12. The year 1982 was a decisive ·year for PLAN. After sue-
cessive defeats and Security Forces incursions PLAN had 
to prove itself still c~pable of undertaking "major" mili-
tary operations within the borders of SWA/Namibia. As 
usual, intensified infiltiat{on took place du~ing the 
fir_st part of · the year, from March to May, under cover of 
the semi-tropical .vegetation from the rainy season. PLAN 
continued infiltrating small specialised groups but with 
the addition of civilian terror as a new strategy,- in 
order to demoralise white civilians; especially farmers, 
and -to diminish their.trust and faith-in ·the Se~urity 
Forces. Consequently, between January and June 1982, 
499 terrorist incidents; 79 civiliari casualties; ~6 
civilian injuries, 63 abductions and 71 Security Force 
casual ties, were reported .<~ 4) 
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PLAN did indeed attain its objective for 1982, that is, to end 
all speculation claiming that it had been militarily decimated. 
To achieve this, in a special effort under the vanguard of a 
group of "ordinary" guerrillas, a group numbering approximately 
one hundred well-equipped "elite" guerrillas infiltrated the 
Mangeti Block during April, 1982. From the Mangeti Block a 
three-pronged attack was launched into the heartland of 
northern SWA/Namibia. Despite the nearlf suicidal nature of 
.the operation, it was quite successful. An area covering 
several hundred kilometres, stretching from the east near 
Tsumkwe to Kamanjab in the west, and penetrating nearly 300 
kilometres into the T~rritory, was infiltratedfSS) The opera-
tion reflected great courage, and PLAN continued functioning 
despite its heavy casualties of the previous seven years. 
Since 1981-82, Angola has paid attention to the establishment 
of a more effective defence system in southern Angola, to 
.. repel and act as deterrent against future SADF incursions. 
This was ach~eved primarily by depl~ying Surface-to-Air-Missile 
batteries in the southern provinces, and by establishing an 
early-warning radar system to alert both MPLA/FAPLA and SWAPO/ 
. PLAN armed forces. It is known that both fronts use the same 
. f t . 1 . . 1 d . t . · t k (S G) in orma ion, ogistica an communica ion ne wor s which 
amounts to a direct link between SWAPO/PLAN, the MPLA/FAPLA 
,/ 
and the Soviet-Cuban elements present in Angola. 
In an interview on the Voice of Namibia; broadcast· from Luanda 
early in February; 1982, SWAPO' s defence sec_retary, Mr P. 
Nanjemba stated that the organisation's Central Committee has 
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assured the people that only the continuation of the armed 
struggle will being the independence to Namibiaj5 ~ 
j 
SWAPO's permanent United nations representative, Mr Theo-Ben 
Gurirab, on 19 March, added that all SWAPO's attempts to 
approach re~ponsible people such as General Lloyd, proved 
futile, thereby l~aving SWAPO only one alternative, to mobilise 
th 1 
. . · : (58) 
e peop e in a resistance campaign. 
SWAPO also embarks upon regular propaganda campaigns aimed at 
impressing the international community and its financial 
backers with its alleged military victories. For example, 
SWAPO officials frequently claim that the military activities 
of PLAN cover the entire country and are not confined to the 
·border operational areaf5 ~ Reports are ·made of large 
·numbers of "South African" soldiers killed, ;,1:umerous 
armoured personnel carriers destroyed, and ~arge amounts of 
' . -~~ 
war material captured. Such claims would appear to be - .,• 
rather over ambitious since ·none of these type of incidents 
have been reported by the SADF. Only three urban incidents 
h~ve been reported up to June 1983~ while the southern and 
~central parts of SWA/Nami~ia have been completely free of in-
surgent activity. Judging from the SADF's continued presence 
in southern Angola it would appear to be unlikely that SWAPO/ 
PLAN's activities could amount to more than sporadic incur-
sions .<61) 
Nevertheless~ as pointed out earlier; the organisation is 
successful in launching regular annual operations into SWA/ 
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Namibia. In this respect 1983 was no exception. In 
February 1983, SWAPO launched what the SADF have described as 
. 1 ff . . . . f f. h : <62) its argest o ensive in sixteen years o ig ting. By mid-
March 1983, the SWA Territory Force announced that 203 of 
approximately 600 insurgents were eliminated, only ten of which 
. . ~~ were able to penetrate south of the war zone. Of importance 
however, is the organisation's evident ability to sustain its 
insurgent activities despite extensive counter-insurgency mili-
tarisation of northern SWA/Namibia. 
•. 
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SECTI6t'4 4.2 
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION 
IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS: 
SOUTH AFRICA'S JUSTIFICATION FOR THE 
SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA WAR? 
No discussion of the South West Africa People's Organisation 
(SWAPO) would be complete without reference to the organisa-
tion's ideological priorities. This should lead to greater 
understanding of the underlying reasons for the militarisation 
of not only the SWA/Namibia society, but that of South Africa 
too. This linkage originates from South Africa's earlier 
legal mandate over SWA, revoked in 1966. · 
General white public opinion on SWAPO's ideological orienta-
tion is largely shaped through government-censored mass 
communication media. The press, radio and television net-
works do not have total freedom of expression in either SWA/ 
Namibia or South Afric·a _(l) Consequently, p:ublic opinion in 
· both these countries -- has to rely largely on information, 
e~idence and arguments advanced by the South African Govern-
·ment. The un-informed are. therefore. in no position to 
formulate their own impre~sions on whatever issue or question 
is at hand in this ~ase, whether or not SWAPO is 'commu-
nist' by origin and aspirations. One question often asked, 
~ 
is why do South African soldiers have. to die on the SWA/Namibian 
borderl2.) Other pertinent questions relate to the tremendous 
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financial, military, political and diplomatic costs tied to 
South Africa's involvement in the Territory. Financially 
the SWA/Namibian war costs South Africa well over one billion 
. d (3) ran per annum. 
South Africa defends its role in SWA/Namibia with the. 
following arguments: 
1. Since World War I 
I 
South Africa has been responsible for 
the security of SWA in order to allow the occupants of 
the Territory to freely participate and expand their 
political convictions without fear of external inter-
ference. 
2. To see to it that the territory attains independence 
along constitutional lines and not as a result of terror 
and fear brought about by a SWAPO-Marxist military 
victory _(4) 
3. SWA/Namibia is also directly tied to South. Africa's own 
security. It is only part of the ultimate African 
National assault on South Africa. This.security link, 
therefore, serves to lend more cedibility to the govern-
ment's survival strategy _(s) 
4. South Africa has strong emotional and cultural relations 
with the local white population group;· ·after all, South 
Africa has a direct historical responsibility for the 
whites settled there. 
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5. At present South Africa and SWA/Namibia are involved in a 
revolutionary war with a strong ideological undercurrent. 
From the beginning of the war, in 1962, when SWAPO cadres 
began military training, and the first armed contact in 
1966, the revolutiona.ries relied entirely on communist 
military aid to keep their effort going!6) 
6. South Africa and SWA/Namibia, for that matter, would be 
tremendous economic prizes for the Soviet Bloc. 
7. A SWAPO governed SWA/Namibia, would undoubtedly facili-
tate an intensified assault on South Africa, (both 
externally and internally through urban terror tactics of 
the African National Congress (ANC).) The acting Commis-
sioner of Police, Lieutenant-General J. Coetzee stated 
in August 1982 that the acts of terrorism and sabotage 
committed in South Africa had risen form 12 incidents in 
1979, to 19 in 1980 and 55 in 1981~7 ) 
8. Should South Africa militarily withdraw before indepen-
derice there would be no guarantee against direct Soviet-
Cuban assistance to SWAPO. In the case of independence 
for SWA/Namibia through SWAPO's efforts, combined with 
Soviet-Cuban support, it is to be expected that a new 
military front would open up on the Orange River. 
Under such circumstances the ANC and PAC would be more 
than welcome to join the strugglef8) 
9. Finally, the South African presence is aimed at ensuring 
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a peaceful transition towards independence, and a con-
tinuation along the path of principled diplomatic negotia-
tion with the Western powers as it has been doing since 
April 1977 _(g) 
An examination of this information makes it impossible to 
reach definite conclusions about SWAPO's ideological position. 
However, to proceed, it is necessary to briefly identify two 
possible interpretations of the so-called "co_mmunist threat" 
posed by SWAPO. 
This is simply to draw a distinction between what can be 
described as a 'direct' or 'real' threat, and an 'indirect' or 
'implied' threat of communism tied to the organisation. Ulti-
mately both interpretations identify the same issue. As a 
'direct' threat SWAPO would be established as the result of 
Soviet planning and strategy and would be a 'pure' Marxist 
organisation. As an 'indirect' threat, it is believed, by the 
South African Government, that SWAPO, as a national liberation 
organisation in its course of struggle. came to completely 
identify itself with the socialist policies of the communist 
countries. This identification would then pose a real threat 
if the organisation attained power in an independent Namibia. 
The South African Government's view of SWAPO is explicit and 
without reservation. A leak of secret United States policy 
memoranda shows a very frank Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Mr Roelof Botha, in discussion with United States State Depart-
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ment representatives during their visit to South Africa in 
April, 1981. Mr botha stated: 
"We (the.South African Government) are con-
vinced that Moscow controls the present 
government in Angola, as well as that SWAPO 
is a Marxist movement" ( 10) 
Mr Botha went on to say that SWAPO's President Sam Nujoma, 
will nationalise the economy of SWA/Namibia, thereby causing 
internal upheaval and civi~ war between black and white, which 
unavoidably, will compel South Africa to intervene: 
"We -:(south Africa) will have to invade Namibia 
and other countries as well. tt would be 
better to have a low level conflict there 
(SWA/Namibia) indefinitely rather than to 
have a civil war escalate to a general con-
flagration." (11) 
Mr Botha concluded with a reiteration of what South Africa has 
maintained all along, that SWA/Namibia is only part of the 
identified total communi~t onslaught on South Africa; 
" first Namibia, then Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland, followed by the final attack 
on South· Africa". (12) 
South African Pri.me Minister, Mt P. W. Botha proclaims the 
right of self-determination foi all the peoples of SWA/Namibia, 
without interference or intimidation from whatever quarter. 
He calls for a democratic process that envisages the continua-
tion of democracy after elections, and not a one-man-one-vote 
election taking place only once. Botha co~ceived SWAPO as 
the greatest danger to the continuation of a democratic poli-
tical process, as 
II 
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it (SWAPO) will not hesitate to stoop 
excess' in the programme of eliminating its 
democratic opponents whichit is not pre-
pared to face in a free and fair election 
contest". (13) 
As for SWAPO's ideological commitment:: 
" ... -its history of ruthless action against: 0 • 
dissidents within its own ranks and its 
dependence on the Soviet Block makes it 
very clear that it is impossible for 
SWAPO to give these (constitutional) 
guarantees " . ( 14 ) 
to 
According to P.W. Botha, the struggle surrounding SWA/Namibia 
is increasingly turning into a struggle between the advocates 
of free expression and self-determination and the advocates 
of power seizure by means of force and intimidation. In his 
view South Africa is an unselfish benefactor of the peoples 
of SWA/Namibia and their great protector agaisnt violent domi-
nation by SWAPO. P.W. Botha by implication sees this orga-
nisation as Marxist along the lines of the regimes that have 
taken over power in Angola and Mozambique. From a South 
African point of view, SWAPO constitutes a direct threat to 
the security of both SWA/Namibia and South Africa. The 
Ottaway' s, in their book Afrocommunism pointed out that the:' 
" leaders of the militant SWAPO and the new 
leader of independent Zimbabwe, Robert Mµg~b~, 
were scarcely hiding their commitment to 
building new socialist societies on the basis 
of Marxis,t-Lenins principles". (15 )· 
It is then in the interest of the South African Government to 
make these communist accusations against SWAPO. The Govern-
ment has a desire to have conclusive evidence in support of 
303 
SWAPO's committed communist nature and aspirations. Un for-
tunately,again no clear distinction is drawn between 
communism and socialism. If the organisation could be 
proved to be a dedicated communist movement leeway would be 
provided for more ruthless military action against SWAPO's 
military wing. Even more important, definite confirmation 
would provide a basis for questioning SWAPO's c~edibility and 
trustworthiness. To prove this the South African Governmert 
has gone to extremes, even producing captured Soviet military 
personnel as evidence of direct Soviet aid to SWAPof16) 
Nevertheless, P.W. Botha confirmed that he and his government 
realise that SWAPO will have to be accommodated in a genuine 
l l . (1 7) d h sett ement so ut1on. An tat: 
II any party that takes part in a consti-
tutional, peaceful way, will be allowed 
to the polling booth with its supporters 
and have the right and the possibility of 
winning the election 11 • (18) 
Statements such as these have little impact on political 
observers, as it is a well-known fact that SWAPO believes: 
II the only solution to bring about 
genuine and democratic independence in 
Namibia is to resort to armed struggle"; (19) 
that SWAPO's Central Committee: 
" ... resolved to continue with, and inten-
sify the armed liberation struggle". (20) 
On 28 February 1978, Sam Nujoma said that SWAPO was not 
interested iri 'majority rule', but rather in 'fighting to 
seize power by means of Revolution' pD 
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In contrast to the picture presented by the South African 
authorities, church personnel in South Africa and SWA/Namibia
1 
the majority of the local political parties and analysts do 
not categorise SWAPO as a Marxist (communist) movement. 
Instead, they view the organisation as a national liberation 
movement born out of the needs and aspirations of the SWA/ 
Namibia people. Well-known academic and SWA/Namibia specia-
list, Dr G. Totemeyer, feels that: 
II it (communism) does not tally with the 
deep seated Christian beliefs;_ of the over-
whelming majority of SWAPO members. The 
churches, especially the black Lutheran, 
Anglican and Roman Catholic churches which 
have the majority support of the black 
population, indeed have something in common 
with SWAPO, in that both institutions feel 
threatened, persecuted and oppressed". ( 22) 
It need only be concluded that SWAPO is likely to jeopardise 
its relations with the church should it seriously involve 
itself in atheistic communism. 
' .For the international. community SWAPO continued to be viewed 
as a national liberation organisation in a natural extension 
of Africa's decolonisation process. However, it seems as if 
the international community is not entirely united in this 
viewpoint. Certainly, the UN, OAU, the WCG and other 
humanitarian bodies do form a strong anti-South African front, 
but without-the full co-operation of the Western Governments 
it has no effective means· for pressurising South Africa into 
a more moderate approach both in SWA/Namibia and domestically. 
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This is so despite the fact that the Western section of the 
international community thinks that the South African Govern-
ment's stubbornness contributes to driving SWAPO £urther 
. h ·. . (2 3) into t e "communist" camp. A United Nations' report in 
late 1980 disclosed that 43 countries still maintained links 
with South Africa in spite of United Nations resolutions 
calling for severance of all relations with South Africa. 
They included Argentine, Paraguay, Portugal, France, Britain 
and . the United States .<24) 
The Reagan Administration's delegate for African Affairs, 
Dr Chester Crocker, has stated that the US Government draws 
an important distinction between a nationalist movement 
applying Marxist-Leninist terminology and the Soviet Union 
and its real allies. Dr Crocker acknowledged that there is 
- no doubt about the extensive military support SWAPO receives 
from the Soviet Union, although, adding that it would be an 
oversimplification to conclude that this in itself makes 
SWAPO communist. SWAPO, he said, is rather considered as a 
true nationalist movement with considerable support amongst 
. black SWA I Namibians .<25) · 
United States officials are of the opinion that· the Soviet 
interest in Southern Africa is subsiding.~~ In 1983, United 
States officials went as far as to .invite members of South 
.Africa's State Security Council to Washington to provide them 
with evidence showing that Southern Africa is not a top Soviet 
priority, and they they should be more lenient over SWA/:: 
Namibia .(2 7) 
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At the same time it is clear that the Regan Administration in 
its turn adopted a much less outspoken anti-South African 
stand. Publicly United States Government policies aimed at 
being non-committal, based on a so-called "constructive 
engagement" approach. This approach is followed not only 
towards South Africa but wherever there are vested interests. 
"Constructive engagement" meant that the Reagan Administra-
tion, unlike its Carter predecessor, chose to negotiate ·~ith 
f . dl . 1. k h f · <2 8) a rien y nation i e Sout Arica'. (Dr Crocker des-
cribed this Regan policy as 'constructive engagement' 
implying that Carter's policy had been 'destructive disengage-
ment' which obviously had not been the case _(2 9)) 
This new approach from the Regan Adminsitration.was not wel-
corned by the African states. The Organisation for African 
Unity, for example, accused the United States of "entering 
into an unholy alliance with South Africa" ~30 ) Yet Dr Crocker 
-made it clear that the United States was not prepared to be 
forced into choosing between its areas of interest in order 
. (31) 
to mete out preferential treatment. He stated clearly 
that a binary goal is sought in the SWA/Namibia negotiations; 
to attain territorial independence for Namibia as well as to 
work towards a reconciliation in Angola _(32) 
A United States Senate Sub-Committee Hearing on Security and 
Terrorism organised by the far-right wing in Washington, 
between March and April 1982, ended abortively. The aim of 
this Sub-Committee; Chaired by Senator Denton, was to put 
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forward evidence proving beyond doubt the committed communist 
inclinations of both SWAPO and the ANC's leadership. This 
attempt was only successful in reiterating old rhetoric and 
did not prove anything conclusively. In America little atten-
tion was paid to the Sub-Committee as Senator Denton carried 
little weight in either the Senate or the Regan Administration _(J 3) 
But once again criticism was voiced as to the United States' 
position. In May 1982, SWAPO's Western European Information 
Officer, Mr P. Manning accused the United States Government 
and members of the Western Contact Group (WCG) of "double-
dealing" with South Africa, to the detriment of SWAPO's posi-
t
. (3 4) 
ion. It was a cooly delivered reminder that the current 
ongoing negotiation process on SWA/Namibian independence could 
collapse at any moment. 
The President of SWAPO, Mr Sam Nujoma, stated explicitly that 
SWAPO was founded inside Namibia, before there was contact 
with anybody from the outside with the exception of the 
Reverent Michael Scott. In a newspaper interview in Paris, 
Mr Nujoma stated: 
II we started organising underground before 
SWAPO was formed, even before the-Ovambo 
People's Organisation was established, and 
I campaigned throughout the country. The 
socialist countries, generally referred to 
as communist countries; had offered help 
and we have gratefully accepted their assis-
tance to fight the enemy ... , but, if the 
West had offered us military assistance we 
would have taken it too." ( 35) 
On another occasion Mr Nujoma, as guest of the Soviet Union 
Communist Party, condemned South Africa's reluctance to 
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engage in peaceful negotiation, thereby forcing SWAPO to con-
tinue the military struggle and its quest for allies and 
support. He also made use of the occasion to express SWAPO's 
(36) gratitude for Russia's constant support and encouragement. 
Co-founder member of SWAPO and current leader of the SWAPO-
Democrats, Mr A. Shipanga, the only person with inside know-
ledge to testify before the earlier mentioned United States 
Senate Sub-Committee Hearing, told United Statfs officials that; 
II 
and: II 
at SWAPO's initiative I went to Moscow, 
Peking, East Berlin and to almost all the 
capitals of Eastern Europe in search of 
support for our struggle against South 
African rule" (37) 
in Moscow no attempt was made to make 
communists of us, and we do not regard 
ourselves as communists. 11 ( 3 8) 
The Ottaway's made a numbei of interesting points in terms of 
Soviet influence on SWAPO and other African nationalist organi-
sations. 
II 
They stated that: 
the two contemporary examples where direct 
and prolonged Soviet, East German, and Cuban 
contacts may have played an important role in 
infusing Marxism-Leninism into the ideologies 
of nationalist movements are ZAPU and SWAPO. 
As these two groups sent more and more 
guerrillas and cadres to Eastern Europe, 
Cuba, and camps in Angola staffed by Cuban 
instructors they became noticeably more 
Marxist in their thinking and pronounce-
ments ... 11 (39) 
While the organisation's military assistance. is· exclusively 
Eastern Bloc in origin, it has many financial and non-military 
suppliers in the West. .This appear to support what has 
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emerged so far that SWAPO accepts all forms of support, 
irrespective of the donors' ideological position, and that it 
so happens to be Eastern Bloc countries or Communist countries 
that beiieve in active military support for revolutionary and 
liberation struggles. The result of the West's refusal to 
supply military hardware to SWAPO was that the organisation 
was left with no alternative but to seek this aid from the 
aforementioned countries. SWAPO does, however, have many 
I 
suppor~ers in the West who believe the organisation's cause 
to be just and well-founded. 
·· Between 1977 and 1981, the United Nations and its specialist 
-. agencies contributed more than 40 million dollars to SWAPO's 
war effort which is not much considering South Africa's 
one million rand per day expenditure on the SWA/Namibia war. 
The World Council of Churches, which has donated four million 
dollars to SWAPO over the last decade, made a new grant of 
.68 000 dollars to the organisation in 1981 _(40) . Despite the 
large sums of financial aid donated to SWAPO it is clear that 
these could by no means cover expenses in military aid 
received from the Soviety Union, which, as the Ottaway's 
Pol. nted out 1· s the maJ·or arms supp11· er· of .SWAPO _(
4l) , 
1. The United Nations development. programi:ne for 19:7T-BL; .. :.:<' 
allocated 7,7 million dollars to SWAPO, while an addi-
tional 7, 7 million dollars was allocated for the periqd 
1982 -1986 _<42> 
2·. SWAPO recei~es large quantities of food from the West, 
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especially from France and Holland. The World Food 
Organisation donated 90 000 dollars to the organisation 
in 1980, while the World Health Organisation for the 
period 1974-1981 donated 256 000 dollars to the organis-
t
. (4 3) ion. 
3. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also 
features prominantely. Between 1979 and 1981 an amount 
of ten million dollars had been allocated to the so-called 
refugee camps of Namibia, situated in Southern African 
. (44) countries. 
4. Since 1979 the United Nations provided SWAPO with a free 
international communications network, access to the 
United Nations information centre and use of its world-
wide radio service, having programmes in English, French, 
Spanish and German. Moreover, SWAPO is the only organi-
. . . th . 'l (45) sation enJoying ese privi eges. 
5. Furthermore, in 1967, SWAPO obtained observer status for 
Namibia in the_United Nations Council. And finally, in 
1971 an invitation was extended to the organisation to 
attend all future United Nations Security Council meetings, 
with permanent observer status in the United Nations 
General Assembly following, in 1976!46) 
SWAPO is not as ideologic~lly united and specific as it some-
times would like to appear. It embraces various ideological 
strands which makes it difficult to associate it with one 
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ideological category. For instance, it is clearly 
nationalist as can be seen from its claims to wide popular 
support. It also has an ardent desire to govern as a 
'people's government' 6ver a unified Namibian nation within 
a single sovereign, national territory, the Republic of Namibia. 
Democracy is embraced as the government will take the form of 
a 'people's government' yet, whether it would be a compe-
titive or one-party social democracy is not made clear~4 ~ 
I 
1 
It merely sees as its future task: 
II the liberation and winning of indepen-
dence for the people of Namibia, by all 
possible means, and the establishment of a 
democratic people's government". ( 48) 
Nevertheless, SWAPO has never made secret the fact that 
"initial socialist policies" immediately or soon after indepen-
dence would be inevitable to alleviate the general poor living 
standards of the masses _(4 g) In accordance with these 




the government of a truly liberated 
Namibia will ensure that all the major 
means of production and exchange are 
owned by the people, 
as 
comprehensive agrarian reform aimed at 
giving land to the tillers". (50) 
Given the two possibilities, SWAPO's claim to ·be a true 
national liberation movement with vast popular support, 
enjoying military, financial and moral aid from the East and 
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West, opposed by South Africa's counter claims, one arrives at 
what rightly can be described as a deadlock situation. It is 
also not plausible to ignore realities of Soviet military 
support to past and prisent liberation or revolutionary struggles. 
As F. Kozongnuizi, member of the internal Democratic Turnhalle 
·Alliance summarised so aptly; 
II the most deadly danger lies not in that 
the
1
leaders of Southern Africa are communist 
- f~r from it, not even SWAPO leaders - but 
in their half-baked adherence to communism 
they let their countries become the experi-
mental stations of Soviet expertise in their 
search for ways to occupy Africa as a colo-
nial area." (51) 
A,t the twenty-third Communist Party Congress L.I. Brezhnev's 
Report noted three interwoven policy priori ties, the unif.ica-
. tion of socialist countries; continued support to people's 
liberation struggles; and to maintain harmonious economic, 




In a book published by SWAPO, Namibia: SWAPO Fights for Freedom, 
a number of "Present and Future Tasks" are outlined which 
show a remarkable similarity to true socialism, but a short 
step from communism: 
1. .'"Ib unite all Namibian people, particularly the 
working class, the peasantry and progressive 
intellectuals, into a vanguard party capable of 
safeguarding national independence and of 
building a classless, non-exploitative society 
based on the ideals and principles of scien-
tific socialism." (53) 
2. Similar to Soviet foreign policy, SWAPo: 
II 
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holds high the banner of international 
anti-imperalist solidarity. In pursuit of 
this the movement has resolved to work 
in solidarity with the other national libera-
tion movements and other anti-imperialist, 
progressive peace-loving forces throughout 
the world with a view to ridding ~amibia, 
the African continent and mankind of 
colonialist and imperialist domination". 
Especially 
" ... to work in co-operation with all pro-
gressive governments, organisations and 
popular forces for the total emancipation 
of the African continent". 
That is, South Africa included, with a specific stipu-
lation, reading; 
II to heighten the campaign to isolate 
South Africa from every possible source 
of support, comfort or contact with the 
rest of the world, because of its illegal 
occupation of Namibia and its institu-
tionalised racial oppression at home". ( 54) 
3. Finally, to: 
" ... strengthen our (SWAPO's) anti-
imperialist international solidarity 
with the socialist countries, liberation 
support organisations, working class move-
ments of the capitalist countries, and 
friendly governments and ordinary people". (55) 
The United Nations Institute for Namibia prepared a document 
entitled Toward a New Legal System for Independent Namibia 
drawn up from a seminar on Namibia's future legal system which_ 
was held in Lusak~ in July 1980 and was attended by several 
top jurists. The document suggested that SWAPO might adopt 
one of two avenues in dealing with existing legislation; 
scrapping all legislation as Russia did after the October 
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revolution in 1917, or apply a 'repugnance test' to existing 
legislation, eliminating laws repugnant to the people and 
retaining desirable legislation. The document says that 
in the event of SWA/Namibia achieving independence through 
the armErl struggle, it is unlikely that the movement will 
attempt to salvage unsatisfactory laws inherited from the 
previous regime. Alternatively, if SWA/Namibia achieves a 
riegotiated independence, there may be pressures tp avoid a 
legal vacuum. The document notes that: 
" the Russian experience is relevant to 
Namibia because it illustrates that a new 
nation can, if so willed, start with a 
clean slate without the old laws and 
references to its history and other con-
siderations, apart from its international 
obligations in the age of modern diplomacy}' (56) 
In itself this would seem unlikely as SWAPO, similar to Robert 
Mugabe's Zimbabwe, would inherit all the punitive iaws and 
the tradition of an authoritarian bureaucracy as part of an 
independent political culture. 
In conclusion, two issues can be stated with certainty. 
SWAPO's ideological motivation, in fact, is unclear, bordering 
on claims to be a nationalist liberation movement perceived by 
h l h . d 1 .. b (5 7) . h . . t e peop e as "t e1r def en er and 1 era tor" , w1 t 1 ts aim, 
"to liberate Namibia as a whole with the support of the mass 
o,f Namibian people" _(5 S) This much is undisputed. It is in 
terms of the political leadership of SWAPO, which is in overall 
control of both military and political activities, where 
doubts arise. Although Sam Nujoma made it clear that SWAPO 
is bent upon building a classless non-exploitative Namibian 
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society based on the principles of scientific socialism a 
I 
point made by the Ottaway's seem to bear relevance~ 
II while it is accurate to speak-of the 
persistance of nationalism in the Marxist~ 
Leninist states, this is only one side of 
them. The other is the ideological con-
formity and policies stemming therefrom 
the building of vanguard parties, the 
attempts at collectivising agriculture, 
the nationalisation of most of the economy 
and the close alignment with the Soviet 
Union pn geo-political issues all phe-
nomena which simply cannot be explained in 
terms 'of nationalism". (59) 
On the other hand, the South African position is less unclear. 
There is no doubt about its reluctance to let go of the mineral-
rich Territory for so long under its control. United Na_tions 
negotiators are of the opinion that South African would agree 
to an independent Namibia only if responsibility was assumed 
.b h. l. t. . h . ( 60 ) y w 1te po 1 1c1ans t ere. 
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SECTION 4.3 
ETHNIC DIVISIONS: EFFECTS ON THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA 
PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION'S SUPPORT AND NATIONALISM 
The preceding sub-section 4.2 dealt with the South West Africa 
People's Organisation's (SWAPO) military, financial and diplo-
.1 matic support in a manner devised to shed light on its outside 
supporters ideological motivations. With respect to SWAPO, 
reference has been made to nationalist, democratic and socia-
list qualities reflected in the political strategy of the 
organisation. The latter part of sub-section 4.2 was devoted 
specificially to the identification of SWAPO's ideological aims 
while its "nationalist nature" had been set aside for discus-
sion in sub-section 4.3. It deals essentially with the 
nature and extent of SWAPO's internal support with considera-
tion of the implications it could have on the organisation's 
nationalist claims. 
The extent of SWAPO's internal support and the validity of its 
nationalist claims are two closely related questions often 
asked but not often answered. The reason being the organisa-
tion 's constant refusal to participate in' any internal elec-
tions other than those under United Nations auspices. Con-
sequently it is virtually impossible to give an accurate-
account of SWAPO's internal popularity other than its wide 
(1) 
support amongst the Ovambo. Only realistic estimates can 
be given until genuine elections are held to reflect the 
organisation's popularity. 
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The existing ethnic division of SWA/Namibia's population is 
by no means artificially manufactured or implanted into the 
society, instead, it is possible to trace the development of 
local multi-ethnicity to historical events. From time 
immemorial SWA/Namibia has been inhabited by the sad2)whose 
ancient rock paintings tell the story of this people's early 
hunting and gathering existence. These same paintings also 
portray the a~rival of other people's with their herds of 
I 
cattle; fir~t the Nama and Damara later the Herero and the 
OvamboJ3) But it would be short-sighted to ignore the fact 
that German and South African 'divide and rule' policies did 
.perpetuate these h . d. . . (4) et nic lVlSlOns. 
Notwithstanding many natural and unnatural disasters, by 1960, 
the Territory of 824 000 square kilometres, accommodated eleven 
ethnic groups. The following table on SWA/Namibia's popula-
tion growth from 1960 and 1981/2 will prove useful for sub-
sequent discussion of the implications attached to the ethnic 
division. 
Under closer examinati~n these population figures disclore 
a number of significant points of which the following are the 
most important: 
1. The multi-ethnic make-up of the popuiation is clear~ 
Therefore,_ it is not only SWAPO and Sduth Africa, that have 
interests in SWA/Namibia, but also a number of other groups. 
2. The table further shows that the Ovambo have increased 
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Population Growth in SWA/Namibia: i960 - 1981/82 
Population Group 
1960 (5) 1970(6) 1981/82(7) 
Total Pere. Total Pere. 'Ibtal Pere. 
Ovambo 239 363 45.5 352 640 46.3 516 600 51.l 
White 73 464 14.0 90 583 11.9 75 600 7.4 
Damara 44 353 8.4 66 291 · 8. 7 76 800 7.6 
Herero 35 354 6.7 50 589 6.6 77 600 7.6 
Kavango 27 871 5,3 49 512 6.5 98 000 9.7 
Nam a 34 806 6.6 32 935 4.3 49 700 4.9 
Coloured 12 708 2.4 28 512 3.7 43 500 4.3 
Caprivian 15 840 3.0 25 580 3.3 39 ·500 3.9 
San 11 762 2.2 22 830 3.0 
Rehoboth Baster 11 257 2.1 16 649 2.2 25 800 2.5 
Kaokolander 9 223 l. 7 6 567 0.9 
Tswana 9 992 l. 7 4 407 0.6 6 800 0.67 
Others 15 089 2.0 
Total 526 004 · 100 762 184 100 1009~ 99.6 
from 46.3% in 1970 to 51.1% of the total population in 1981/ 
82. A clear numerical superiority over the second largest 
group, the Kavangos with a mere 9.7% in 1981/82. 
3. Equally significant is the decline of the White ethnic 
group as second largest and official opposition groupf
8
) 
This group is now only ranked fifth on the numerical ..list. 
This downward trend in ihe white gro~p's numerical 
strength had set in after 1974, ~s J.H.P. Serfontein 
pointed out. From 99 000 in 197J9) to 75 600 in 1981/82, 
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/' 
2 316 less than in 1960. The first ethnic group to show 
a numerical decline over the past twenty years. Over 
the past decade 1972 to 1982 the white population 
has declined 15%.(lO) 
The most important point is that the multi-ethnic groups will 
remain but their numerical strength may change with time. 
Earlier SWA/Namibia's population was des1ribed as multi-ethnic. 
It must be appreciated that the cultures of the society at large 
may differ from that of the ethnic group _(ll) The members of 
ethnic groups are, or feel themselves to be or are thought to 
be, bound together by common ties of race, nationality, or 
culture. The nature of these groups' relationships with the 
society as a whole, and with other groups within it, consti-
tutes one of the major problems in describing and analysing 
h 
. . (12) sue societies. 
There are other important implications attached to the natural 
division of the Territory's population that deserve attention. 
Three sets of interrelated aspects, or consequences need con-
sideration: 
1. The ethnic division still is one of the ~orner-stones in 
the South African Government's administrative approach 
towards SWA/Namibia. That is, to restrain inter-group 
integration by urging the development of ethnic groups as 
separate political entities under their traditional leader-
h
. (13) sip. 
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2. SWAPO's support undoubtedly has been affected by this 
policy of 'divide and rule'. The emancipation of all 
non-white groups' political consciousness received a 
tremendous boost by the 1974/75 Turnhalle Talks. The 
events surrounding the Turnhalle Talks have been dis-
cussed in Section Three. Sufficient then to point out 
that the Turnhalle events had effectively split the popu-
1 t . 1 h . 1 . (l 4) . h 1 . . 1 1 d f 
1a ion a ong et n1c 1nes , wit po 1t1ca ea ers or 
each of the groups. 
3. Both points one and two in· turn have an effect on SWAPO's 
national claims. Taking the hypothetical situation of 
an ethnically divided SWA/Namibian population in support 
of group-based political parties. Is it then plausible 
for SWAPO to claim a truly nationalistic representation of 
the whole country? These issues are interrelated, but 
for the sake of convenience and clarity, each will be 
discussed separately. 
THE ETHNIC DIVISION: A CORNERSTONE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH 
The Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in 
South West Africa Act 54 of 1968, outlined the first six 
regional "native nations" with specific territories reserved 
for them in which they could have a legislative and executive 
council for local affairs~ The.Act provided for regional 
authorities in Ovambo, Kavango, East Caprivi and the Rehoboth 
G b . t(l5) e 1e . , while Bushmanland and Namaland ·received Advisory 
Boards. Until approximately 1980 this state of affairs 
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remained basically unchanged. The repeal of Act 54 of 1968 
and its replacement by the Representative Authorities Procla-
mation of 1980, better known as Proclamation No.AG.8, that 
~hanged the situation and provided for: 
"The administration of the affairs of a popu-
lation group to be carried on by the execu-
tive authority of that group as from the date 
on which the legislative authority of that 
population group becomes empowered by virtue 
of Section 14(2) of Proclamation No.AG.8." (16) 
Both the Odendaal Recommendations and the amendment thereof 
and replacement by the Representative Authorities Proclama-
tion of 1980 reinforced the constitutional and political 
evolution of SWA/Namibia's population groups along ethnic 
-lines. At the heart of the dispute for or against an ethni-
cally based political dispensation, -according to Kenneth 
Abrahams, lies a basic difference in opinion on the nature of 
the SWA/Namibian population. Those who accept ethnic 
authorities are also accepting the thesis that SWA/Namibia's 
population is comprised of eleven major population groups 
and that for each of these groups the maintenance of its 
. h . . d . . f . t (l 7) unique et nic i entity is o paramount impor ance. 
Those opposed to an ethnic dispensation argue that while there 
may be several communities or population groups in the terri-
tory, the differences between them is not of cardinal impor-
tance, and have to a· large extent been deliberately manufac-
tured, enforced and maintained by successive colonial amdinis-
. (18) 
trations ... Furthermore, the differences that do exist are 
far less serious than the fact that these communities or 
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population groups are in the process of integrating and 
forming a single Namibian nation. Opponents point to the fact 
that the territory is a single economic unit and that the 
South African Government should reshape and modify the social 
. . (19) 
order and constitutional framework accordingly. 
One can agree with Abraham~ that the differences between those 
in favour of and those against, ethnic gove~nments are funda-
mental and irreconcilable, but by late 1977; only the Herero 
and Nama did not have a regional authority of some descrip-
tion; a situation rectified during the early 1980s. The 
major implication attached to the ethnic approach in a consti-
tutional dispensation is the effective way in which it frus-
trates efforts at building one united Namibian nation. 
THE. ETHNIC DIVISION ITS INFLUENCES ON SWAPO's SUPPORT 
Did the development of an ethnically-based constitutional dis-
pensation have an influence on the extent of SWAPO's internal 
support? That is briefly, the Odendaal Commission Recommen-
dations, reinforced and replaced by the Representative Authori-
ties Proclamation of 1980. While the 1974 I 75 Turnhalle Con-
ference Talks boosted the implementation of the recommenda-
tions in practice, as well as resulting in the crystalisation 
of a wider more common political consciousness amongst Blacks. 
All these developments were based on ethnic lines, in order 
to complement and facilitate the governments "official" ethnic 
approach towards the Territory. Proclamation AG.8 of 1980 
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served to officialise and foster the ethnic dispensation 
during the interim period preceding independence. The South 
African Government for its part in the current ongoing 
settlement negotiations, demanded constitutional guarantees 
that envisaged and ensured the continuity of multi-party 
democracy after independence. As the majority of internal 
parties, including SWAP0(2o), are ethnically based, it is to 
be 1expected that ethnicity will be further manifested in the 
' 
electorate's choice of political parties, even in United 
Nation~ supervised elections. 
One of the pre-requisites for elections under United Nations 
auspices, is that neither South Africa, nor the UN/SWAPO 
front should influence the outcome of such elections in any 
.way. The reality of course is that the mere existence of 
the ethnically based interim structure must have a definite 
effect on the outcome of such elections. It does not neces-
sarily have to follow that the ethnic dispensation be supported 
by all groups. Likewise it does not necessarily follow that 
the local ethnically-based multi-party structure resulted 
from the manipulations of the South African Government. What 
is important, however, is that the ethnic dispensation in fact 
exists and that the local political scene is characterised by 
an unusual ~egree of fragmentation and inter-group disunity. 
By the close of 1982 more than-46 separate parties, organisa-
.. . ~D 
tions and-factions were recorded. 
' As David Welsh pointed out:. 
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II any hope that the democratisation of a 
deeply divided society will have an automatic 
'non-racial' outcome is a chimera, as is the 
hope that a common feeling of national identity 
will emerge." (22) 
The real problem is that one cannot predict in advance exactly 
what configuration of groups or salient sub-national divisions 
will arise. (Section 1.2 pointed out the importance of 
avoiding zero-sum-situations which advance the interests of 
one 'group' to the detriment of another.) 
The 1978 and 1980 ethnic elections provided useful demonstra-
tions of the population's mixed feelings. Statistics cited 
are from Proclamation AG.83 of 1978 and Proclamation AG.180, 
183, 184, 185 and 186 of 1980 which give the official election 
results. Also supplied are the percentages represented by 
each of the eleveri groups, based on figures released by the 
Department of Statistics in April, 1982, and published in the 
Suidwester of 2 April 1982. These statistics must not be 
viewed as absolute, but merely as an indicator of the direc-
tion of local political sympathies. 
1. The Damara, 7.6% 76 800 1981 / 2 .. · Of the Damara 
41246 people were registered; 11677 (28.3%) voted for 
the Damara-Council, 8 291 (20.1%) for SWAPDUF (member of 
the DTA), and 449 (1.1%) supported the Damara Executive 
Committee. Forty-nine and a half percent of the Damara 
voted and 50.5% abstained. 
2. The Herero, 7.6% 77 600 1981/82. Of the Herero 
40 452 were registered; 21 036 (50. 9%) voted for NUDO 
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{member of the DTA) , and only 444 {l.1%) voted for the 
NUDO Progressive Party. The Herera had the highest poll, 
53.1%, of all the black ethnic groups. 
3. The Coloured, 4.3% 43 500 1981/2. Of the 
Coloured· 22 540 were registered; 5 292 {23.4%) voted for 
the Labour Party (member of the DTA), and 2101 (9.4%) 
for the Liberal Party. Only 32.8% of the registered 
I 
voters went to the polls. 
4. The Kavango, 9.7% 98 000 1981/82. The DTA 
obtained 6 452 {87.5%) of the registered votes while the 
NCDP gained 918 {12.4%) of the votes. This group amounts 
to a large part of the DTA's support. 
5. Among the Tswana, 0.67% 6 800 and Caprivian, 3.9% 
- 3 9 500 in 1981/82, only DTA candidates were fielded 
so that no elections were held for these groups. Similarly 
with the San, 3.0% 22 830 in 1970, and the Nama 
elections that did not go through. The Nama amounted to 
4°. 9% 49 700 in 1981/82. 
6. The ovambo, 51.1% 516600; the_Caprivian, 3.9% 
39 500; and the Basters, 2. 5% 25 800 in 1981/82, 
had no elections at all. 
Altogether 122 083 black voters were regist~red for the 1980 
ethnic elections. Of these 33.6% 41 071 voted for 
the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA); 12.8% 15 589 -
supported opposition parties; and 53.6% 65 423 of 
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the registered voters abstained from participating. More 
significant being the Ovambos who did not have elections at 
all, ostensibly because of the border war in northern SWA/ 
Namibia. 
In 1978, 412 448 people registered as voters, despite SWAPO, 
SWAPO-D, NNF and SWANU's non-participationf2 ~ Of these, 
p5.0l% 268 130 voted for the DTA; 14.1% 58 434 -
I 
~upported opposition parties, while 20.8% 85 884 
abstrained. In 1980, 176168 black and white people regis-
tered as voters. Of these, 33. 6% 59 290 supported the 
DTA; 23.4% 41 339 voted for opposition parties, and 
42.7% abstained. The DTA's support, therefore, declined in 
real terms from 65.01% in 1978 to 33.65% in 1980, while the 
percentage of abstentions increased from 20.82% in.1978 to 
* 42. 79% in 1980 .C24) 
The Ovambo (51.1%), Caprivian. (3.9%), (3.0% in 1970) Basters 
(2.5%), Tswana (0.67%), and the Nfoma (4.9%) had no elections 
at all. A further 42.79% of the voters actually registered 
did not turn up at the polls, thereby casting a cloud of doubt 
over the popularity of the leaders and parties that were 
supported. The most unfortunate aspect of both the 1978 and 
1980 ethnic elections was that the Ovambo were not provided 
with the opportunity to express their view. As . the most 
conservative estimates indicated that at least 80%.of the 
Ovambo would support SWAPO it must be obvious that should 
elections be held in Ovambo, the massive rejection of the 
.Ethnic Authority system would become even more apparent.QS) 
Foaruar1t: THE 01.LTC.CMI- 01" EL.EC.TIO NS WKteli \JRS NOT (.OMO I.lei Eb ut11)£Q. \ ,-.eE f\)I~ 
CONDITIONS, su.c.tt I\~ 'THE "'c,'11£ , 'iM0"-1.0 '" 1"~£1\'tEI) Wl1'H $0t\C R.l,.$P.'1RT\olf. 
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This is unfortunately too vague a standpoint to adopt, as the 
extent of SWAPO's internal support is of great importance 
to the outcome and aftermath of United Nations-supervised 
elections, besides the Ovambo are not united in ·support of 
one party or organisation. Other interesting developments 
have set in since the early 1970s to transform SWAPO's support 
into a more debatable issue. 
The Ovambo Legislative Council first met in 1968 as result of 
Act 54 of 1968. This Legislative Council was based on the 
traditional leadership structure of Headmen and Chiefs. 
Nevertheless, it was neither truly representative of the 
Ovambo, nor was it popularly supported by them. Only 3% of 
all eligible voters participated in the 1968 Legislative 
Council elections. It was generally felt that the Council 
did not represent the ~epresents of migrant labourers and that 
the low level of education of Council-members curbed much of 
the body's effectiveness!26). 
Dr Gerhard Totemeyer's thesis entitled 'The Role of the Ovambo 
elite in the political development of Ovambo', based on field-
work done by him between 1971 and 1974, completed in 1975, 
provided a wide spectrum of new facts and statistics that 
suggested rather different political developments taking 
place in Ovambo. His findings confirmed the Ovambo Legis-
lative Counci1•·s unpopularity and that the first Legislative 
Assembly and Executive Council were nominated and did not 
accommodate the developing modern elite. The traditional 
elite feared that their authority might be impaired if 
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political parties were admitted in Ovambo~27) Dr Totemeyer 
stressed the important and responsible role played by the 
black churches in Ovambo. For instance, the Ovambokavango 
Church became politicised against its will because of the 
absence of a suitable partyf2~ In summary his findings were 
that SWAPO and especially DEMCOP were considered by the 
majority of the population as instruments and symbols of 
modernity and that they were in 
1
a position to mobilise the 
masses and change the patterns of behaviour. In this, they 
(2 9) 
were sustained by international recognition and support. 
·In evaluation, the clear numerical superiority of the Ovambo 
leaves no doubt about SWAPO's ability to win a free and fair 
election based on a "one-man one-vote winner-takes-all" 
principle, providing that the organisation can rely on the 
undivided support of the Ovambo. It is important, therefore, 
to determine whether the Ovambo are united in support of one 
t . . t. (30) par y or organisa ion. 
One of the interesting developments of the.70s articulates 
exactly the Ovambo unity issue~ In the 197ft/75 Turnhalle 
Conference Talks, foundations were laid for the creation of 
a multi-ethnic political coalition composed of members of 
all groups, including the Ovambof3D Thus, a new contender 
for Ovambo support was created. By the close of 1982, .at 
least three new "contenders" came into existence. Ranked 
and discussed according to estimated importance they are: 
The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA 1976), the National 
Democratic Party/Christian Democratic Alliancefor Social Justice 
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(NDP/CDA 1982), the SWAPO-Democrats. (SWAPO-D 1978) 
and SWAPO as popular favourite. 
The DTA, under the Chairmanship of Dirk Mudge, has suffered 
a significant setback in losing its largest member-party, the 
NDP/CDA which broke away under Peter Kalangula, indicating the 
DTA's isolation from Ovambo support. There is little hope 
for the alliance to set up a formidable organisation in Ovambo 
to counter either SWAPO or the Ovambo-based NDP/CDA. Such 
an organisation will have to grow out of Ovambo, it cannot be 
. . (32) 
implanted there. Furthermore, the NDP/CDA break with the 
DTA spells out that it can no longer claim to be an official 
spokesman of the Ovambof3 ~ 
Apart from objecting to the ethnic nature bf the Turnhalle 
dispensation, officialised by Pro~lamation No.AG.8, and 
preceded over by the DTA until January 1983, a further impor-
tant issue spurred the CDA break-away. Soon after its forma-
tion it became clear that it had the suppor~ of the South 
African Government. The Government hoped to foster the CDA 
as a new anti-SWAPO front that would be more ,effective and 
locally acceptable as it was under the leadership of a Black 
Ovambo political leader _(34) Peter Kalangula himself stated 
that: 
"We have had to work hard to get sympathy 
away from SWAPO. We're succeeding. ·our 
meetings are now well attended. There is 
much discussion. In the past the people 
did not want to talk now they are 
making positive contributions. . The biggest 
change is that in the past a lot of people 
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used to think that without Nujoma there 
was no independence. Now they are openly 
sayin9 that we the CDA can bring 
about real independence. They support us 
openly now, they do not hide their' support." {35) 
Informed sources in Ovambo estimate the local support for the 
DTA at between 2%and 3% for June, 1982, while in January of 
the same year, it had been an estimated 20% support, that is, 
before the NDP/CDA split from the DTA occurred.DQ Yet, 
irrespective of its apparent weak position in Ovambo, the DTA' 
Central Government's 1982/83 budget allocation of R96 million 
for Ovambo development, suggests that the campaign for support 
f th O b . l . . t . . . l (3 ?) I f t rom e vam os is on yin 1 s 1n1t1a stages. n ac , 
in the light of a number of DTA-meetings held in Kavango 
during September, 1982, it would appear as if the DTA mounted 
its campaign for the envisaged internationally supervised 
elections well before 1983, the date generally considered as 
the "deadline" for independence elections _(39) 
The NDP/CDA, under Peter kalangula, naturally evoked bitter 
resentment for braking awa~ The DTA, denied the impact 
of the split <39) depicting Peter Kalangula as an outcast from 
his own tribe, the Kuanyama, who make up some 45% of the total 
of the Ovambo voters _(4o) {The Ovambo include sever tribal 
groups; the Kuanyama, Ndonga, ~uambi, Ngandjera, Mbalantu, 
Kualuthi and Nkolonkati-Eunda groups.) 
On 15 February, 1982, Peter Kalangula left 'the National 
Assembly, i.e. as a member of the DTA, ·to establish his own 
party, initially known as the National Democratic Party, 
335 
since substituted with Christian Democratic Alliance for Social 
Justice (CDA). Thereby, in addition to the Baster, Coloured, 
and White groups, becoming the fifth major ethnic party nor 
represented in the Nati6nal Assembly!4D 
Although the extent of Ovambo support for Peter Kalangula is 
uncertain, the DTA Head Committee are quite aware of his 
.efforts to reorganise the ~maller parties in his area and to 
! 
incorporate them into his dwn party. The Head Committee's 
objections revolve around the so-called "addition of a north-
south polarisation on top of the existing black-white division".(42) 
Peter Kalangula in turn denied the CDA having secessionist 
intentions for Ovambo, but, he 'added that neither is there 
any intention to rejoin forces with the ruling DTA in the 
foreseeable future _(43) 
Instead, an alliance with other parties and groups th~t share 
principles and views basic to the CDA is more likely. For 
instance, the Damara Raad agreed in principle at its July, 
1982, Congress to co-operate in a. United Nations-supervised 
election with the CDA, the Coloured Labour Party and the 
Baster Liberation Front _(44) This would indeed amount· to a 
formidable political alliance, but possibly more significant, 
on 7 August, 1982, the Damara Raad decided to initiate talks 
with SWAPO, since it views SWAPO as an imperative link in 
bringing about a satisfactory solution to the country's inde-
pendence settlement. (4S} · 
Overall it then appears as if the SWAPO-Democrats {SWAPO-D) 
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and SWAPO are the two stronger contenders which will draw at 
least 70% of the Ovambo vote. That is, all-0wing 5% of the 
support to the DTA and 25% to the CDA, rather conservative 
estimates at this stage in time. Since the SWAPO-Democrats 
are discussed extensively in Section 4.4, it is sufficient at 
this stage to point out that the SWAPO-Democrats came into 
existence as a party in June 1978, and its leader, Andreas 
Shipanga, "claims" a certain 20% support from the electorate 
in any free and fair election held within the Territory.~ 6) 
Thus, SWAPO is still left with an estimated 50% Ovambo support·, 
should even the very worst go wrong for the organisation during 
election time, and 25.55% support of the total population, (of 
the people eligible for the vote). 
Leon Kok, editor of the Windhoek Advertiser, after a visit to 
Ovambo in 1982, concluded to "his own astonishment" that SWAPO 
.is very much alive amongst the local people. His personal 
estimation of SWAPO's support amongst the Ovambo is in the 
region of 75%. He added that SWAPO's local support is very 
much underestimated, that the 1978 elections results, ending 
in a DTA victory, is nowhere near a true reflection of the 
present situation in northern SWA/Namibia.~ 7) John Barratt, 
Directrir of the SA Institute of International Affairs pointed 
out that a reai independence settlement provides a strong 
possibiJ.._i ty for a SWAPO government take-over _(48) 
Totemeyer identified two more factors that may count in SWAPO's 
favour should free and fair elections take place. Firstly, 
there is no united white political front to act as vanguard 
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for white interests, or effectively combat SWAPO, with the 
non-white groups more likely to team up with SWAPO rather 
than with the whites, who are seen as remnants of the old 
regime. The white division was explicitly manifested in the 
1980 white ethnic elections, the results of which mandated 
the local National Party, and not the ruling DTA, as official 
spokesman of the white voters. The ultra-conservative 
Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) remains a factor of its own 1 
reluctant to merge with either the National Party or the DTA. 
Secondly, Totemeyer is also of the opinion that there are 
m~ny locals who view the military struggle against SWAPO as 
responsible for so much suff~ring and misery, that while 
political and even military domination by SWAPO would possibly 
not mean any immediate improvements, it will still bring an 
end to death, destruction and foreign occupation.~~ 
SWAPO's election campaign undoubtedly will rely heavily on 
emotionally-charged slogans, .envisaging liberation, peace and 
prosperity as well as an end to all forms of oppression. 
This is likely to appeal to the gross majority of illiterate 
voters in Ovambo. Mr J. Himmelhoch, formerly employed by the 
Bureau of State Security, estimated that as much as 83% of the 
votes in a free and fair election would go to SWAPO. It may 
appear to be an unrealisticly high estimate, however, Tote-
meyer and others have pointed to the Zimbabwe experience. 
Even Koos Pretorius, current leader of the local National Party 
has no reservations about a SWAPO victory in "one-man one-vote 
winner-takes-all" elections, only, he and his party.with the 
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assistance of the HNP and the South African Government are 
against such an election taking place{5~ 
THE ETHNIC DIVISION INFLUENCE ON SWAPO's NATIONALIST CLAIMS 
Before assessing the validity of SWAPO's nationalist claims, 
which, it has been pointed out in Section 4.2 does carry 
weight, it would be usefut to put forward a number of general 
points on the nature and 'meaning of "nationalism". These 
would then be investigated in terms of SWAPO's policies. 
Rupert Emerson outlines some useful points: 
"In the large, nationalism in Asia and Africa, 
as in at least its initial phases in Europe 
and America, is a forward-looking and not a 
reactionary force, a spur to revolution and 
not a bulwark of the status quo." (51) 
II the major immediate contributions of 
nationalism are a sense of independent 
worth and self-respect and a new social 
solidarity to replace the traditional 
bonds. From being "natives" they rise to 
the honorable title of nationals ... over-
coming that lack of social-political cohe-
sion ... " (52) 
"The nationalisms which have emerged are 
neither a spontaneous and self-generating 
movement among the Asian and African 
peoples nor merely an effort on their part 
to get rid of the alien intruder. Far 
more they are an assertion of their redis-
covery or newly created individuality, 
already sharply influenced by the imperial 
impact ... " (53) · 
On the last aspect Ellie Kedourie would agree with Emerson, 
as he views nationalism simply as a reaction to conquest and 
alien rule. Nationalism Kedourie asserts 
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"' is a doctrine invented in Europe in the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. It 
pretends to supply a criterion for the deter-
mination of the unit of population ~roper to 
enjoy a government exclusively its own, for 
the legitimate exercise of power in the state, 
and for the right organisation of a society 
of states. Briefly the doctrine holds that 
the only legitimate government is national 
self-government." (54) 
In SWA/Namibia the Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO), 
established in 1958, became the first organisation aspiring 
to protect the interests of a section of the population. In 
1960 the OPO, initially aimed at opposing the contract labour 
system and representing the Ovambo workers, was renamed the 
South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) in order to 
·become a national organisation representative of all the 
oppressed people of SWA / Namibia _(55) Country-wide national 
branches were established to organise workers in mines and 
factories and peasants in the rural areas~56 ) 
SWAPO's constitution also clearly states its desire to acquire 
independence for all the people of the country; to establish 
a bond of national and political consciousness amongst the 
· {5 7) 
people; and to establish a democratic people's government. 
Thus, corresponding to Emerson -and Kedourie as far as resis-
tance to the status quo and alien rule is concerned. 
The real issue in dispute is whether SWAPO can plausibly make 
its claims on behalf of all SWA/Namibians. ·As·a result of 
the organisation's refusal to participate in any elections 
other than those organised and supervised by the United.Nations, 
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it is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately predict 
the extent of rocal support for the organisation. The 1971 / 72 
strikes did illustrate a definite "nationally"-based support 
for SWAPO.(SS) Labourers from all the non-white groups joined 
the strike, which affected all spheres of activity of the 
SWA/Namibian society55 ~ 
Is this sufficient proof for suggesting that "all" the Terri-
tory's people's, excluding the whites, support SWAPO? This 
cannot be the case, as it has already been pointed out that 
SWAPO cannot count on the undivided support of the Ovambo, 
not even to mention the support of the other groups. Tangari 
points to nationalism as a feeling of common solidarity and 
mutual sympathy that is not extended to outsiders560 This 
is not the situation in SWA/Namibia. Section 3, dealing 
with local politics, indicated the existence of more than one 
feeling of group-solidarity, as well as an abundancy of 
political parties, each with their own principles, leadership 
and ethnic affiliations. SWAPO itself is largely ethnically 
based, drawing most of its supports from the Ovambo~61) 
There is also a lack of unity between the major "national 
liberation" movements. This is well illustrated in terms 
of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), which, like 
SWAPO, draws most of its support from one ethnic group 
the Herero. SWANU, established late in 1959, under the 
leadership of J.F. Kozonguizi, strove towards independence, 
like SWAPO, yet without active involvement in the armed 
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liberation struggle _(62) Though there is little or no co-
operation between SWANU and SWAPO, SWANU also failed to sus-
tain momentum during the 1970s owing to a lack of a coherent 
. t l . . (6 3) in erna organisation. 
Equally undeniable is that SWAPO, SWANU, SWAPO-D and other 
.internal parties are voicing objections to South Africa's 
profitable economic relations with SWA/Namibia. 
! 
Yet the 
economic aspect is of much less importance to the local resis-
tance to South Africa's administrative and military presence. 
In the latter respect, all indigenous parties, with the 
possible exception of the white parties, are "united" in 
wanting independence from South africa. It is not sure 
whether they would want to replace South African domination 
with SWAPO domination. 
The dilemma on a SWAPO Government arose and expanded to its 
present magnitude when the organisation was given legal 
acclaim to be the 'sole authentic representative' of all the 
indigenous people United Nations Resolution 3III (XXVIII) 
(1973). In Sections 3 and 4 it had been argued_ that other 
internal parties, both black and white, certainly did not 
saction this status being ascribed to SWAPO .(64) 
To evaluate SWAPO's nationalist claims it is important to 
consider the role played by Ovambo support in justifying 
these claims. SWAPO insists that it enjoys broad national 
supporl65), while· such a claim is by no means a foregone con-
clusion. What is beyond doubt, is the Ovambo "natioanlist" 
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support underlying and backing-up SWAPO's claims. As the 
Ovambo comprises 51. 5% of the total population, ( in 1981) this. 
support in itself is sufficient to justify nationalist claims. 
As Gwen Lister of the Windhoek Observer sums up; 
11 
••• apart from the fact that certain people 
do not want to belong to any of the eleven 
classified population groups, being of 
mixed blood, there are other people who do 
not care to be classified as anything other 
than 'Namibians' 11 • (66) 
Until a 'free and fair' election takes place, it is impossible 
to tell where the peoples and parties of SWA I Namibia stand. A 
SWAPO victory, despite South Africa's attempts to divide the 
country on ethnic lines, is still a strong possibility. yet 
if a SWAPO victory should come about, as Thomas pointed out, the: 
II rise of African nationalist and African 
socialist rhetoric ... could lead to con-
siderable estrangement between blacks and 
whites inside Namibia. 11 ( 6 7) 
343 
REFERENCES: Section 4.3 
1. Venter, D and Du Pisani, 
for coalition building. 
(Pretoria, 1978), p. 11 
A. South West Africa/Namibia: prospects 
Africa Institute of South Africa. 
2. Totemeyer, G. South West Africa/Namibia (Pretoria West, Focus 
Suid Publishers, 1977), p.3 
, 3. Liberatio~ Support Movement. Namibia: SWAPO Fights for Freedom. 
(Oakland, LMS Information Centre, 1978), p.10 
4. Cockram, G.M. South West African Mandate. 
p.315 
(Cape Town, Juta, 1976) 
5. Thomas, W.H. The Economy of South Hest Africa: An Overall Perspec-
··tive. Paper presented to the University of Cape Town Summer School 
of the Centre for Extra-Mural Studies. (Cape Town, University of 
Cape Town Press, 1975), p.3 
6. Serfontein, J.H.P. Namibia? (Randburg, Focus Suid Publishers, 1976) 
p.10 
7. 1981/82 Figures released by the Department of Statistics, April 1982, 
published in Die Suidwester, {Windhoek), 2 April 1982. 
8. Totemeyer, G. South l~est Africa/Namibia. Strictly speaking it is 
incorrect to refer to the Whites as one unified ethnic group, as it 
is comprised of three sub-groups; Africaners + 65 percent, 
Germans+ 23 percent ·and English ±_
0
12 percent. p.9 
9. Serfontein, J.H.P. Namibia? p.10 
10. Africa Contemporary Record. Vol.XIV 1981-82 p.8667 
11. International Encyclopedia of t_he Social Sciences. Vol.5/6 
(Macmillan and Free Press), p.167 
12. Ibid. 
344 
13. Proclamation No.AG.8 (1980) Proclamation on Representative 
Authorities, which perpetuated the 1964 Odendaal Commission 
Recommendations. 
14. Africa Contemporary Record. 1975-1976,p.8557-558 
15. Prins 1 oo, D.S. 
Settlement. 
August 1977 
South West Africa/Namibia Towards A Negotiated 
Foreign Affairs Association Study Report No.6 
(Pretoria, 1977), p.9 
16. Proclamation No.AG.8 (1980) Proclamation on Representative 
Authorities. (Published by the Sui dwes Drukkery Bpk. 1980) 
Section 22 (1), p.7 
17. The Namibian Review. A Journal of Contemporary South West African 
Affairs. Edited by K. Abrahams. No. 18 July/August 1980. 
(Windhoek, 1980), p.7 
18. Cockram, G.M. South West African Mandate. pp.301~316 
19. The Namibian Review, No. 18 July/ August 1980, p. 7 
20. Frontline, June 1983 Vol.3 No.8 (Braamfontein, 1983), p.42 
21. See Appendix I of Section 3.3 
22. Van Zyl Slabbert. F. and Welsh, D. South Africa•s Options: 
Strategies for sharing power. (Caoe Town, David Philip. 1979) · 
pp.74-75 
23. Africa Contemporary Record. Vol .Xr 1973.,.79 p.8828 
24. The Namioi an Review. No. 20 November/Decemoer 1980 op, 15 ... 20 
25. Ibid. 
26. Wellington, J.H. South West Africa and its Human Issues. 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968) 
345 
27. Totemeyer, G. Namibia Old and New. 
p.188 
28. Op.cit., p;l90 
29. Op.cit. ,p.191 
(London, Hurst and Co., 1978) 
30. Barratt, J. The Namibian Dilemma. Factors Preventing a Settlement. 
The South African Institute of International Affairs (Braamfontein. 
September 1982), p.10 
31. Prinsloo, D.S. South West Africa: The Turnhalle and Independence. 
Foreign Affairs Association Study Report. No.4 November 1976 . 
.( Pre tori a, 1976) , pp. 11-12 
32. Die Republikein, (Windhoek), 29 March 1982 
33. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek), 19 February 1982 
34. Abrahams, 0. Strategic Options in the Namibian Independence 
Dispute. In the Centre for African Studies, Perspectives on 
Namibia: Past and Present. No.4/1983 (Cape Town, University 
of Cape Town Press, 1983)~ p.114 
35. Frontline, May 1983 Vol.3 No.7 (Braamfontein, 1983), p.33 
36. Die Suidwester, (Windhoek), 23 Jurie 1982 
37. Die Republikein, (Windhoek), 26 April 1982 
38. pie Republikein, (Windhoek}, 20 September 1982 
39. Die Re~ublikein, (Windhoek), 26 April 1982 
40. Die Republikein, (Windhoek), 8 September 1982 
41. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek), 19 February 1982 
346 
42. Windhoek Observer, (Windhoek), 21 February 1982 
43. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek), 22 March 1982 
44. The Windhoek Advertiser, (Windhoek), 1 August 1982 
45. The Windhoek Advertiser, l August 1982 and the Windhoek Observer~ 
(Windhoek), 14 August 1982 
46. Windhoek Observer, (Windhoek), 5 December 1982 
47. Die Suidwester, (Windhoek), 15 February 1982 
48. Die Suidwester, (Windhoek), 29 October 1982 
49. Windhoek Observer, (Windhoek), 14 July 1980 
50. Die Repub 1 i kei n, (Windhoek), 19 January 1982 
51. Emerson, R. From Empire To Nation. (United States of America, 
Harvard University Press, 1967),ip,205 
52. Emerson, R. p.380 
53. Op.cit., p204 
54. Kedourie, E. Nationalism in Asia and Africa: Introduction. p.9 
55. Interviews In Depth Namibia SWAPO with Andreas Shipanga. (Canada, 
LSM Information Centre, 1973), p.4 
56. Op.cit., p.6 
57. Namibia: SWAPO Fights for Freedom. 
·> 
pp.98-99 
58. Interviews In Depth Namibia SWAPO. · pp.18-20 
347 
59. To Be Born A Nation: The Liberation Struggle for Namibia. 
,(London, LSM Ihformation Centre, 1981) Chapter 7 
60. Tangari, R.K. The Rise of Nationalism in Colonial Africa. 
Comparative Studies in Societies and History. Vol.10 (1968) 
p.144 
61. Gayner, J.B. Namibia: The Road to Self-Government. Council on 
American Affairs. (Washington, O.C. 1979), p.59 
62. First, R. South West Africa. 
pp.206-208 
(Great Britain, Penguine, 1963), 
63. Namibia in the 1980's. Published by the Catholic Institute for 
International Relations and British Council of Churches. {United 
Kingdom, Russell Press, 1981), pp.12-13 
64. Prinsloo, D.S. ~outh West Africa: The Turnhalle and Independenc~. 
p.31 
65. Point adopted from a statement made by Herman Toivo ja Toivo, in 
Namibia: The Struggle for Liberation. World Council of Churches. 
(Geneva, September 1971) 
66. Windhoek Observer, (Windhoek}, 25 June 1983 
67. Thomas, W.H. The Economy in Transition to Independence in 
Namibia: Political and Economic Prospects. Edited by R.I. Rotberg. 
(Canada, D.C. He.ath ahd Company., 1983}., p.84 
348 
SECTION 4.4 
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION 
DIVISIONS FROM WITHIN: 
THE SWAPO-DEMOCRATS 
Sectiori 4.1 included a brief analysis of the development of 
SWAPO/PLAN's military policies since the early 1960s. Unlike 
other "liberation struggles" elsewhere in Africa and Southern 
Africa, the movement had made little headway on the military 
front, especially since the introduction of SADF incursions 
into southern Angola from 1975 onwards. By the close of 1982 
it was evident that a military victory for SWAPO/PLAN was less 
of a possibility than when the armed struggle was initiated 21 
years previously. 
In international diplomatic_circles, SWAPO has over the past 
decade succeeded in maintaining a public image portraying the 
organisation as a strong 'unified mcivement~ widely and enthu-
siastically supported by the broad mass of Namibians _(l) However, 
there appear to be cracks in SWAPO's public facade. The 
reality of the situation is that the SWAPO-Democrats (SWAPO-Df 
is a breakaway party which highlights the tensions and divi-
sions within SWAPO itselff2) 
Tension within the military wini of the o~ganisation 
mounted since 1980, especially when it became cl~ar that inde-
pendence would not result from the armed struggle. In a sense 
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PLAN's mission became suicidal. The only function of mili-
tary resistance from that point was to back up SWAPO's diplo-
matic effort. 
In April 1982, Dimo Aamambo, a top military official, fled to 
Tanzania after severe differences with party President, Sam 
Nujoma. This fate also befell SWAPO's (ex) Chief Commander, 
Peter Nanyemba, also in Tanzania, and Richard 1Kapelwa, vice-, 
Secretary of Defence, presently in a refugee ~amp in Zambia!~ 
In a SADF incursion, early in July, 1981, PLAN lo~t the 
services of two more officials in command. John Angula, Head 
of. the northern Artillery and the Head of Reconnaissance, (name 
not disclosed) were captured by the Security Forces. A 
number of succesful SADF incursions followed in the wake of 
these captures, delivering a further blow to the morale of 
PLAN cadres _(4) John Angula also proved willing to elaborate on 
the poor conditions under which the armed struggle continued. 
Food shortages·amongst frontline insurgents, with commander 
camps well-stocked, and above all, Nujoma's absence from the 
operatiorial area, were some .of the more common complaints of 
PLAN defectors who made use of the Administrator~General's 
amnesty offer _(5) In December 1979, SWAPO guerrillas were 
offered "amnesty" if they surrendered to the Security Forces .<6) 
irrespective of the difficulties encountered by the mi,li tary 
wing, SWAPO 's unity as an organisation, especially in relation 
to the SWAPO-Democrats, has long been under question. Avail-
able evidence suggested a deep-seated division in SWAPO ranks, 
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dating back well before 1980~7) To advocates of SWAPO's 
cause any statement or suggestion remotely related to a divi-
sion in the organisation's ranks is tantamount to betrayal. 
This type of attitude is not conducive to a firm evaluation of 
all possibilities. It is widely believed that discontent 
between the external (military) w~ng and the internal 
(organising) wing is mounting as a result of discrepancies in 
Cfedit and recognition given to the respective wings~B) It is 
surprising that the South African Government has not yet tried 
to play off one against the other. 
Furthermore, SWAPO-D have not received international recogni-
tion and are simply written off as an internal legal front for 
SWAPO itself~9) This is not the case. Arguments such as 
these could be seen as a reason not to question SWAPO's 
credibility. Andreas Shipanga, leader of the SWAPO-Democrats 
has in the past frequently charged Sam Nujoma with corruption, 
. tribalism and incompetence. He has made it clear that he 
prefers Herman Toivo ja Toivo as the real leader of SWAPO~lO) 
As for the initial development of local resistance Shipanga 
stressed the double-dealing of General Smuts and the British 
Prime Minister, Winston Churchill~ 
II who promised the~black peoples of South 
West Africa; food, clothing and freedom, in 
return for their assistance in the defeat of 
the German armed forces,and never made good· 
their side of the agreement", 
and the misguided South African attempts at attaining provin-
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(11) 
cial status for SWA in the early 1940s. The local black 
people never had any political rights, nor were they consulted 
in matters directly related to their future. This culminated 
in the formation of the OPO and later of SWAPO. (l 2 ) 
A split in SWAPO ranks occurred in 1976 after a number of "fund a-
mental differences" between Shipanga and SWAPO President, Sam 
N 
. (D) 
UJoma. In May, 1982, Mr Shipanga released a public state-
ment critical of SWAPO on several points, including the non-
possibility of co-operation with SWAPO in the future. The 
exchange of Sapper John van der Mescht for a Soviet intelli""--
gence agent, was considered to be unsuitable. This indeed 
triggered off Shipanga's statement, as in his opinion Herman 
Toivo ja Toivo was a much more logical candidate for such an 
exchange. He further accused Nujoma of using Toivo ja Toivo 
for propaganda purposes, holding him up as "martyr" whenever 
South African security legislation caused a public outcry, 
though, when a real opportunity presented itself, not a second 
th ht . d t T . . . T . ( 14 ) S. th f oug was pa1 o 01vo Ja 01vo. 1nce ea ore-
mentioned examples are likely to appear trival and unimpor-
tant, it would be advisable to put the entire SWAPO/SWAPO-D 
debate in proper historical context. 
Examination of documents and publications issued by both SWAPO 
and SWAPO-D are relevant to th~ issue. In SWAPO's publica-
tion, To Be Born A Nation, the-following extracts appear: 
"The South Africans and their allies have 
repeatedly tried to divide SWAPO's ranks 
by labelling different sections of the 
party as 'internal' and 'external' wings 
and then alleging serious policy diffe.rences 
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between them, the former being 'moderate' 
and 'peaceful', the latter 'communist' and 
'terrorist'. Not once in the 20 years of 
its existence has this manoeuvre had the 
slightest success; it is the Western news 
media, not the Namibian people, who have 
been deceived." ( 15) 
On the contrary, as stated before, SWAPO projects the image of: 
" ... a single party ·united around a common 
programme and dedication to the overriding 
task of national liberation", ( 16) 
I 
and that:: 
II in the twentieth anniversary year (1981) 
of its formation SWAPO remains as it 
started, a broad front against colonial 
oppression and imperialist exploitation, as it 
is not a vanguard party, nor an exclusive 
instrument of any particular social class." (17) 
Academics such as John Dugard and Deon Prinsloo draw.B definite 
distinction between an internal and external SWAPO wing. 
Prinsloo asserts that.this resultErl from factionalism and the fact that 
. . "( 18 ) 
many of the organisation's leaders are in detention. 
also alleges that it: 
II became clear that Sam Nujoma had built 
a despotic leadership group around him who 
do not feel themselves bounded by SWAPO 
rules and constitutional prescriptions." ( 19) 
He 
Not surprisingly this does not tally with the views presented 
in the SWAPO-Democrats' Ba~ic Documents; in relation·t:o 
either "party unity" or "party aspirations". While 
Namibians have joined SWAPO as a movement in the vanguard of 
the struggle for independence; the very organisation itself 
is being destroyed from the inside by a clique which has 
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placed its own interests above those of SWAPO and above those 
of the Namibian nation. The 'Nujoma clique' is not fighting 
for democracy and independence for Namibia. This clique, 
having gained total and complete control of SWAPO, is now 
trying to gain dictatorial control over Namibia as well. 
SWAPO-D's main accusation against Sam Nujoma, and the external 
leadershiP., is that they: 
II 
r 
have left the path of principled struggle 
and thereby severely harmed the organisation 
by a fragrant abuse of authority". (20) 
As a result, SWAPO-D alleged, the movement has been split and 
rendered vulnerable to attack f~om the outside. 
On 21 April 1976, eleven high-ranking SWAPO officials and 
approximately l 500 rank-and-file supporters were arrested and 
detained by Zambian authorities, who acted on Sam Nujoma's 
instructions.~D Th~ main thrust of these aggressive tactics 
.was aimed at neutrali~ing a group of SWAPO members who dared to 
deviate from and to criticise tlie leadership's preference for 
. (2 2) 
armed resistance instead of peaceful dialogue. The 
resulting "split" in SWAPO ranks had a lasting effect on the 
organisation's support as well. Andreas Shipanga, having been 
released from jail in Zambia, established the SWAPO-Democrats 
in Sweden, and retuined to SWA/Namibia in August 1978i
2
~ It 
would be incorrect to imply that he took a significant amount 
of support away from SWAPO, but undoubtedly he did build a 
following of his own. Shipanga himself "claims" that he will 
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receive a "certain twenty percent" of the electoral support 
in any 'free and fair' electionf2 ~ Outside observers, 
however, are much more sceptical. They believe that SWAPO-D 
will be fortunate if it receives 5% of the popular support ina 
free election ~25) 
On the strength of such."estimates", SWAPO-D cannot pose a 
real threat to SWAPO's victory in a United Nations' super-
vised election. The external leadership under Sam Nujoma also 
does not appear unduly concerned over the opposition embodied 
by SWAPO-D. Claims made by the party's mouthpiece, The 
Voice of the SWAPO-Democrats, that SWAPO-D is not entirely 
a new party, but is composed of loyal SWAPO members who 
remained true to the organisation's original and traditional 
principle~ 261 is unlikely to make any real impact on the 
electorate. 
Yet it is c~ear that the div~de within the SWAPO organisation 
goes much deeper than Sam Nujoma's simplistic explanation of 
an "internal and external wing" which work in harmony as 
parts of the same organisation towards the same goal~2 ~ As 
Shipanga himself explained; 
II we are calling ourselves SWAPO-D 
because of fundamental differences between 
the organisations. SWAPO's constitution 
is aimed at bringing about scientific 
socialism and a classless society in Namibia 
while the ideal is that SWAPO should be a 
party for all patriotic Namibians who want 
self-rule and the end of South African 
occupation". ( 28) 
The real reason for the 1976 arrests, he said, was Nujoma's justified 





No real SWAPO congress has been held since 1969 (except for 
the Tanga Consultative Congress, of December, 1969/January, 
1970), and when Nujoma finally conceded to a congress con-
vening in 1976, it was again postponed because of the mass 
imprisonment of SWAPO leaders and supporters alike~30) 
Despite ready agreement amongst local and foreign political 
observers and governments on the occurrence of the 1976 
. I 
Zambian incident and the consequent establishment of SWAPO-D> 
they fail to attach any importance to these events. Apart 
from the South African Governmen~, SWAPO-D receives no recog-
nition from the outside world and is not even allowed a plat-
form in the United Nations. As a result, it is easy to be 
left with the impression that SWAPO is "above" criticism. 
All issues and questions critical of SWAPO are avoided with 
the same hackneyed excuse of the South African government 
and its allies trying to discredit the organisation with pro-
pagandist slander. Yet; irrespective of such "trivialities", 
there are some basic underlying consequences attached to 
SWAPO-D's establishment: 
First and foremost, as The Voice of SWAPO-D had put it, the 
events leading up to the split and the actual split itself, 
rendered the organisation open to outside criticism and 
attack. The ~plit itself amounted to the external leader-
ship being faced with a crisis of confidence, resulting pri-
marily from Nujoma's refusal to hold a party congres~ where 
his position cou1d be challenged. Since its inception, 
SWAPO-D has never refrained from accusing the external 
356 
leaders of leaving the path of principled struggle. Except 
for adopting a 'go-it-alone' policy, the SWAPO-D breakaway 
provided critics of SWAPO with further fuel for their fires. 
Secondly, and as important, separation into two distinct 
parties or organisations added more reason for questioning 
both the validity and justifiability of the United Nations 
recognition of SWAPO as sole authentic representative of the 
Namibian people. With the establishment of SWAPO-D, Shipanga 
explicitly stated that SWAPO-D did not recognise SWAPO as the 
1 1 . f h . b . 1 (
3 l) A · on y rea representative o t e Nami ian peop es. view 
supported by Justus Garoeb of the Damara Raad and by Peter 
Kalangula, leader of the NDP/CDA. 
It was pointed out that United Nations-partiality towards 
SWAPO has a detrimental effect on the status ot other internal 
parties which enjoy similar popular support. For example, 
some of the ethnic groups such as the Baster, Damara, Herero 
and Whites, have as many as three separate parties competing 
to represent the interests of these groups. Surely a multi-
party system would be more in line with the principles of 
free and fair democratic competition, than the assumption that 
one political party or organisation could be truly representa-
tive of all the interests of a population as diverse as that 
encountered in SWA/Namibia. 
In conclusion, there is a need for some tentative speculation 
concerning the future of the SWAPO "organisations". The 
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-only statement that can be made beyond reasonable doubt is 
that no reconciliation is possible between SWAPO and SWAPO-D. 
However, this will not seriously affect SWAPO's support, and 
therefore, its victory in any 'free and fair' election. The 
sincerity of the SWAPO-Democrats is cerain, with Andreas 
Shipanga actually communicating with the United Nations 
Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, urging him to the 
utmost caution in all his activities related to the SWA/ 
N . b. . (32) am1 1a issue. Shipanga also stressed the need for an 
impartial United Nations approach towards SWAPO, as any par-
tiality is detrimental to the interests of all internal 
parties _(33) 
On 7 April, 1982, the SWAPO-Democrats suggested a new 
"Geneva type" all-party·conference at which problems impeding 
the progress of Phases Two and Three of the settlement plan 
could be discussed, including the speeding-up-of negotiationsl3 -0 
Later in Arpil, Mr Shipanga ·reiterated his impatience with 
the lack of progiess in the Western initiative, specifically 
referring to the unexpected deadlock that had set in due to 
SWAPO's objection to the "dual voting system".suggested by 
the Western Contact Group. He expressed his disappointment 
with this unnecessary delay, adding that he rather expected 
the initiative to falter on the more difficult questions in 
Phase Two of the Settlement Plan!35) 
Despite such "good intentions" it is unclear what the SWAPO-
Democrats stand to gain from a United Nations su~ervised 
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election, as SWAPO is bound to get the better of such an 
election. Equally unclear is the position of Herman Toivo ja 
Toivo, should he be released from detention. An interesting 
point is whether Toivo ja Toivo will take over the leadership 
from Sam Nujoma, and if SWAPO will continue to exist as a 
"single" party. By the close of 1983 it appeared as if 
questions such as these would remain unanswered for some time 
to come. 
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The final objective of this dissertation is to present an 
overview of the material covered and to advance some tentative 
conclusions. Restrictions on length has inevitably curtailed 
some information. Certain sub-section topics were discussed 
briefly, not so much due to greater $r lesser importance, but 
because they are directly related to the central themes of the 
dissertation. It is important to discuss these top;Lcs as . well , as it is 
impossible to isolate their influence on.th~ central themes. In particular 
the discussion of the economy of SWA/Namibia was such a topic. 
Wolfgang Thomas noted two views on the Territory's economic 
prospects. One group of observers desctibes the country as 
"poor in resources, economically unstable, and hampered by 
nature", while another group describes it as "having one of 
Africa's best resource endowments relative to the size of its 
(1) 
population". While Thomas himself suggested that it was 
difficult to evaluate the country's future economic develop-
ments, Reginald Green expressed optimism when he noted that 
" ... the resource base, much of the basic 
physical infrastructure, and a substan-
tial production/surplus generation capa-
city f6r building a Namibia able to move 
rapidly towards meeting basic human needs, 
do exist". (2) 
The economic introduction of this dissertation cited a number 
of pointed statements by a local businessman, Eric Lang. In 
his opinion the· country is paying dearly for politicians, 
local and South African, who spend millions on political 
experiments and buying the goodwill of a minority group. 
Lang suggested an immediate scrapping of the second~tier of 
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government and cutting it down to cultural ~ouncils.8 ) 
·Evidenc~ before the Thirion Commission of Inquiry into the 
malfunctioning and malpractice of. the State Departments suggested 
built-in ingredients for malfunction of the existing government 
structure, as provided for under Proclamation NJ.AG.8 .of 1980. (4 ) 
Apart from the need for a new 11 poli tical dispensation 11 , and 
the Territory's multiple political problems, prevailing 
.economic conditions also add anxiety over the country's financial well-being. 
I 
I. 
Undoubtedly, the Territory's political dilemma is still of 
paramount importance. Arguments in favour of the political 
"accommodation" of all the population groups, instead of the 
favoured "one-man one-vote winner-takes-all" resolution, 
sought by SWAPO and the United Nations, formed a very imper-
tant part of the dissertation. 
The fact that SWAPO is the strongest opponent of such 11 accommo-
dation II is not surprising. · Sam Nujoma has been quoted as 
saying, "We have fought. The power is due to us. And we 
shall not share power with anyone. ,(S) It is also an .open 
secret that the organisation has sought a 'free and fair' 
election as its election victory seems assured. To this end, 
the organisation's willingness to "negotiate" for a cease-fire 
has been emphatically reiterated by Sam Nujoma since 1978 56) In 
August 1983, SWAPO's Vice-President elect, Pastor.Hendrik Wit-
booi, released ~he organisation's first statement in Windhoek 
for more than three years, which called for talks with. 
Administrator. - General Van Niekerk that could lead to the 
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
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435 (1978)_(7) Furthermore, at the Paris Conference on SWA/ 
Namibia, during April 1983, Sam Nujoma told reporters that 
all SWAPO wanted was to "manage or mismanage" Namibia. SWAPO, 
he said, was ready to talk to South Africa as it believed that 
"negotiations and the armed struggle are not contradictory but 
. ( 8 ) 
can run concurrently". 
1
. It seems apparent that a military "solution" is highly.unlikely 
' clespite SWAPO's endeavours to step-up the armed struggle. In 
June 1983, a Defence Force spokesman said that it was evident 
that SWAPO's military wing in southern Angola was engaged in 
a military build-up; and that 1983 could be described as 
SWAPO ' t t ff t to w1· n the war _< 9 ) s grea es e or However, Dr Gerhard 
Totemeyer, a well-known authority on SWA/Namibian affairs, is 
of the opinion that SWAPO has to accept tha~ for many years to 
come it could not win the military struggle. Likewise South 
Africa should realise that it will not win the political 
·~ 1 . . (10) strugg e aga~nst SWAPO. Dr Totemeyer is also of the 
opinion that South Africa's military presence in SWA/Namibia 
has not resulted in stability for the Territory, and is likely 
to cost South Africa severe losses economically, in military 
personnel and in diplomatic status. (ll) 
Apart from SWAPO, the South African Government and a number 
of local parties, there is no question about the United 
Nations' desire to achieve an independence settlement in the 
Territory. Since the early 1950s this organisation has 
engaged in attempts to bring the Territory to internationally 
recognised independence. Despite numerous failures, in 
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August 1983, the United Nations, via its Secretary-General, 
mounted a new attempt to achieve this independent status for 
SWA /Namibia. On 25 August 1983, Secretary-General Javier 
Perez de Cuellar arrived in Windhoek for talks with the local 
parties on ~n independence settlement. He also visited 
Angola for the continuation of these talks . 
. In Windhoek De Cuellar met with SWAPO, SWAPO-D, NCDP, L9bour 
·party, Damara Council, DTA, the National Party, and other less 
. 'f' t l't' 1 . · (12) signi ican po 1 ica groupings. The HNP, SWANU and CDA 
declined invitations to have ~eetings with the Secretary-
(13) 
General. It was evident, after these meetings, that 
very little was achieved by the Secretary-General. Internal 
parties, such as the DTA, rejected the United Nations' par-
tiality towards SWAPO. They also felt that a "solution" 
could not be found in twenty minutes if such a solution had been 
. ( 14) 
.elusive for more than thirty years. 
The importance of these local parties' participation in the 
determination of SWA/Namibia's constitutional future cannot be 
denied. Should. they be excluded, there can be no doubt that 
the South African Government will be reluctant to allow such 
constitutional arrangements to proceed, or that it would be 
genuinely representative of all the peoples of the Territory. 
Equally certain is the fact that South Africa alone can permit 
developments towards independence to take place; 
On the other hand, South Africa's co-operation will only be 
secured if a number of pre-conditions are met. Although the 
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Government claimed compliance with the provisions of Resolution 
435 and the resulting three phases, with the inauguration of 
the Reagan Administration in 1981, a n~w issue, the Angolan-
based Cubans, entered the SWA/Namibian independence negotia-
t
. (15) ions. The Cuban issue is bound to impede upon a 
settlement in SWA/Namibia for as long as it remains an issue, 
despite the Angolan Government's claims that the Cuban presence 
is a domestic matter. 
Yet the Reagan Administration is confident about a Cuban with-
drawal from Angola before the end of 1984. (lG) Unfortunately, 
such a withdrawal will by no means guarantee South Africa's 
willingness to proceed with the implementation of Resolution 
435, or that it will not find a new issue to stall upon. 
Prime Minister Botha would like the Cubans out of Angola, but 
.is in no hurry . Particularly if the price paid were to be a 
. loss of South African influente over half of Angola, the sac-
rificing of Jonas Savimbi and the danger of a SWAPO Government 
in Windhoek. ( 1 7 ) 
When the French journalist Edward Girardet of the Christian 
Science Monitor, interviewed Savimbi, the latter expressed 
his convictions on a number of issues: That the Cubans were 
a major factor preventing a settlement in Angola; that the 
Cubans would eventually leave Angola; that UNITA. re~eived 
extensive support from South Africa, and that UNITA supports 
1 f "b" . d d (l
9 ) a sett ement or Nami ian in epen ence. 
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A Cuban withdrawal, however, will nqt necessarily imply a 
settlement in SWA/Namibia. A settlement will not be achieved 
unless equal treatment of all parties is assured, the rights 
of minority groups are protected and guaranteed, and funda-
1 . . 1 f d d (l
9 ) menta pr1nc1p es o emocracy are assure . A settle-
ment should also not pose security risks for South Africa. 
It is clear that South African goodwill is essential if any 
settlement is to be achieved and it would appear the latter 
is still in the distant future and that independence is 
merely a mirage in the desert of South West Africa/Namibia. 
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